

Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations,
Statistical Appendix, Simulation Requests, and The Chairman's Concluding Remarks
June 22, 2010

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

**Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares:
Further Considerations**

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I. INTRODUCTION¹

1. **At its most recent meeting in April 2010, the IMFC pledged to complete the 14th General Review of Quotas before January 2011.**² This follows an earlier call by G-20 Leaders and the IMFC to bring forward the deadline for completing the 14th Review by two years as part of the multilateral response to the global financial crisis and the recognized need to enhance the Fund's legitimacy and effectiveness.

2. **The first formal meeting by the Committee of the Whole on realigning quota shares in the context of the 14th Review took place in March.** The discussions drew on preliminary analysis based on a derived data set through 2008, largely using WEO rather than IFS data as the primary source.³ Directors stressed that their views were preliminary, pending release of the full 2008 data update. Nonetheless, a wide range of views were expressed, and it was evident that significant differences remain on several key issues.

3. **The 2008 data update has now been finalized.** As discussed in the recent update paper,⁴ the new data confirm the broad trends that were evident in the earlier derived 2008 data set. In particular, they point to a further significant increase in calculated quota share of emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs) as a group relative to the 2007 data set (Table 1). In aggregate, EMDCs are now underrepresented by 2.2 percentage points compared with a position that was broadly aligned with their aggregate calculated quota share using data through 2007 (Table 2). As before, the aggregate data mask significant disparities across both regions—with Asia remaining the main under-represented region among EMDCs—and individual countries. Within the EMDC group, 50 out of 161 countries are under-represented by a total of 8.9 percentage points, while many EMDCs remain over-represented. Similarly, while advanced economies as a group are over-represented, 10 individual advanced economies also remain under-represented.

4. **This paper seeks to provide a basis for further discussions on the realignment of quota shares, but does not present any specific proposals.** It begins with a brief stocktaking of the key outstanding issues, and then presents further illustrative simulations, based on the updated data set through 2008 and taking account of Directors' views expressed in March. It would be premature to present specific proposals at this time, given that

¹ The paper was prepared by a staff team led by S. Bassett and S. Prowse, and consisting of H. Treichel, R. Rozenov, L. Kohler, H. Lin, C. Visconti, C. Janada, S. Rodriguez, A. Dabney, and B. Wennerholm. T. Krueger also contributed.

² *Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund* (4/24/10).

³ See *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares-Initial Considerations* (3/5/10).

⁴ See *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Updated Data Set and Quota Calculations* (6/03/2010).

discussions are still at an early stage and many Directors have stressed that their views remain preliminary. Rather, it is hoped that the discussion of this paper will help lay the groundwork for beginning to narrow options and moving toward formulation of a specific proposal in the coming months.

**Table 1. Distribution of Quotas and Calculated Quotas
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 1/	Calculated Quota Shares 2/		
		2005 3/	2007 4/	2008 5/
Advanced economies	60.5	63.8	60.4	58.2
Major advanced economies	45.3	47.6	45.0	42.9
Of which: US	17.7	19.0	17.8	17.0
Other advanced economies	15.1	16.2	15.4	15.3
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	36.2	39.6	41.8
Developing countries	32.4	30.0	32.6	34.1
Africa	4.9	2.8	3.1	3.1
Asia 6/	12.6	15.8	17.2	17.7
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	4.8	5.4	6.2
Western Hemisphere	7.7	6.6	6.9	7.0
Transition economies	7.1	6.2	7.0	7.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:				
EU 27	31.9	32.9	32.1	31.3
LICs (PRGT-eligible countries)	4.3	2.2	2.5	2.6

Source: Finance Department.

1/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

2/ Based on the following formula: $CQS = (0.50 \cdot GDP + 0.30 \cdot Openness + 0.15 \cdot Variability + 0.05 \cdot Reserves) \cdot K$. GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates. K is a compression factor of 0.95.

3/ Based on IFS data through 2005. Reflects the impact of adjustments to current receipts and payments for re-exports, international banking interest, and non-monetary gold.

4/ Based on IFS data through 2007.

5/ Based on IFS data through 2008.

6/ Including Korea and Singapore.

**Table 2. Under- and Over-represented Countries by Major Groups 1/
(In percentage points)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share	Difference 2/	
		2007 3/	2008 4/
Advanced economies	60.5	0.0	-2.2
Under-represented		2.3	1.8
Over-represented		-2.3	-4.1
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	0.0	2.2
Under-represented		7.7	8.9
Over-represented		-7.6	-6.7
Total Under-represented Countries		9.9	10.7
Total Over-represented Countries		-9.9	-10.7
Memorandum items:			
EU 27	31.9	0.2	-0.5
Under-represented		2.1	2.2
Over-represented		-1.9	-2.8
LICs (PRGT-eligible countries)	4.3	-1.7	-1.7
Under-represented		0.1	0.1
Over-represented		-1.8	-1.8
Number of under-represented countries		64	60
Of which: EMDCs		52	50

Source: Finance Department.

1/ Under- and over-represented countries for the two datasets, respectively.

2/ Difference between calculated quota shares and post second round actual quota shares.

3/ Based on IFS data through 2007.

4/ Based on IFS data through 2008.

II. STOCKTAKING

5. **Discussions to date have been guided by the parameters agreed by the IMFC in Istanbul.** These were that the review should achieve a shift in quota share to dynamic emerging market and developing countries of at least 5 percent from over-represented to under-represented countries using the current quota formula as the basis to work from. These changes would come on top of the 2008 reform, which when fully implemented will result in a net 2.7 percent shift in voting share to EMDCs as a group. The IMFC also indicated that the voting share of the poorest members should be protected.⁵

6. **The March paper addressed several issues arising from this guidance.** In particular, it noted that there were differences of view among the membership on whether the quota shift of at least 5 percent should be to dynamic EMDCs, from over- to under-represented countries, or to both groups, with some also emphasizing the net shift to EMDCs as a whole. The paper also discussed several alternative approaches to capturing the concept of dynamic EMDCs, and how to define the group of poorest members whose voting share should be protected, as well as alternative modalities for achieving that protection.

7. **The paper also presented a set of initial simulations to illustrate some of these issues.** The simulations allocated quota increases either equiproportionally (i.e., in proportion to a member's post second round quota share), selectively (i.e., in proportion to calculated quota shares, using the quota formula), or on an ad hoc basis (based on other criteria). The combinations of these allocation mechanisms were geared, based on a doubling of quotas, to achieving at least a 5 percent shift to one or both of the groups referenced in the IMFC guidance. The net shift to EMDCs was somewhat smaller, in the range of 1-3½ percent, but the simulations also resulted in a substantial realignment among the largest quotas. Given the goal of realigning quota shares, the equiproportional element (which does not alter quota shares) was set either to zero or a relatively small part of the overall increase compared with previous general reviews, with the major part distributed either selectively to all members or as ad hoc increases to a subset of the membership.

8. **The initial simulations gave prominent weight to the quota formula in determining quota increases.** In particular, the formula was used both to distribute the selective increases and for allocating ad hoc increases, which were mainly confined to countries that were under-represented using the formula. The only exceptions were the inclusion of (i) a small number of moderately over-represented EMDCs that met alternative criteria for capturing dynamism based on their relative shares in PPP GDP; and (ii) over-represented PRGT-eligible members whose quota shares were protected through part of the ad hoc increases.

⁵ *Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (10/04/09).*

9. **Directors expressed a range of views in the March discussion.**⁶ In particular, there were clear differences on the broad goals of the quota realignment, with many emphasizing a 5 percent shift from over- to under-represented countries, while many others called for a shift in quota share of at least 5 percent to EMDCs. Several Directors were open to considering alternative criteria to the formula for capturing dynamic EMDCs, but a number were skeptical about the usefulness of such work or considered that dynamism would be better captured in the formula itself. On the issue of the formula, many Directors maintained that it should not be reopened, given the tight timeframe available for completing the review, but others called for further work on the formula before it is used again. Many Directors expressed an initial preference for a combination of selective and ad hoc increases, while a number considered it premature to rule out an equiproportional increase at this stage. Finally, while Directors supported the goal of protecting the voting share of the poorest members, views differed on how to define this group and on the modalities, with many Directors open to exploring all options.

10. **Directors also held an initial discussion in April on the size of the overall quota increase under the 14th Review.** The staff paper prepared as a basis for that discussion presented a range of indicators and scenarios that broadly pointed to the need for at least a doubling of quotas.⁷ Many Directors expressed preliminary views in support of a doubling of quotas, with some favoring a larger increase. A few other Directors were skeptical about the need for a quota increase beyond the amount needed to achieve a realignment of shares, and some considered it too early to express a view.

11. **It is clear from these discussions that meeting the IMFC pledge of completing the 14th Review before January 2011 will require compromises from all sides.** Many positions expressed to date, particularly on the realignment of quota shares, are in conflict. For example, while substantial shifts in individual quota shares are possible using the formula, a substantial net shift in quota share to EMDCs as a group is more difficult to achieve on this basis and additional elements are required. This reflects the fact that, within the EMDC group, many countries remain over-represented, as noted above. In particular, as illustrated in Table 2, more sizable net shifts would require a willingness of under-represented advanced economies to forego part of the increases they could expect under the formula and/or over-represented advanced economies to become modestly under-represented. Reopening the formula could in principle give a different result, but there seems little basis for expecting that it would be easier to agree on a revised formula than on an acceptable realignment of quota shares, and past experience suggests that changes in the formula have typically required protracted periods of discussions.

⁶ See *The Chairman's Concluding Remarks – Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Initial Considerations* (3/22/10).

⁷ See *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—The Size of the Fund—Initial Considerations* (3/15/10).

12. **While compromise is essential, the whole membership stands to gain from enhanced legitimacy and effectiveness of the Fund.** The needed compromises will inevitably require all members to sacrifice some of their individual interests for the broader good of the institution. However, there is wide agreement that enhanced legitimacy is critical to increasing the overall effectiveness of the Fund’s role as the pre-eminent international financial institution responsible for fostering global monetary and economic stability, and that realigning quota shares together with broader governance reforms are needed to achieve this goal. All members stand to gain if the realignment of shares under the 14th Review is seen as enhancing the Fund’s legitimacy and fostering greater engagement in the institution. Such an outcome would help support the Fund’s efforts in promoting sustainable global recovery and reducing the vulnerability of the international monetary system to future crises.

III. ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATIONS

A. Overview

13. **This section presents purely illustrative simulations that seek to provide a basis for the next round of discussions.** As noted, all the simulations at this stage are illustrative only and do not in any way represent staff proposals. The simulations take account of Directors’ views expressed in March and can be divided into three broad groups. All three approaches would allow the 14th Review to proceed using the current quota formula as a key distribution tool, and without pre-judging the outcome of future work to improve the formula.

14. **The three groups differ in their approach to the ad hoc increases.** The first builds on the approach presented in the March paper, which focuses on EMDCs and relies primarily on the quota formula as the distribution key. The second group is intended to recognize the concerns that a number of Executive Directors have expressed about the formula, by giving a somewhat larger role to a country’s economic weight in allocating quota shares. Specifically, the second group of simulations incorporates the quota formula’s GDP blend variable⁸ in the distribution key for allocating ad hoc increases, along with the quota formula. The third group makes the GDP blend variable the primary distribution key for the ad hoc increases, while the formula continues to be used to distribute selective increases.

⁸ Consistent with the approach taken in the quota formula, the GDP blend variable—which reflects a linear combination of market GDP (60 percent) and PPP-based GDP (40 percent)—is compressed using a factor of 0.95 for the purpose of allocating quota increases. The number of countries potentially eligible under this approach depends on the specific assumptions used in each simulation. Up to 38 countries (including up to 32 EMDCs) are eligible in the simulations reported below; without the compression factor, the maximum number would drop to 23 countries (including 17 EMDCs).

15. **The simulations have several common features:**⁹

- **Data base:** all simulations use the updated data set through 2008, as presented in EB/CQuota/10/3.
- **Size of the overall quota increase:** pending further discussions on the size of the overall increase, all simulations are presented for overall increases of 50 percent, 100 percent, and 150 percent, respectively.
- **Allocation mechanism:** to facilitate comparability, all three sets of simulations employ the same mix of equiproportional/selective/ad hoc increases, namely: 0/60/40, 0/75/25, and 20/50/30.
- **Protecting the poorest:** as in the March paper, the quota shares of individual PRGT-eligible members are protected at their post-2008 reform levels. However, as discussed in Section IV, other options could also be considered for meeting the goal of protecting the voting share of the poorest members.

16. **The simulations include two other elements that could help facilitate a larger overall shift to EMDCs:**

- **The ad hoc increases are concentrated on EMDCs that meet the specified criteria.** Under-represented advanced economies benefit fully from the selective increases, but only participate in the ad hoc increases to the extent required to ensure that their increased quota share following the selective increase is not diluted by the ad hoc increase. This is similar to the approach presented in Tables 8, 10 and 12 of [Fourteenth General Review of Quotas Realigning Quota Shares Initial Considerations](#) (3/5/2010), except that the quota share of under-represented advanced economies following the selective increase was not protected in the previous simulations.
- **Some of the simulations allow over-represented countries to become modestly under-represented as a result of the realignment.** In the 2008 reform, some over-represented countries (mainly EMDCs) became under-represented as a result of the agreed realignment. The extent of the resulting under-representation in these cases was modest, with the largest being 11.5 percent. In contrast, in the 11th Review, a limit was imposed to ensure that no over-represented country became under-represented. This limit affected a very small number of countries, reflecting the fact that the ad hoc increases themselves were a small part (10 percent) of the total distribution. The simulations in this paper illustrate two possible approaches: in the

⁹ For further details, see the first section of the Statistical Appendix.

first (Tables 3A, 4A and 5A, and Tables A1, A3 and A5),¹⁰ over-represented countries are fully protected from becoming under-represented; while in the second (Tables 3B, 4B and 5B, and Tables Table A2, A4, and A6) the protection is set at 95 percent of calculated quota share (allowing these countries to become modestly under-represented by up to 5 percent). Other thresholds could also be considered.

17. Taking account of the above elements, the method used for allocating ad hoc increases in each group can be summarized as follows:

Set 1: Ad hoc increases to dynamic EMDCs (Tables 3A and 3B, and Tables A1 and A2):

Ad hoc increases are allocated mainly to under-represented EMDCs and other EMDCs that meet the dynamic criterion based on their share in PPP GDP (i.e., the third option in Section III.C of [Fourteenth General Review of Quotas Realigning Quota Shares Initial Considerations](#) (3/5/2010)—see Box 1). Under-represented EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the formula or a fixed percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota, whichever is greater, while other dynamic EMDCs receive the fixed percentage increase.¹¹ A smaller portion of the ad hoc increase is allocated to protect against (i) the share of under-represented advanced economies being diluted as a result of the ad hoc increases; (ii) over-represented countries becoming (more than modestly) under-represented; and (iii) a decline in the post second round quota share of individual PRGT-eligible countries.

Set 2: Ad hoc increases allocated based on either the formula or the GDP blend (Tables 4A and 4B, and Tables A3 and A4):

Ad hoc increases are allocated mainly to countries that are under-represented either under the formula or the compressed GDP blend variable (i.e., a country's share in the compressed GDP blend variable is greater than its quota share after the selective increase). Eligible EMDCs receive the higher of the increase indicated by a uniform reduction in their out-of-lineness with respect to each of these two variables, respectively. The same protections apply as in the first set. In addition, advanced economies that are only under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (i.e., are over-represented using the formula) are capped at their post second-round quota share so that they do not gain quota share as a result of this approach.

¹⁰ Tables A1–A7 of the Statistical Appendix present simulation results for individual countries.

¹¹ This approach seeks to ensure that no over-represented EMDC under the formula receives a larger increase than under-represented EMDCs. The size of the fixed percentage increase is determined with a view to allowing a substantial decrease in out-of-lineness for under-represented EMDCs and an adequate increase in share for eligible dynamic but over-represented EMDCs.

Set 3: Ad hoc increases allocated based on the GDP blend variable (Tables 5A and 5B, and A5 and A6):

Ad hoc increases are allocated mainly to countries that are under-represented on the basis of the GDP blend. Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in their out-of-lineness with respect to the GDP blend variable. The same protection as in the first two sets applies to over-represented and to PRGT-eligible countries, and eligible advanced economies that are over-represented using the formula are again capped at their post-2008 reform quota share. In addition, the quota shares of EMDCs and advanced economies that are under-represented under the formula but not eligible for an ad hoc increase are protected at their quota share after the selective quota increase, so that their quota share does not decline as a result of the ad hoc increase.

Box 1. Dynamic EMDCs

The March paper ([Fourteenth General Review of Quotas Realigning Quota Shares Initial Considerations](#) (3/5/2010)) discussed three alternative criteria for capturing “dynamic” EMDCs. Staff has updated these calculations using the 2008 data base, and the set of countries meeting these criteria remains broadly unchanged. In particular, in the case of the criteria based on PPP GDP and contribution to growth, only Pakistan no longer meets the threshold (of 25 percent) for over-representation applied for all criteria. In the case of average GDP growth, Uganda no longer meets this threshold with the data update. In all, between 19 and 32 countries meet the criteria following the data update, compared with the previous range of between 20 and 33.

Alternative Approaches to Capturing Dynamism 1/

	PPP GDP 2/	Contribution 3/	Growth 4/
1	Albania	Brazil	Angola
2	Angola	* China	Azerbaijan
3	Azerbaijan	Colombia	Belarus
4	Belarus	Egypt	Bhutan
5	Bhutan	* India	Cambodia
6	Botswana	Indonesia	Chad
7	Brazil	Iran	* China
8	Cambodia	Korea	Equatorial Guinea
9	* China	Malaysia	Ethiopia
10	Colombia	Mexico	* India
11	Dominican Republic	* Peru	Jordan
12	Ecuador	Philippines	Kazakhstan
13	Egypt	Poland	Latvia
14	Equatorial Guinea	Romania	Panama
15	Estonia	Russia	* Peru
16	Ethiopia	Singapore	Qatar
17	Guatemala	Thailand	Slovak Republic
18	* India	Turkey	Turkmenistan
19	Indonesia	* Vietnam	United Arab Emirates
20	Iran		* Vietnam
21	Kazakhstan		
22	Korea		
23	Lithuania		
24	Mexico		
25	Nepal		
26	* Peru		
27	Philippines		
28	Poland		
29	Russia		
30	Thailand		
31	Turkey		
32	* Vietnam		

1/ Shading denotes over-represented countries. An asterisk in front indicates that the country meets the criteria under all three approaches.

2/ Includes EDMCs whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

3/ Includes EDMCs whose contribution to global GDP growth during 2004-08 is above 0.5% and not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

4/ Includes EDMCs whose real GDP growth during 2004-08 is above EDMC average and not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

B. Main Results

18. **Key results of the simulations are summarized in the Text Table below** (see also Tables 3–5 and the individual country results in Tables A1–A6). All three approaches considered in this paper can result in sizable shifts in quota shares, as well as a significant realignment in rankings among the largest quota countries. In general, the impact of the different approaches on country rankings is more stable (with a few exceptions) than the shifts in shares, particularly when comparing the first set of simulations with the second and third sets. The first set of simulations achieves the largest overall shifts in shares, resulting in increases that are significantly above the IMFC targets. However, this mainly reflects a decline in the U.S. quota share (and to a smaller extent that of Japan) and a correspondingly larger increase in the share of China. The second and third sets of simulations generally also achieve the IMFC targets provided the overall quota increase is large enough (a doubling rather than 50 percent).

Summary Table: Shifts of Quota Share under Alternative Simulations 1/
(In percentage points)

	Range of shift of quota share to:		
	Under-represented countries	Dynamic EMDCs 2/	EMDCs as a group
<i>Set 1 Ad hoc to dynamic EMDCs 3/</i>			
Full protection 4/	5.2 - 8.1	5.1 - 7.3	2.9 - 3.4
Partial protection 4/	6.6 - 10.2	6.6 - 9.7	4.4 - 5.5
<i>Set 2 Ad hoc based on formula and GDP blend 5/</i>			
Full protection 4/	4.2 - 7.0	4.0 - 6.3	1.9 - 2.3
Partial protection 4/	4.6 - 8.0	4.4 - 7.4	2.2 - 3.2
<i>Set 3 Ad hoc based on GDP blend 6/</i>			
Full CQS protection 4/	4.1 - 6.9	4.0 - 6.3	1.9 - 2.3
Partial CQS protection 4/	4.5 - 7.9	4.4 - 7.3	2.2 - 3.2

1/ Results for quota increases of 50, 100, and 150 percent; see Tables 3-5 for details.

2/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

3/ Ad hoc increase to all under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs.

4/ As described in the text, under full protection the quota share of initially over-represented countries cannot fall below the calculated quota share as a result of the quota increase. In the case of partial protection, the quota share of initially over-represented countries cannot fall below 95 percent of the calculated quota share.

5/ Ad hoc increase to countries under-represented with respect to the formula or the GDP blend.

6/ Ad hoc to countries under-represented with respect to the GDP blend.

IV. PROTECTING THE POOREST

19. **The modalities for protecting the voting share of the poorest members, as called for by the IMFC, still need to be decided.** In the 2008 reform, it was agreed that the share of basic votes in total votes would be maintained as quotas increase, implying that a

member's voting share would remain unchanged as long as its quota share does not change. However, low income countries remain over-represented on average and will tend to lose quota and therefore voting share as part of a formula-based realignment of quotas. One way of providing protection would be to further increase the ratio of basic votes to total votes over and above that agreed in the 2008 reform. This option would require another amendment of the Fund's Articles. An alternative, and the focus of the remainder of this section, is to set aside part of an ad hoc increase to the poorest countries to maintain their quota share.

20. **Protection of the poorest countries through ad hoc quota increases can be undertaken either individually or for the poorest members as a group.** Individual country protection (used in the simulations discussed above) has the effect of partially reversing the adjustments in quota share that result from the selective increases. In particular, eligible countries that are over-represented and therefore lose quota share after the selective increase receive (in some cases relatively large) ad hoc increases to reverse that decline. As a result, relatively little realignment in shares takes place within the group of PRGT-eligible countries. Conversely, when protection is applied at the group level, realignment within the group still takes place and the overall cost of the protection is somewhat reduced.

21. **These effects are illustrated in Tables 6 and A7 for two of the simulations presented in the previous section.** Overall, the impact of applying protection at the group rather than individual country level is to reduce somewhat the amount of the ad hoc increases set aside for protection, leaving more available for distribution to other eligible members. As a result, the shifts to the IMFC targeted groups are slightly higher (by 0.1 – 0.2 percent in these simulations) with no change in aggregate share of EMDCs. Within the group, the share of Africa declines by about 0.2 percent, while the shares of Asia and the Middle East, Malta, and Turkey increase.

22. **An additional issue concerns the countries that would be covered under the group of the poorest members.** As discussed in the EB/CQuota/10/1, there are different criteria that could be used, including the list of PRGT-eligible countries (presently 71 members) or the low income countries based on the IBRD's World Development Indicators (WDI) definition (presently 42 members; see Table 7). A further alternative would be to focus on those countries considered in the context of the recent proposal on post-catastrophe debt relief,¹² namely, eligibility could be limited to PRGT-eligible countries with annual per capita income below the prevailing IDA cut-off, or below twice the cut-off for countries meeting the "small country" definition. This group includes 48 countries with a per capita income of less than \$1,135 (and up to twice this amount for small states), whereas the PRGT-eligible group includes a number of countries with significantly higher per capita incomes. All simulations in the previous section included protection of individual PRGT-eligible

¹² See *Proposal for a Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust Fund* (4/22/10).

members. The impact of applying the protection to the smaller group of countries is to free up part of the ad hoc increase for other eligible countries. This again results in larger shifts to the IMFC targeted groups (by 0.2 percent for the simulations shown here), without changing the overall distribution between advanced economies and EMDCs. It also may reduce some anomalies in the treatment of over-represented countries based on whether they fall within or outside the PRGT-eligible list.¹³

V. ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

23. **Directors may wish to comment on the following issues:**

- What are Directors' views on the broad goals of the reform, taking into account the objectives set out by the IMFC? In this regard, should staff continue to pursue approaches that could generate shifts in quota share to both dynamic EMDCs and from over- to under-represented countries of at least 5 percent?
- How do Directors view the relative merits of the alternative approaches set out in this paper for distributing the quota increase? Do they see merit in the approach of introducing a distribution key based on the compressed GDP blend as a complement or alternative to the formula for distributing ad hoc increases? Are there other approaches that Directors consider worth exploring?
- What are Directors' views on the relative size of the selective and ad hoc increases? Do they agree that these should be the predominant elements of the increase, given the focus on realigning shares in the 14th Review? Do they see merit in keeping open the option of including a smaller equiproportional element as part of the overall increase?
- The simulations in this paper consider two options for facilitating larger net shifts to EMDCs: foregoing of ad hoc increases by under-represented advanced economies (while preserving their gains from the selective increase); and allowing for the possibility that over-represented advanced economies could become modestly under-represented. How do Directors view these approaches?
- How do Directors assess the options for protecting the voting share of the poorest members, including the role of a further increase in the share of basic votes? If protection were to be achieved through ad hoc quota adjustments, should protection be provided for individual countries or for the group as a whole? Would Directors see

¹³ An example is the relative ranking of South Africa (not PRGT eligible) and Nigeria (PRGT eligible). If the quota share of PRGT eligible countries is protected, South Africa's quota share would tend to fall below Nigeria's even though it has a higher actual and calculated quota share.

merit in further exploration of the option of using the set of members that would be eligible for post-catastrophe debt relief, as recently discussed by the Board, as an alternative to the PRGT-eligible list? Are there alternative approaches that Directors wish to explore?

**Table 3A. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs; Full Protection 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	0/60/40 3/			0/75/25 3/			20/50/30 3/		
			50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	57.1	57.1	57.3	57.6	57.3	57.4	57.4	57.1	57.2
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	42.8	42.8	42.8	43.0	42.8	42.8	43.0	42.8	42.8
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	14.3	14.3	14.4	14.6	14.5	14.6	14.4	14.3	14.4
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	42.9	42.9	42.7	42.4	42.7	42.6	42.6	42.9	42.8
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	35.3	35.2	35.1	34.9	35.1	35.0	35.1	35.2	35.1
Africa	4.9	3.1	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.5
Asia 4/	12.6	17.7	16.1	16.7	16.9	15.6	16.4	16.7	15.6	16.1	16.4
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	7.0	6.6	6.3	7.0	6.7	6.5	7.1	6.8	6.6
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	7.6	7.4	7.3	7.6	7.4	7.3	7.7	7.7	7.6
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	7.6	7.6	7.7	7.5	7.6	7.6	7.5	7.7	7.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:											
EU 27	31.9	31.3	30.1	30.2	30.3	30.4	30.4	30.5	30.3	30.2	30.2
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.4
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.)			6.1	7.4	8.1	5.4	7.0	7.8	5.2	6.5	7.1
Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)			5.6	6.7	7.2	5.0	6.2	6.8	4.8	6.0	6.5
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 5/			5.9	6.9	7.3	5.1	6.3	6.8	5.1	6.2	6.7
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)			3.4	3.3	3.2	2.9	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.3
Uniform reduction factor 6/			46.1	53.1	56.5	35.0	42.9	49.0	37.8	40.2	40.5
Minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs			25	35	40	15	20	20	20	30	35

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to dynamic EMDCs as defined in footnote 5. Eligible under-represented EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post-selective nominal quota as shown above, whichever is higher. Eligible over-represented EMDCs receive the minimum percentage increase above their post-selective nominal quota. Under-represented advanced countries maintain their post-selective quota share. Over-represented countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

4/ Including Korea and Singapore.

5/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

6/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share.

**Table 3B. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs; 95 Percent Protection 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	0/60/40 3/			0/75/25 3/			20/50/30 3/		
			50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	55.2	55.0	55.1	56.1	55.3	55.3	55.8	55.0	55.0
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	41.2	41.0	41.0	41.7	41.1	41.0	41.5	41.0	41.0
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2	16.2
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	14.1	14.0	14.1	14.4	14.2	14.3	14.3	14.0	14.0
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	44.8	45.0	44.9	43.9	44.7	44.7	44.2	45.0	45.0
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	36.8	37.0	37.0	36.2	36.9	36.8	36.3	37.1	37.1
Africa	4.9	3.1	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.5
Asia 4/	12.6	17.7	17.0	17.9	18.2	16.5	17.7	17.9	16.2	17.5	17.8
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	7.2	6.9	6.6	7.2	7.0	6.8	7.2	7.1	6.9
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.8	7.6	7.8	7.6	7.6	8.1	7.9	7.8
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	7.9	8.0	8.0	7.7	7.8	7.9	7.9	7.9	7.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:											
EU 27	31.9	31.3	29.5	29.4	29.5	30.1	29.7	29.7	29.9	29.4	29.4
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.)			7.7	9.5	10.2	6.8	9.0	9.8	6.6	8.5	9.2
Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)			7.3	8.8	9.4	6.3	8.2	8.8	6.2	8.0	8.6
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 5/			7.8	9.2	9.7	6.6	8.4	9.1	6.7	8.4	9.0
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)			5.2	5.5	5.4	4.4	5.2	5.2	4.7	5.4	5.4
Uniform reduction factor 6/			57.0	76.4	89.5	50.9	77.3	82.0	41.4	70.0	76.2
Minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs			35	45	50	20	25	30	30	35	40

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to dynamic EMDCs as defined in footnote 5. Eligible under-represented EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post-selective nominal quota as shown above, whichever is higher. Eligible over-represented EMDCs receive the minimum percentage increase above their post-selective nominal quota. Under-represented advanced countries maintain their post-selective quota share. Over-represented countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at 95 percent of their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

4/ Including Korea and Singapore.

5/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

6/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share.

**Table 4A. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
Full Protection 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	58.1	58.1	58.2	58.6	58.3	58.4	58.4	58.2	58.2
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	43.8	43.8	43.8	44.0	43.8	43.8	44.0	43.8	43.8
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.3	14.3	14.4	14.6	14.5	14.6	14.4	14.3	14.4
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	41.9	41.9	41.8	41.4	41.7	41.6	41.6	41.8	41.8
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	34.5	34.5	34.3	34.1	34.3	34.2	34.3	34.5	34.5
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.5
Asia 5/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.4	16.0	16.2	15.0	15.7	16.0	14.9	15.6	15.9
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.9	6.5	6.2	6.9	6.6	6.4	7.0	6.7	6.5
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.7	7.5	7.4	7.6	7.5	7.3	7.7	7.6	7.5
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.3	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.4	7.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:												
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	30.3	30.4	30.5	30.6	30.5	30.6	30.5	30.3	30.4
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2
Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.)				5.0	6.4	7.0	4.5	6.0	6.8	4.2	5.5	6.2
Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				4.6	5.7	6.1	4.0	5.2	5.8	3.9	5.0	5.5
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 6/				4.8	5.9	6.3	4.0	5.3	5.9	4.0	5.1	5.7
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				2.3	2.3	2.2	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.3
Uniform reduction factor 7/				29.6	32.0	29.7	18.4	20.4	17.9	24.4	29.4	30.3

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the formula or with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 3). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the formula (for those EMDCs under-represented under the formula only), or the GDP-blend (for those EMDCs under-represented under the GDP blend only), or the greater of the two (for those EMDCs that qualify under both criteria). Eligible advanced countries are capped at their post second round or post-selective quota share, whichever is greater. Over-represented countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Including Korea and Singapore.

6/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

7/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share or GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share, whichever is applicable.

**Table 4B. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
95 Percent Protection 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	57.6	57.3	57.3	58.3	57.6	57.5	58.0	57.3	57.3
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	43.5	43.3	43.3	43.8	43.3	43.2	43.8	43.3	43.3
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.1	14.0	14.1	14.4	14.2	14.3	14.3	14.0	14.0
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	42.4	42.7	42.7	41.7	42.4	42.5	42.0	42.7	42.7
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	35.1	35.3	35.2	34.4	35.0	35.0	34.7	35.3	35.3
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.5
Asia 5/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.7	16.5	16.9	15.2	16.2	16.5	15.2	16.1	16.4
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	7.0	6.6	6.4	6.9	6.7	6.5	7.0	6.9	6.7
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.8	7.6	7.5	7.6	7.6	7.5	7.8	7.7	7.7
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.4	7.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:												
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	29.8	29.7	29.8	30.3	29.9	29.9	30.1	29.7	29.7
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.)				5.6	7.3	8.0	4.8	6.8	7.6	4.6	6.3	7.0
Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				5.2	6.6	7.1	4.3	6.0	6.6	4.3	5.8	6.4
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 6/				5.4	6.8	7.4	4.4	6.1	6.8	4.4	6.0	6.6
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				2.9	3.2	3.1	2.2	2.9	2.9	2.5	3.1	3.2
Uniform reduction factor 7/				36.5	44.1	45.1	22.3	31.3	31.9	28.9	39.5	41.9

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the formula or with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 3). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the formula (for those EMDCs under-represented under the formula only), or the GDP-blend (for those EMDCs under-represented under the GDP blend only), or the greater of the two (for those EMDCs that qualify under both criteria). Eligible advanced countries are capped at their post second round or post-selective quota share, whichever is greater. Over-represented countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at 95 percent of their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Including Korea and Singapore.

6/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

7/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share or GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share, whichever is applicable.

**Table 5A. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; Full Protection 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	58.1	58.2	58.3	58.6	58.3	58.4	58.4	58.2	58.2
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	43.8	43.8	43.8	44.0	43.8	43.8	44.0	43.8	43.8
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.3	14.3	14.4	14.6	14.5	14.6	14.4	14.3	14.4
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	41.9	41.8	41.7	41.4	41.7	41.6	41.6	41.8	41.8
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	34.6	34.6	34.4	34.2	34.4	34.3	34.4	34.6	34.6
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.5
Asia 5/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.4	16.1	16.3	15.0	15.8	16.1	15.0	15.7	16.0
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.8	6.4	6.2	6.8	6.5	6.3	6.9	6.7	6.5
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.8	7.6	7.5	7.7	7.5	7.4	7.8	7.7	7.6
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.2	7.2	7.3	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.2	7.2	7.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:												
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	30.3	30.3	30.4	30.6	30.5	30.6	30.4	30.3	30.3
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.1
Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.)				5.0	6.3	6.9	4.4	6.0	6.7	4.1	5.5	6.1
Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				4.5	5.6	6.1	3.9	5.2	5.7	3.8	4.9	5.4
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 6/				4.8	5.8	6.3	4.0	5.3	5.8	4.0	5.1	5.6
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				2.3	2.3	2.2	1.9	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.3	2.3
Uniform reduction factor 7/				37.8	40.9	37.9	23.5	26.1	22.7	31.1	37.6	38.6

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 3). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend. Eligible advanced countries are capped at their post second round or post-selective quota share, whichever is greater. Over-represented countries that would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share. The quota shares of EMDCs and advanced economies that are under-represented under the formula but not eligible for the ad hoc are protected at their post-selective quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Including Korea and Singapore.

6/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

7/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share.

Table 5B. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; 95 Percent Protection 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	57.6	57.3	57.4	58.3	57.6	57.5	58.0	57.4	57.3
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	43.5	43.3	43.3	43.8	43.3	43.3	43.8	43.3	43.3
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.1	14.0	14.1	14.4	14.2	14.3	14.3	14.0	14.0
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	42.4	42.7	42.6	41.7	42.4	42.5	42.0	42.6	42.7
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	35.2	35.5	35.4	34.5	35.1	35.2	34.8	35.4	35.4
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.5
Asia 5/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.8	16.6	16.9	15.2	16.2	16.6	15.2	16.2	16.5
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.9	6.6	6.4	6.9	6.6	6.5	7.0	6.8	6.6
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.9	7.8	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.6	7.9	7.9	7.8
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.3	7.3	7.2	7.2	7.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:												
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	29.8	29.6	29.7	30.3	29.9	29.9	30.0	29.7	29.7
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.1
Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.)				5.5	7.2	7.9	4.7	6.7	7.5	4.5	6.3	6.9
Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				5.1	6.5	7.0	4.2	5.9	6.5	4.2	5.7	6.3
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 6/				5.4	6.8	7.3	4.4	6.1	6.8	4.4	6.0	6.6
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				2.9	3.2	3.1	2.2	2.9	2.9	2.4	3.1	3.1
Uniform reduction factor 7/				46.5	56.3	57.5	28.4	39.9	40.6	36.8	50.4	53.4

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 3). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the GDP blend. Eligible advanced countries are capped at their post second round or post-selective quota share, whichever is greater. Over-represented countries that would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at 95 percent of their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share. The quota shares of EMDCs and advanced economies that are under-represented under the formula but not eligible for the ad hoc are protected at their post-selective quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Including Korea and Singapore.

6/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

7/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share.

**Table 6. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
Alternative Protection Mechanisms for Poorest Members 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Individual PRGT protection 4/		Group PRGT protection 5/		Individual PCDR protection 6/	
				0/75/25 7/	20/50/30 7/	0/75/25 7/	20/50/30 7/	0/75/25 7/	20/50/30 7/
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	58.3	58.2	58.3	58.2	58.3	58.2
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	43.8	43.8	43.8	43.8	43.8	43.8
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.5	14.3	14.5	14.3	14.5	14.3
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	41.7	41.8	41.7	41.8	41.7	41.8
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	34.3	34.5	34.3	34.5	34.3	34.5
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.6	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4
Asia 8/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.7	15.6	15.9	15.7	15.8	15.7
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.8	6.6	6.8
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.5	7.6	7.5	7.6	7.5	7.6
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.3	7.4	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:									
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	30.5	30.3	30.5	30.4	30.5	30.4
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.0	4.0
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2
Underrepresented countries (shift in p.p.)				6.0	5.5	6.2	5.7	6.2	5.7
Underrepresented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				5.2	5.0	5.4	5.1	5.4	5.2
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 9/				5.3	5.1	5.5	5.3	5.6	5.4
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				2.2	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.1	2.3
Uniform reduction factor 10/				20.4	29.4	21.3	30.2	23.6	32.0

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the formula or with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 3). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness based on the formula (for those EMDCs under-represented under the formula only), or the GDP-blend (for those EMDCs under-represented under the GDP blend only), or the greater of the two (for those EMDCs that qualify under both criteria). Eligible advanced countries are capped at their post second round or post-selective quota share, whichever is greater. Over-represented countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. Three alternative protection mechanisms for poorest members are implemented (see footnotes 4, 5, and 6).

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

5/ PRGT-eligible countries as a group maintain their post second round actual quota share.

6/ PCDR-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

7/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

8/ Including Korea and Singapore.

9/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

10/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share or GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share, whichever is applicable.

Table 7. Selective Lists of Poor Countries

PRGT - eligible 1/		World Bank Low Income 2/	Proposed PCDR eligibility 3/				
1	Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	49	Nigeria	1	Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	1	Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of
2	Armenia	50	Papua New Guinea	2	Bangladesh	2	Bangladesh
3	Bangladesh	51	Rwanda	3	Benin	3	Benin
4	Benin	52	Samoa	4	Burkina Faso	4	Burkina Faso
5	Bhutan	53	Sao Tome and Principe	5	Burundi	5	Burundi
6	Bolivia	54	Senegal	6	Cambodia	6	Cambodia
7	Burkina Faso	55	Sierra Leone	7	Central African Republic	7	Central African Republic
8	Burundi	56	Solomon Islands	8	Chad	8	Chad
9	Cambodia	57	Somalia	9	Comoros	9	Comoros
10	Cameroon	58	St. Lucia	10	Congo, Dem. Republic of	10	Congo, Dem. Republic of
11	Cape Verde	59	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	11	Eritrea	11	Cote d'Ivoire
12	Central African Republic	60	Sudan	12	Ethiopia	12	Djibouti
13	Chad	61	Tajikistan	13	Gambia, The	13	Eritrea
14	Comoros	62	Tanzania	14	Ghana	14	Ethiopia
15	Congo, Dem. Republic of	63	Timor-Leste	15	Guinea	15	Gambia, The
16	Congo, Republic of	64	Togo	16	Guinea-Bissau	16	Ghana
17	Cote d'Ivoire	65	Tonga	17	Haiti	17	Guinea
18	Djibouti	66	Uganda	18	Kenya	18	Guinea-Bissau
19	Dominica	67	Uzbekistan	19	Kyrgyz Republic	19	Haiti
20	Eritrea	68	Vanuatu	20	Lao, People's Dem. Republic	20	Kenya
21	Ethiopia	69	Vietnam	21	Liberia	21	Kyrgyz Republic
22	Gambia, The	70	Yemen, Republic of	22	Madagascar	22	Lao, People's Dem. Republic
23	Georgia	71	Zambia	23	Malawi	23	Liberia
24	Ghana			24	Mali	24	Madagascar
25	Grenada			25	Mauritania	25	Malawi
26	Guinea			26	Mozambique	26	Mali
27	Guinea-Bissau			27	Myanmar	27	Mauritania
28	Guyana			28	Nepal	28	Mozambique
29	Haiti			29	Niger	29	Myanmar
30	Honduras			30	Rwanda	30	Nepal
31	Kenya			31	Senegal	31	Nicaragua
32	Kiribati			32	Sierra Leone	32	Niger
33	Kyrgyz Republic			33	Somalia	33	Papua New Guinea
34	Lao, People's Dem. Republic			34	Tajikistan	34	Rwanda
35	Lesotho			35	Tanzania	35	São Tomé & Príncipe
36	Liberia			36	Togo	36	Senegal
37	Madagascar			37	Uganda	37	Sierra Leone
38	Malawi			38	Uzbekistan	38	Somalia
39	Maldives			39	Vietnam	39	Sudan
40	Mali			40	Yemen, Republic of	40	Tajikistan
41	Mauritania			41	Zambia	41	Tanzania
42	Moldova			42	Zimbabwe	42	Togo
43	Mongolia					43	Uganda
44	Mozambique					44	Uzbekistan
45	Myanmar					45	Vietnam
46	Nepal					46	Yemen, Republic of
47	Nicaragua					47	Zambia
48	Niger					48	Zimbabwe

Source: Finance Department

1/ See *Eligibility to Use the Fund's Facilities for Concessional Financing (January 11, 2010)*.

2/ Includes countries whose yearly per-capita GNI is \$975 or less. See <http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0>.

3/ Cutoffs based on income (Atlas method); Countries with income per capita below the IDA cutoff (currently US\$1,135 per year) plus "small states" with income per capita below 200% of the IDA cutoff. See *Proposal for a Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust Fund (April 22, 2010)*.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

**Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares:
Further Considerations
Statistical Appendix**

Prepared by the Finance Department

Approved by Andrew Tweedie

June 22, 2010

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Illustrative Quota Simulations – Technical Aspects

This Appendix discusses technical aspects of the quota simulations presented in Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations (Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations, 6/22,10). In addition, the attached Tables A1–A7 provide simulation results for individual countries.

Data set

Simulation results are presented for the quota data set which covers the period through 2008 as presented in *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Updated Data Set and Quota Calculations* (6/3/10), based primarily on data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS).

Size of the overall quota increase

For illustrative purposes, the size of the overall quota increase is assumed to be 50, 100 and 150 percent. The overall increase is the sum of the equiproportional, selective, and ad hoc increase. The equiproportional increase is distributed to all members in proportion to their post second round quota share (i.e., a member's quota share after the 2008 Quota and Voice reforms become effective). The selective increase is distributed to all members in proportion to their calculated quota share, as presented in *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Updated Data Set and Quota Calculations* (6/3/10). The ad hoc increase is distributed to eligible members as described below.

Ad hoc increase—eligibility

The three sets of illustrative simulations presented in the main paper use different eligibility criteria.

- *Set 1:* the ad hoc increase is allocated to dynamic EMDCs. Dynamic EMDCs include all EMDCs that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula (i.e., whose ratio of calculated to post second round quota share is greater than 1) plus other EMDCs whose share in global PPP GDP is greater than their post second round quota share, and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent (i.e. whose ratio of calculated quota share to post second round quota share is greater than 0.8, see Box 1 in *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas – Realigning Quota Shares – Further Considerations* (6/22/2010).
- *Set 2:* Countries are eligible for an ad hoc increase if they are under-represented either with respect to the quota formula or with respect to the GDP blend variable.¹ A

¹ Consistent with the quota formula, the GDP blend variable is a weighted average of GDP at market prices (60 percent) and PPP GDP (40 percent), compressed by a factor of 0.95.

country is under-represented with respect to the GDP blend if its post selective quota share² is smaller than its share in the GDP blend variable.

- *Set 3*: Countries are eligible for ad hoc increases if they are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend variable.

In all simulations, part of the ad hoc increase is set aside for the protection of the poorest and full or partial protection for over-represented countries against becoming under-represented. In addition, there is protection for countries that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula but not eligible for an ad hoc increase in Sets 1 and 3 (see below).

Ad hoc increase—implementation

The allocation of the ad hoc increase is primarily based on a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. A uniform reduction in out-of-lineness means that the difference between a country's calculated quota share and its post selective quota share or the difference between a country's share in the GDP blend variable and its post selective quota share is reduced proportionately by a uniform reduction factor (URF).³ The former is called the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the quota formula and the latter is called the uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the GDP blend variable. Set 1 also employs a fixed percentage increase over the post selective nominal quota in order to allocate quota increases to eligible over-represented EMDCs. Specifically,

- *Set 1* (Tables 3A and 3B and Tables A1 and A2):
 - Eligible over-represented EMDCs receive a given fixed percentage increase over their post selective nominal quota – the “minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs” as shown in Tables 3A and 3B. The size of the fixed nominal increase is determined with a view to allowing a substantial decrease in out-of-lineness for under-represented EMDCs and an adequate increase in quota share for eligible over-represented EMDCs.
 - Eligible under-represented EMDCs receive the uniform reduction of out-of-lineness as described above or the minimum ad hoc increase allocated to dynamic EMDCs, whichever is greater. This approach seeks to ensure that no over-represented EMDC under the quota formula receives a larger increase than under-represented EMDCs.

² A country's post selective quota share is the simulated quota share that would result if only the equiproportional and selective increases were implemented.

³ The uniform reduction in out-of-lineness was also used in the 2008 reform for allocating ad hoc increases.

- *Set 2* (Tables 4A and 4B and Tables A3 and A4):
 - EMDCs that are under-represented under the quota formula only, receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the quota formula.
 - EMDCs that are under-represented under the GDP blend only, receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the GDP blend variable.
 - EMDCs that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula as well as with respect to the GDP blend variable, receive the greater of the two uniform reductions.
 - Advanced countries that are under-represented under the GDP blend only, are capped at their post second round quota share.
 - Advanced countries that are under-represented under the quota formula only or under both criteria are capped at their post selective quota share.
- *Set 3* (Tables 5A and 5B and Tables A5 and A6):
 - Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the GDP blend variable.
 - Eligible advanced countries that are over-represented with respect to the quota formula are capped at their post second round quota share.
 - Eligible advanced countries that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula are capped at their post selective quota share.

Protection for countries under-represented with respect to the quota formula

- In Set 1, advanced countries that are under-represented under the quota formula are protected at their post selective quota share.
- In Set 3, countries that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula but not with respect to the GDP blend are protected at their post selective quota share.

Protection of over-represented countries from becoming under-represented

Countries that are over-represented with respect to the quota formula are either fully or partially protected against becoming under-represented. With full protection, (Tables 3A, 4A and 5A and Tables A1, A3 and A5), the simulated quota share of an over-represented country cannot fall below its calculated quota share. With partial protection (Tables 3B, 4B and 5B

and Tables A2, A4 and A6), the simulated quota share of an over-represented country cannot fall below 95 percent of its calculated quota share.

Protection of the poorest members

All scenarios allocate part of the ad hoc increase to the “poorest” members.

- In Tables 3A - 5B each PRGT-eligible country maintains at least its post second round actual quota share. Some PRGT-eligible countries see their quota share increase based on the allocations mechanisms described above (selective and ad hoc) and these countries see no further gain in their quota share from the protection. PRGT-eligible countries that would see their quota share decrease below the post second round quota share based on the allocations mechanisms described above retain their post second round quota share.
- In Tables 6 and A7, two alternative protection mechanisms are presented—group protection for PRGT-eligible countries and individual protection for those countries meeting the proposed Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief (PCDR) eligibility criteria.⁴
 - The group protection for PRGT-eligible countries is implemented by increasing by a common factor the quota share that each PRGT-eligible member would receive based on the allocation mechanisms described above. The common factor is chosen in such a way that the quota (and voting) share of the group of PRGT-eligible members remains at its post second round level.
 - Individual protection for the proposed PCDR-eligible countries works in the same way as individual protection of PRGT-eligible countries, i.e., each individual country included under the proposed PCDR eligibility criteria retains at least its post second round quota share.

⁴ See *Proposal for a Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust Fund* (4/22/10).

Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs; Full Protection -- by Member 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	0/60/40 3/			0/75/25 3/			20/50/30 3/			
			50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	
United States	17.670	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987
Japan	6.556	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.541	4.564	4.579	4.548	4.572	4.588	4.534	4.551	4.562	4.562
China 4/	3.996	7.917	6.292	6.767	7.019	6.065	6.638	6.977	5.930	6.261	6.438	6.438
Italy	3.306	2.992	2.992	2.992	2.992	2.992	2.992	2.992	2.992	2.992	2.992	2.992
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	2.221	1.866	1.653	2.288	1.966	1.774	2.372	2.092	1.925	1.925
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.357	2.303	2.303	2.343	2.303	2.303	2.303
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.813	2.873	2.877	2.757	2.818	2.831	2.782	2.900	2.941	2.941
India	2.442	2.403	2.636	2.622	2.579	2.563	2.547	2.470	2.630	2.686	2.688	2.688
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.908	1.857	1.857	1.898	1.857	1.857	1.857
Belgium	1.932	1.324	1.553	1.363	1.324	1.619	1.462	1.368	1.637	1.490	1.402	1.402
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.024	2.075	2.083	1.986	2.038	2.064	2.000	2.090	2.123	2.123
Spain	1.688	2.236	1.814	1.894	1.948	1.837	1.923	1.978	1.789	1.849	1.888	1.888
Mexico	1.521	1.793	1.716	1.753	1.755	1.681	1.719	1.727	1.697	1.769	1.794	1.794
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.274	1.227	1.227	1.268	1.227	1.227	1.227
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.820	1.904	1.949	1.779	1.881	1.941	1.755	1.814	1.846	1.846
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.367	1.372	1.376	1.368	1.374	1.378	1.365	1.369	1.372	1.372
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.840	0.703	0.621	0.865	0.739	0.664	0.899	0.790	0.725	0.725
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.711	0.623	0.597	0.741	0.668	0.624	0.751	0.682	0.641	0.641
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	0.952	0.954	0.943	0.928	0.929	0.906	0.948	0.973	0.978	0.978
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.795	0.798	0.800	0.796	0.799	0.802	0.794	0.797	0.798	0.798
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.638	0.578	0.578	0.667	0.608	0.578	0.671	0.615	0.581	0.581
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.818	0.823	0.816	0.798	0.803	0.785	0.813	0.838	0.843	0.843
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.849	0.878	0.894	0.835	0.870	0.891	0.827	0.861	0.881	0.881
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.688	0.690	0.683	0.671	0.673	0.657	0.684	0.704	0.707	0.707
Turkey	0.611	1.148	0.925	0.991	1.025	0.894	0.973	1.019	0.876	0.921	0.946	0.946
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.713	0.735	0.747	0.702	0.729	0.745	0.696	0.728	0.744	0.744
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.944	1.018	1.056	0.909	0.998	1.050	0.889	0.940	0.967	0.967
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.449	0.384	0.345	0.465	0.408	0.373	0.477	0.426	0.396	0.396

Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs; Full Protection -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	0/60/40 3/			0/75/25 3/			20/50/30 3/									
		Calculated Quota Share		50%	100%	150%	50%		100%	150%	50%		100%	150%			
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.468	0.422	0.422	0.489	0.446	0.422	0.489	0.446	0.422	0.489	0.446	0.422	0.492	0.451	0.426
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.654	0.733	0.788	0.677	0.763	0.818	0.629	0.689	0.728	0.629	0.689	0.728	0.629	0.689	0.728
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.433	0.411	0.411	0.454	0.417	0.411	0.454	0.417	0.411	0.454	0.417	0.411	0.454	0.419	0.411
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.386	0.329	0.295	0.399	0.349	0.319	0.410	0.366	0.339	0.410	0.366	0.339	0.410	0.366	0.339
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.365	0.311	0.279	0.377	0.330	0.302	0.388	0.346	0.321	0.388	0.346	0.321	0.388	0.346	0.321
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.488	0.503	0.514	0.492	0.509	0.520	0.483	0.495	0.502	0.483	0.495	0.502	0.483	0.495	0.502
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.357	0.342	0.342	0.374	0.345	0.342	0.375	0.346	0.342	0.375	0.346	0.342	0.375	0.346	0.342
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.383	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.436	0.438	0.440	0.436	0.439	0.440	0.435	0.437	0.438	0.435	0.437	0.438	0.435	0.437	0.438
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.464	0.463	0.456	0.451	0.450	0.437	0.462	0.473	0.474	0.462	0.473	0.474	0.462	0.473	0.474
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.480	0.494	0.497	0.472	0.487	0.495	0.474	0.496	0.505	0.474	0.496	0.505	0.474	0.496	0.505
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.431	0.431	0.425	0.420	0.419	0.408	0.429	0.440	0.441	0.429	0.440	0.441	0.429	0.440	0.441
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.303	0.266	0.262	0.316	0.286	0.268	0.319	0.291	0.274	0.319	0.291	0.274	0.319	0.291	0.274
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.394	0.395	0.391	0.384	0.385	0.376	0.391	0.403	0.405	0.391	0.403	0.405	0.391	0.403	0.405
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.366	0.373	0.374	0.358	0.366	0.367	0.362	0.377	0.382	0.362	0.377	0.382	0.362	0.377	0.382
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.580	0.634	0.663	0.554	0.619	0.658	0.538	0.576	0.596	0.538	0.576	0.596	0.538	0.576	0.596
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.212	0.184	0.167	0.220	0.196	0.181	0.224	0.202	0.189	0.224	0.202	0.189	0.224	0.202	0.189
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.291	0.290	0.286	0.283	0.282	0.274	0.290	0.297	0.297	0.290	0.297	0.297	0.290	0.297	0.297
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.202	0.185	0.185	0.211	0.193	0.185	0.212	0.194	0.185	0.212	0.194	0.185	0.212	0.194	0.185
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.157	0.137	0.129	0.163	0.147	0.137	0.165	0.150	0.141	0.165	0.150	0.141	0.165	0.150	0.141
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.257	0.271	0.278	0.251	0.267	0.277	0.247	0.257	0.262	0.247	0.257	0.262	0.247	0.257	0.262
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.266	0.284	0.294	0.258	0.279	0.292	0.253	0.265	0.272	0.253	0.265	0.272	0.253	0.265	0.272
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.227	0.237	0.242	0.222	0.234	0.241	0.220	0.227	0.232	0.220	0.227	0.232	0.220	0.227	0.232
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.251	0.298	0.330	0.265	0.316	0.349	0.236	0.272	0.295	0.236	0.272	0.295	0.236	0.272	0.295
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.133	0.114	0.102	0.138	0.120	0.110	0.142	0.126	0.117	0.142	0.126	0.117	0.142	0.126	0.117
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.171	0.167	0.163	0.165	0.162	0.155	0.171	0.173	0.172	0.171	0.173	0.172	0.171	0.173	0.172
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.102	0.079	0.065	0.103	0.080	0.066	0.111	0.093	0.082	0.111	0.093	0.082	0.111	0.093	0.082

Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs; Full Protection -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	0/60/40 3/			0/75/25 3/			20/50/30 3/					
		Calculated Quota Share			50%			100%			150%		
		50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Ecuador	0.146	0.158	0.158	0.156	0.154	0.149	0.158	0.154	0.149	0.158	0.162	0.162	
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.182	0.189	0.193	0.178	0.193	0.176	0.187	0.193	0.176	0.181	0.186	
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.107	0.090	0.079	0.110	0.085	0.114	0.094	0.085	0.114	0.100	0.092	
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	
Sudan	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	
Uruguay	0.129	0.101	0.087	0.079	0.105	0.086	0.107	0.093	0.086	0.107	0.096	0.090	
Qatar	0.127	0.166	0.175	0.179	0.163	0.178	0.160	0.172	0.178	0.160	0.166	0.169	
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	
Angola	0.120	0.175	0.186	0.192	0.170	0.191	0.166	0.183	0.191	0.166	0.174	0.178	
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	
Slovenia	0.115	0.130	0.133	0.133	0.127	0.131	0.129	0.130	0.131	0.129	0.134	0.136	
Jamaica	0.115	0.086	0.072	0.063	0.088	0.067	0.092	0.075	0.067	0.092	0.081	0.074	
Kenya	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	
Lebanon	0.112	0.145	0.152	0.155	0.141	0.155	0.140	0.150	0.155	0.140	0.144	0.147	
Myanmar	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	
Oman	0.099	0.122	0.127	0.130	0.120	0.129	0.119	0.126	0.129	0.119	0.123	0.126	
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.101	0.101	0.100	0.098	0.097	0.100	0.099	0.097	0.100	0.103	0.104	
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.069	0.058	0.051	0.071	0.055	0.073	0.061	0.055	0.073	0.065	0.060	
Guatemala	0.088	0.095	0.094	0.093	0.092	0.089	0.095	0.092	0.089	0.095	0.097	0.097	
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	
Tanzania	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	
Cameroon	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	
Lithuania	0.077	0.097	0.101	0.103	0.095	0.103	0.094	0.100	0.103	0.094	0.097	0.099	
Uganda	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	
Bahrain	0.074	0.088	0.091	0.092	0.086	0.092	0.086	0.090	0.092	0.086	0.089	0.091	
Bolivia	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.063	0.060	0.063	0.060	0.060	0.063	0.060	0.060	
Jordan	0.072	0.078	0.078	0.077	0.076	0.074	0.077	0.076	0.074	0.077	0.079	0.080	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.058	0.056	0.056	0.061	0.056	0.061	0.056	0.056	0.061	0.056	0.056	
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	
Senegal	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.078	0.081	0.082	0.077	0.082	0.077	0.080	0.082	0.077	0.081	0.082	
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	

Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs; Full Protection -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	0/60/40 3/			0/75/25 3/			20/50/30 3/		
			50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
			Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.051	0.044	0.040	0.053	0.047	0.044
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.075	0.079	0.080	0.074	0.078	0.080	0.073	0.075	0.077
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.043	0.035	0.031	0.044	0.037	0.033	0.046	0.040	0.037
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.060	0.060	0.058	0.058	0.058	0.056	0.060	0.061	0.061
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.041	0.034	0.030	0.042	0.036	0.032	0.044	0.038	0.035
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.061	0.068	0.073	0.063	0.071	0.076	0.059	0.064	0.068
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.036	0.035	0.035	0.037	0.035	0.035	0.037	0.035	0.035
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.034	0.029	0.027	0.035	0.031	0.029	0.036	0.032	0.030
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.046	0.046	0.045	0.044	0.044	0.043	0.045	0.047	0.047
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.054	0.056	0.057	0.052	0.055	0.057	0.052	0.053	0.054
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.058	0.061	0.063	0.056	0.060	0.063	0.055	0.057	0.059
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.028	0.022	0.019	0.028	0.023	0.020	0.030	0.026	0.023
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.044	0.045	0.046	0.043	0.045	0.046	0.043	0.045	0.046
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.039	0.038	0.037	0.038	0.037	0.037	0.039	0.040	0.039
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031

Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs; Full Protection -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	0/60/40 3/			0/75/25 3/			20/50/30 3/			
		50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	
		Calculated									
		Quota Share									
Comoros	0.0037	0.0019	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.0037	0.0022	0.0029	0.0025	0.0023	0.0027	0.0030	0.0031	0.0028	0.0026	0.0026
Bhutan	0.0036	0.0050	0.0044	0.0046	0.0047	0.0045	0.0043	0.0043	0.0044	0.0045	0.0045
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.0035	0.0024	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035
Dominica	0.0034	0.0017	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034
Sao Tome and Principe	0.0031	0.0016	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031
Tonga	0.0029	0.0013	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029
Kiribati	0.0023	0.0018	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.0021	0.0014	0.0017	0.0015	0.0014	0.0016	0.0018	0.0018	0.0016	0.0015	0.0015
Marshall Islands	0.0015	0.0010	0.0012	0.0010	0.0010	0.0011	0.0012	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011	0.0011
Palau, Republic of	0.0015	0.0010	0.0012	0.0010	0.0010	0.0011	0.0012	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011	0.0011
Tuvalu	0.0008	0.0004	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005	0.0006	0.0006	0.0006	0.0006	0.0005

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to dynamic EMDCs as defined in footnote 5. Eligible under-represented EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post-selective nominal quota, whichever is higher. Eligible over-represented EMDCs receive the minimum percentage increase above their post-selective nominal quota. Under-represented advanced countries maintain their post-selective quota share. Over-represented countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

4/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

5/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

**Table A2. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs, 95 Percent Protection -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	0/60/40 3/			0/75/25 3/			20/50/30 3/			
			50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	
United States	17.670	16.987	16.178	16.178	16.178	16.178	16.178	16.178	16.178	16.178	16.178	16.178
Japan	6.556	6.493	6.184	6.184	6.184	6.184	6.184	6.184	6.184	6.184	6.184	6.184
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.493	5.408	5.408	5.427	5.408	5.408	5.408
France	4.505	3.789	3.761	3.608	3.608	3.950	3.608	3.608	3.935	3.650	3.608	3.608
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.541	4.564	4.579	4.548	4.572	4.588	4.534	4.551	4.562	4.562
China 4/	3.996	7.917	6.621	7.339	7.700	6.517	7.410	7.585	6.047	7.086	7.326	7.326
Italy	3.306	2.992	2.849	2.849	2.849	2.952	2.849	2.849	2.923	2.849	2.849	2.849
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	2.221	1.866	1.653	2.288	1.966	1.774	2.372	2.092	1.925	1.925
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.242	2.194	2.194	2.357	2.200	2.194	2.343	2.194	2.194	2.194
Russia	2.494	2.938	3.038	3.086	3.083	2.877	2.936	3.015	3.014	3.012	3.049	3.049
India	2.442	2.403	2.847	2.816	2.763	2.675	2.653	2.676	2.849	2.789	2.787	2.787
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.815	1.769	1.769	1.908	1.779	1.769	1.898	1.769	1.769	1.769
Belgium	1.932	1.324	1.553	1.363	1.261	1.619	1.462	1.368	1.637	1.490	1.402	1.402
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.186	2.229	2.232	2.072	2.123	2.186	2.166	2.171	2.202	2.202
Spain	1.688	2.236	1.814	1.894	1.948	1.837	1.923	1.978	1.789	1.849	1.888	1.888
Mexico	1.521	1.793	1.853	1.882	1.881	1.755	1.791	1.840	1.838	1.837	1.860	1.860
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	1.213	1.169	1.169	1.274	1.186	1.169	1.268	1.177	1.169	1.169
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.878	2.006	2.070	1.860	2.018	2.049	1.803	1.961	2.003	2.003
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.367	1.372	1.376	1.368	1.374	1.378	1.365	1.369	1.372	1.372
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.840	0.703	0.621	0.865	0.739	0.664	0.899	0.790	0.725	0.725
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.897	0.897	0.897	0.905	0.897	0.897	0.897	0.897	0.897	0.897
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.711	0.623	0.570	0.741	0.668	0.624	0.751	0.682	0.641	0.641
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.800	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.796
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.029	1.025	1.010	0.968	0.968	0.981	1.027	1.011	1.014	1.014
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.696	0.696	0.696	0.712	0.696	0.696	0.704	0.696	0.696	0.696
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.795	0.798	0.800	0.796	0.799	0.802	0.794	0.797	0.798	0.798
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.638	0.565	0.550	0.667	0.608	0.573	0.671	0.615	0.581	0.581
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.884	0.884	0.874	0.833	0.836	0.850	0.881	0.870	0.874	0.874
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.894	0.926	0.937	0.863	0.918	0.928	0.881	0.898	0.914	0.914
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.743	0.741	0.732	0.700	0.701	0.711	0.741	0.731	0.733	0.733
Turkey	0.611	1.148	0.971	1.069	1.118	0.956	1.079	1.103	0.892	1.034	1.067	1.067
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.757	0.781	0.789	0.723	0.765	0.776	0.747	0.756	0.771	0.771
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.995	1.106	1.161	0.979	1.116	1.143	0.907	1.067	1.104	1.104
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.449	0.384	0.345	0.465	0.408	0.373	0.477	0.426	0.396	0.396

Table A2. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs; 95 Percent Protection -- by Member (continued) 1
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		0/60/40 3/			0/75/25 3/			20/50/30 3/		
	Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.468	0.414	0.402	0.489	0.446	0.420	0.492	0.451	0.426
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.654	0.733	0.788	0.677	0.763	0.818	0.629	0.689	0.728
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.433	0.392	0.392	0.454	0.417	0.396	0.454	0.419	0.397
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.386	0.329	0.295	0.399	0.349	0.319	0.410	0.366	0.339
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.365	0.311	0.279	0.377	0.330	0.302	0.388	0.346	0.321
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.488	0.503	0.514	0.492	0.509	0.520	0.483	0.495	0.502
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.389	0.389	0.389	0.399	0.389	0.389	0.394	0.389	0.389
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.392	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.357	0.325	0.325	0.374	0.345	0.327	0.375	0.346	0.328
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.364	0.362	0.362	0.383	0.362	0.362	0.380	0.362	0.362
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.436	0.438	0.440	0.436	0.439	0.440	0.435	0.437	0.438
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.501	0.497	0.489	0.471	0.469	0.474	0.501	0.491	0.492
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.518	0.530	0.532	0.492	0.506	0.522	0.513	0.516	0.524
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.465	0.463	0.455	0.438	0.437	0.442	0.465	0.457	0.458
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.303	0.266	0.249	0.316	0.286	0.268	0.319	0.291	0.274
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.425	0.424	0.419	0.400	0.401	0.407	0.424	0.418	0.420
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.395	0.401	0.400	0.374	0.381	0.391	0.392	0.391	0.396
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.617	0.700	0.742	0.606	0.708	0.728	0.551	0.671	0.699
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.212	0.184	0.167	0.220	0.196	0.181	0.224	0.202	0.189
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.314	0.312	0.307	0.295	0.294	0.297	0.314	0.308	0.308
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.202	0.179	0.176	0.211	0.193	0.182	0.212	0.194	0.184
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.157	0.137	0.125	0.163	0.147	0.137	0.165	0.150	0.141
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.267	0.287	0.297	0.264	0.289	0.294	0.251	0.280	0.286
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.279	0.306	0.319	0.275	0.308	0.315	0.257	0.296	0.305
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.234	0.249	0.256	0.232	0.250	0.254	0.228	0.244	0.249
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.251	0.298	0.330	0.265	0.316	0.349	0.236	0.272	0.295
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.133	0.114	0.102	0.138	0.120	0.110	0.142	0.126	0.117
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.184	0.180	0.174	0.173	0.168	0.168	0.185	0.180	0.178
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.102	0.079	0.065	0.103	0.080	0.066	0.111	0.093	0.082

Table A2. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase to Dynamic EMDCs; 95 Percent Protection -- by Member (continued) 1
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	0/60/40 3/			0/75/25 3/			20/50/30 3/			
			50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	
Comoros	0.0037	0.0019	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.0037	0.0022	0.0029	0.0025	0.0023	0.0030	0.0027	0.0025	0.0031	0.0028	0.0026	0.0026
Bhutan	0.0036	0.0050	0.0046	0.0048	0.0049	0.0045	0.0048	0.0049	0.0045	0.0047	0.0048	0.0048
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.0035	0.0024	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035
Dominica	0.0034	0.0017	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034
Sao Tome and Principe	0.0031	0.0016	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031
Tonga	0.0029	0.0013	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029
Kiribati	0.0023	0.0018	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.0021	0.0014	0.0017	0.0015	0.0014	0.0018	0.0016	0.0015	0.0018	0.0016	0.0015	0.0015
Marshall Islands	0.0015	0.0010	0.0012	0.0010	0.0009	0.0012	0.0011	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011	0.0011
Palau, Republic of	0.0015	0.0010	0.0012	0.0010	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011	0.0011
Tuvalu	0.0008	0.0004	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005	0.0006	0.0006	0.0006	0.0005

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to dynamic EMDCs as defined in footnote 5. Eligible under-represented EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post-selective nominal quota, whichever is higher. Eligible over-represented EMDCs receive the minimum percentage increase above their post-selective nominal quota. Under-represented advanced countries maintain their post-selective quota share. Over-represented countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at 95 percent of their calculated quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

4/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

5/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

**Table A3. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
Full Protection -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/					
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%			
				United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.541	4.564	4.579	4.548	4.572	4.588	4.551	4.551	4.534	4.551	4.551	4.562
China 5/	3.996	7.917	8.128	5.857	6.319	6.530	5.630	6.177	6.440	6.026	6.026	5.552	6.026	6.026	6.247
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.277	3.249	3.223	3.250	3.214	3.183	3.263	3.263	3.280	3.263	3.263	3.248
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	2.221	1.866	1.653	2.288	1.966	1.774	2.092	2.092	2.372	2.092	2.092	1.925
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.357	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.343	2.303	2.303	2.303
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.697	2.749	2.774	2.675	2.736	2.766	2.717	2.717	2.664	2.717	2.717	2.741
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.609	2.620	2.603	2.541	2.548	2.530	2.606	2.606	2.579	2.606	2.606	2.609
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.908	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.898	1.857	1.857	1.857
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.553	1.363	1.324	1.619	1.462	1.368	1.490	1.490	1.637	1.490	1.490	1.402
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.101	2.156	2.165	2.026	2.087	2.099	2.116	2.116	2.047	2.116	2.116	2.141
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.814	1.894	1.948	1.837	1.923	1.978	1.849	1.849	1.789	1.849	1.849	1.888
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.731	1.769	1.778	1.685	1.728	1.739	1.742	1.742	1.695	1.742	1.742	1.760
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.274	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.268	1.227	1.227	1.227
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.731	1.812	1.851	1.695	1.792	1.839	1.761	1.761	1.679	1.761	1.761	1.800
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.367	1.372	1.376	1.368	1.374	1.378	1.369	1.369	1.365	1.369	1.369	1.372
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.840	0.703	0.621	0.865	0.739	0.664	0.790	0.790	0.899	0.790	0.790	0.725
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.711	0.623	0.597	0.741	0.668	0.624	0.682	0.682	0.751	0.682	0.682	0.641
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.931	0.938	0.936	0.912	0.919	0.918	0.932	0.932	0.921	0.932	0.932	0.935
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.795	0.798	0.800	0.796	0.799	0.802	0.797	0.797	0.794	0.797	0.797	0.798
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.638	0.578	0.578	0.667	0.608	0.578	0.615	0.615	0.671	0.615	0.615	0.581
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.766	0.772	0.774	0.764	0.770	0.774	0.768	0.768	0.763	0.768	0.768	0.771
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.819	0.847	0.860	0.806	0.839	0.856	0.829	0.829	0.801	0.829	0.829	0.842
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.696	0.704	0.701	0.674	0.682	0.679	0.697	0.697	0.684	0.697	0.697	0.700
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.901	0.967	0.993	0.857	0.934	0.967	0.924	0.924	0.853	0.924	0.924	0.955
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.689	0.711	0.721	0.680	0.705	0.718	0.697	0.697	0.675	0.697	0.697	0.707
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.868	0.938	0.971	0.836	0.920	0.961	0.894	0.894	0.822	0.894	0.894	0.928
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.449	0.384	0.345	0.465	0.408	0.373	0.426	0.426	0.477	0.426	0.426	0.396

**Table A3. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
Full Protection -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round			GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
	Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/		50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
					0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/	20/50/30 4/						
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.468	0.422	0.422	0.489	0.446	0.422	0.492	0.451	0.426	
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.654	0.733	0.788	0.677	0.763	0.818	0.629	0.689	0.728	
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.433	0.411	0.411	0.454	0.417	0.411	0.454	0.419	0.411	
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.386	0.329	0.295	0.399	0.349	0.319	0.410	0.366	0.339	
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.365	0.311	0.279	0.377	0.330	0.302	0.388	0.346	0.321	
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.488	0.503	0.514	0.492	0.509	0.520	0.483	0.495	0.502	
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.423	0.415	0.408	0.416	0.405	0.396	0.424	0.419	0.415	
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.383	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.436	0.438	0.440	0.436	0.439	0.440	0.435	0.437	0.438	
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.428	0.429	0.429	
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.465	0.477	0.482	0.460	0.474	0.481	0.458	0.470	0.475	
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.414	0.416	0.415	0.408	0.410	0.409	0.411	0.414	0.415	
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.303	0.266	0.262	0.316	0.286	0.268	0.319	0.291	0.274	
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.367	0.369	0.370	0.366	0.369	0.370	0.366	0.368	0.369	
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.386	0.395	0.395	0.369	0.380	0.380	0.375	0.388	0.392	
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.522	0.575	0.600	0.499	0.562	0.592	0.489	0.542	0.567	
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.212	0.184	0.167	0.220	0.196	0.181	0.224	0.202	0.189	
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.275	0.275	0.275	0.272	0.273	0.273	0.273	0.275	0.275	
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.202	0.185	0.185	0.211	0.193	0.185	0.212	0.194	0.185	
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.157	0.137	0.129	0.163	0.147	0.137	0.165	0.150	0.141	
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.244	0.256	0.262	0.238	0.253	0.261	0.235	0.248	0.254	
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.247	0.265	0.273	0.240	0.260	0.270	0.236	0.254	0.262	
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.217	0.226	0.231	0.213	0.224	0.229	0.211	0.220	0.225	
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.251	0.298	0.330	0.265	0.316	0.349	0.236	0.272	0.295	
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.133	0.114	0.102	0.138	0.120	0.110	0.142	0.126	0.117	
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.144	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.102	0.079	0.065	0.103	0.080	0.066	0.111	0.093	0.082	

**Table A3. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
Full Protection -- by Member (concluded) 1/**
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Comoros	0.0037	0.0019	0.0014	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.0037	0.0022	0.0015	0.0029	0.0025	0.0023	0.0030	0.0027	0.0037	0.0025	0.0031	0.0026
Bhutan	0.0036	0.0050	0.0044	0.0042	0.0044	0.0045	0.0041	0.0043	0.0041	0.0044	0.0041	0.0044
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.0035	0.0024	0.0018	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035
Dominica	0.0034	0.0017	0.0012	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034
Sao Tome and Principe	0.0031	0.0016	0.0005	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031
Tonga	0.0029	0.0013	0.0009	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029
Kiribati	0.0023	0.0018	0.0008	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.0021	0.0014	0.0011	0.0017	0.0015	0.0014	0.0018	0.0016	0.0018	0.0015	0.0018	0.0015
Marshall Islands	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0012	0.0010	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0012	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011
Palau, Republic of	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0012	0.0010	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0012	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011
Tuvalu	0.0008	0.0004	0.0001	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005	0.0006	0.0005	0.0006	0.0005	0.0006	0.0005

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the formula or with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 3). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-likeness based on the formula (for those EMDCs under-represented under the formula only), or the GDP-blend (for those EMDCs under-represented under the GDP blend only), or the greater of the two (for those EMDCs that qualify under both criteria). Eligible advanced countries are capped at their post second round or post-selective quota share, whichever is greater. Over-represented countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

**Table A4. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
95 Percent Protection -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	3.761	3.608	3.608	3.673	3.608	3.608	3.650	3.608	3.608
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.541	4.564	4.579	4.572	4.588	4.551	4.551	4.562	4.562
China 5/	3.996	7.917	8.128	6.078	6.641	6.879	5.747	6.444	6.325	6.325	6.560	6.560
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.287	3.273	3.257	3.256	3.237	3.279	3.279	3.270	3.270
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	2.221	1.866	1.653	2.288	1.966	2.092	2.092	1.925	1.925
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.242	2.194	2.194	2.357	2.200	2.194	2.194	2.194	2.194
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.721	2.763	2.809	2.687	2.763	2.748	2.748	2.774	2.774
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.650	2.692	2.696	2.564	2.614	2.666	2.666	2.679	2.679
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.815	1.769	1.769	1.779	1.779	1.769	1.769	1.769	1.769
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.553	1.363	1.261	1.619	1.462	1.637	1.490	1.402	1.402
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.155	2.245	2.271	2.055	2.164	2.083	2.192	2.226	2.226
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.814	1.894	1.948	1.837	1.923	1.789	1.849	1.888	1.888
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.765	1.825	1.844	1.703	1.776	1.718	1.790	1.813	1.813
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.213	1.169	1.169	1.274	1.186	1.268	1.177	1.169	1.169
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.768	1.865	1.907	1.715	1.835	1.705	1.811	1.852	1.852
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.367	1.372	1.376	1.368	1.374	1.378	1.369	1.372	1.372
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.840	0.703	0.621	0.865	0.739	0.899	0.790	0.725	0.725
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.897	0.897	0.897	0.905	0.897	0.897	0.897	0.897	0.897
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.711	0.623	0.570	0.741	0.668	0.624	0.682	0.641	0.641
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.800	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.796
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.943	0.958	0.962	0.919	0.938	0.928	0.949	0.954	0.954
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.696	0.696	0.696	0.712	0.696	0.704	0.696	0.696	0.696
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.795	0.798	0.800	0.796	0.799	0.794	0.797	0.798	0.798
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.638	0.565	0.550	0.667	0.608	0.671	0.615	0.581	0.581
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.769	0.775	0.778	0.765	0.773	0.777	0.772	0.774	0.774
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.831	0.865	0.879	0.813	0.854	0.809	0.846	0.860	0.860
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.710	0.728	0.732	0.682	0.704	0.694	0.718	0.724	0.724
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.939	1.026	1.059	0.877	0.983	0.879	0.977	1.012	1.012
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.699	0.725	0.736	0.685	0.717	0.682	0.710	0.721	0.721
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.899	0.984	1.020	0.853	0.958	0.845	0.937	0.972	0.972
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.449	0.384	0.345	0.465	0.408	0.477	0.426	0.396	0.396

**Table A4. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
95 Percent Protection -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round			GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
	Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/		50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
					Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.468	0.414	0.402	0.489	0.446	0.420	0.492	0.451	0.426	
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.654	0.733	0.788	0.677	0.763	0.818	0.629	0.689	0.728	
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.433	0.392	0.392	0.454	0.417	0.396	0.454	0.419	0.397	
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.386	0.329	0.295	0.399	0.349	0.319	0.410	0.366	0.339	
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.365	0.311	0.279	0.377	0.330	0.302	0.388	0.346	0.321	
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.488	0.503	0.514	0.492	0.509	0.520	0.483	0.495	0.502	
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.389	0.389	0.389	0.399	0.389	0.389	0.394	0.389	0.389	
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.392	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388	
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.426	0.421	0.417	0.418	0.411	0.405	0.426	0.423	0.420	
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.364	0.362	0.362	0.383	0.362	0.362	0.380	0.362	0.362	
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.436	0.438	0.440	0.436	0.439	0.440	0.435	0.437	0.438	
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.471	0.484	0.490	0.463	0.480	0.487	0.462	0.477	0.482	
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.417	0.422	0.423	0.410	0.416	0.416	0.413	0.419	0.421	
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.303	0.266	0.249	0.316	0.286	0.268	0.319	0.291	0.274	
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.368	0.371	0.372	0.367	0.370	0.371	0.367	0.369	0.370	
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.397	0.414	0.418	0.376	0.396	0.401	0.383	0.404	0.410	
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.546	0.609	0.636	0.512	0.590	0.622	0.505	0.574	0.600	
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.212	0.184	0.167	0.220	0.196	0.181	0.224	0.202	0.189	
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.276	0.278	0.278	0.273	0.275	0.276	0.274	0.277	0.277	
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.202	0.179	0.176	0.211	0.193	0.182	0.212	0.194	0.184	
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.157	0.137	0.125	0.163	0.147	0.137	0.165	0.150	0.141	
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.249	0.265	0.271	0.241	0.260	0.268	0.239	0.256	0.263	
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.255	0.276	0.285	0.244	0.269	0.280	0.242	0.264	0.273	
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.221	0.232	0.237	0.215	0.229	0.235	0.214	0.226	0.231	
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.251	0.298	0.330	0.265	0.316	0.349	0.236	0.272	0.295	
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.133	0.114	0.102	0.138	0.120	0.110	0.142	0.126	0.117	
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.137	0.136	0.136	0.144	0.136	0.136	0.143	0.136	0.136	
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.102	0.079	0.065	0.103	0.080	0.066	0.111	0.093	0.082	

**Table A4. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
95 Percent Protection -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.032	0.032	0.033	0.031	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.022	0.018	0.016	0.023	0.019	0.017	0.024	0.019	0.019
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.029	0.030	0.030
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.022	0.018	0.016	0.022	0.019	0.017	0.023	0.020	0.019
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.030	0.030	0.031	0.030	0.030	0.031	0.030	0.030	0.030
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.028	0.029	0.029	0.028	0.029	0.029	0.028	0.028	0.029
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.020	0.017	0.016	0.021	0.018	0.017	0.021	0.019	0.018
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.037	0.041	0.043	0.035	0.040	0.042	0.034	0.039	0.041
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.018	0.017	0.016	0.018	0.017	0.016
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.013	0.014	0.014	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.013	0.013	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.010	0.010	0.011	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.010
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Timor Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.006
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005

**Table A4. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
95 Percent Protection -- by Member (concluded) 1/**
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
				Comoros	0.0037	0.0019	0.0014	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.0037	0.0022	0.0015	0.0029	0.0025	0.0023	0.0030	0.0027	0.0025	0.0031	0.0028	0.0026
Bhutan	0.0036	0.0050	0.0044	0.0043	0.0045	0.0046	0.0042	0.0044	0.0045	0.0042	0.0044	0.0045
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.0035	0.0024	0.0018	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035
Dominica	0.0034	0.0017	0.0012	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034
Sao Tome and Principe	0.0031	0.0016	0.0005	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031
Tonga	0.0029	0.0013	0.0009	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029
Kiribati	0.0023	0.0018	0.0008	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.0021	0.0014	0.0011	0.0017	0.0015	0.0014	0.0018	0.0016	0.0015	0.0018	0.0016	0.0015
Marshall Islands	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0012	0.0010	0.0009	0.0012	0.0011	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011
Palau, Republic of	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0012	0.0010	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011
Tuvalu	0.0008	0.0004	0.0001	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005	0.0006	0.0006	0.0005

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the formula or with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 3). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-likeness based on the formula (for those EMDCs under-represented under the formula only), or the GDP-blend (for those EMDCs under-represented under the GDP blend only), or the greater of the two (for those EMDCs that qualify under both criteria). Eligible advanced countries are capped at their post second round or post-selective quota share, whichever is greater. Over-represented countries which would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at 95 percent of their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table A5. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; Full Protection -- by Member 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
	Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share		50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
				17.670	16.987	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.950	3.789	3.789	3.935	3.789	3.789
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.541	4.564	4.579	4.548	4.572	4.588	4.554	4.551	4.562
China 5/	3.996	7.917	8.128	6.121	6.555	6.716	5.787	6.316	6.540	5.780	6.269	6.473
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.289	3.266	3.241	3.258	3.226	3.194	3.289	3.276	3.264
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	2.221	1.866	1.653	2.288	1.966	1.774	2.372	2.092	1.925
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.357	2.303	2.303	2.343	2.303	2.303
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.653	2.695	2.720	2.646	2.700	2.733	2.629	2.670	2.691
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.658	2.673	2.653	2.572	2.582	2.559	2.619	2.655	2.659
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.908	1.857	1.857	1.898	1.857	1.857
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.533	1.363	1.324	1.619	1.462	1.368	1.637	1.490	1.402
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.165	2.221	2.222	2.065	2.127	2.132	2.101	2.178	2.202
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.814	1.894	1.948	1.837	1.923	1.978	1.789	1.849	1.888
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.771	1.810	1.813	1.709	1.753	1.759	1.729	1.781	1.798
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.274	1.227	1.227	1.268	1.227	1.227
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.700	1.770	1.805	1.674	1.762	1.810	1.655	1.727	1.760
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.367	1.372	1.376	1.368	1.374	1.378	1.365	1.369	1.372
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.840	0.703	0.621	0.865	0.739	0.664	0.899	0.790	0.725
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.711	0.623	0.597	0.741	0.668	0.624	0.751	0.682	0.641
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.945	0.953	0.950	0.921	0.929	0.926	0.932	0.946	0.949
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.795	0.798	0.800	0.796	0.799	0.802	0.794	0.797	0.798
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.638	0.578	0.578	0.667	0.608	0.578	0.671	0.615	0.581
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.755	0.762	0.767	0.757	0.757	0.770	0.753	0.758	0.762
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.819	0.844	0.856	0.806	0.837	0.853	0.802	0.829	0.841
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.713	0.722	0.718	0.684	0.693	0.689	0.698	0.714	0.717
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.947	1.010	1.029	0.884	0.960	0.986	0.892	0.967	0.996
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.647	0.674	0.692	0.655	0.684	0.702	0.639	0.659	0.672
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.730	0.817	0.877	0.755	0.850	0.910	0.702	0.768	0.812
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.449	0.384	0.345	0.465	0.408	0.373	0.477	0.426	0.396

Table A5. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; Full Protection -- by Member (continued) 1,
(In percent)

	Post Second Round			GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
	Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/		50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.488	0.422	0.422	0.489	0.446	0.422	0.492	0.451	0.426	
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.654	0.733	0.788	0.677	0.763	0.818	0.629	0.689	0.728	
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.433	0.411	0.411	0.454	0.417	0.411	0.454	0.419	0.411	
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.386	0.329	0.295	0.399	0.349	0.319	0.410	0.366	0.339	
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.365	0.311	0.279	0.377	0.330	0.302	0.388	0.346	0.321	
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.488	0.503	0.514	0.492	0.509	0.520	0.483	0.495	0.502	
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.426	0.420	0.412	0.418	0.408	0.399	0.427	0.423	0.419	
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.383	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.436	0.438	0.440	0.436	0.439	0.440	0.435	0.437	0.438	
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.428	0.428	0.429	0.428	0.429	0.429	0.428	0.428	0.428	
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.443	0.457	0.467	0.447	0.463	0.472	0.439	0.449	0.456	
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.418	0.420	0.419	0.411	0.413	0.412	0.414	0.418	0.419	
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.303	0.266	0.262	0.316	0.286	0.268	0.319	0.291	0.274	
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.363	0.366	0.368	0.364	0.367	0.369	0.362	0.364	0.366	
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.399	0.409	0.408	0.378	0.388	0.387	0.386	0.401	0.405	
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.420	0.485	0.529	0.439	0.509	0.554	0.399	0.448	0.481	
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.212	0.184	0.167	0.220	0.196	0.181	0.224	0.202	0.189	
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.276	0.277	0.277	0.273	0.274	0.274	0.275	0.276	0.277	
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.202	0.185	0.185	0.211	0.193	0.185	0.212	0.194	0.185	
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.157	0.137	0.129	0.163	0.147	0.137	0.165	0.150	0.141	
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.230	0.240	0.246	0.229	0.242	0.251	0.224	0.234	0.239	
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.227	0.241	0.250	0.227	0.245	0.258	0.220	0.233	0.240	
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.198	0.210	0.218	0.202	0.214	0.223	0.194	0.203	0.209	
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.251	0.298	0.330	0.265	0.316	0.349	0.236	0.272	0.295	
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.133	0.114	0.102	0.138	0.120	0.110	0.142	0.126	0.117	
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.144	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.102	0.079	0.065	0.103	0.080	0.066	0.111	0.093	0.082	

Table A5. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; Full Protection -- by Member (continued) 1,
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.031	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.022	0.018	0.016	0.023	0.019	0.017	0.024	0.021	0.019
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.029	0.030	0.030	0.029	0.029	0.029
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.022	0.018	0.016	0.022	0.019	0.017	0.023	0.020	0.019
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.029	0.030	0.030	0.029	0.029	0.029
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.028	0.029	0.029	0.028	0.028	0.029	0.028	0.028	0.029
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.020	0.017	0.016	0.021	0.018	0.017	0.021	0.019	0.018
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.029	0.033	0.036	0.030	0.035	0.038	0.028	0.031	0.033
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.018	0.017	0.016	0.018	0.017	0.016
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.010	0.010	0.011	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.010
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Timor Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004

Table A5. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; Full Protection -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Comoros	0.0037	0.0019	0.0014	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.0037	0.0022	0.0015	0.0029	0.0025	0.0023	0.0030	0.0027	0.0025	0.0031	0.0028	0.0026
Bhutan	0.0036	0.0050	0.0044	0.0041	0.0042	0.0043	0.0041	0.0042	0.0043	0.0040	0.0041	0.0042
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.0035	0.0024	0.0018	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035
Dominica	0.0034	0.0017	0.0012	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034
Sao Tome and Principe	0.0031	0.0016	0.0005	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031
Tonga	0.0029	0.0013	0.0009	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029
Kiribati	0.0023	0.0018	0.0008	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.0021	0.0014	0.0011	0.0017	0.0015	0.0014	0.0018	0.0016	0.0015	0.0018	0.0016	0.0015
Marshall Islands	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0012	0.0010	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011
Palau, Republic of	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0012	0.0010	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011
Tuvalu	0.0008	0.0004	0.0001	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005	0.0006	0.0006	0.0005

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 3). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lininess based on the GDP blend. Eligible advanced countries are capped at their post second round or post-selective quota share, whichever is greater. Over-represented countries that would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share. The quota shares of EMDCs and advanced economies that are under-represented under the formula but not eligible for the ad hoc are protected at their post-selective quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; 95 Percent Protection -- by Member 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
	Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share		50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
				17.670	16.987	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408	5.408
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	3.761	3.608	3.608	3.950	3.673	3.608	3.935	3.650	3.608
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.541	4.564	4.579	4.548	4.572	4.588	4.534	4.551	4.562
China 5/	3.996	7.917	8.128	6.402	6.966	7.161	5.936	6.656	6.907	5.976	6.650	6.872
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.301	3.296	3.285	3.266	3.254	3.237	3.296	3.297	3.292
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	2.221	1.866	1.653	2.288	1.966	1.774	2.372	2.092	1.925
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.242	2.194	2.194	2.357	2.209	2.194	2.343	2.194	2.194
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.666	2.709	2.728	2.652	2.709	2.736	2.686	2.686	2.704
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.710	2.765	2.771	2.601	2.666	2.668	2.653	2.731	2.748
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.815	1.769	1.769	1.908	1.779	1.769	1.898	1.769	1.769
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.533	1.363	1.261	1.619	1.462	1.368	1.637	1.490	1.402
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.234	2.334	2.358	2.103	2.226	2.253	2.147	2.276	2.311
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.814	1.894	1.948	1.837	1.923	1.978	1.789	1.849	1.888
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.815	1.881	1.897	1.733	1.814	1.834	1.759	1.842	1.866
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.213	1.169	1.169	1.274	1.186	1.169	1.268	1.177	1.169
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.729	1.806	1.838	1.689	1.790	1.833	1.676	1.764	1.796
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.367	1.372	1.376	1.368	1.374	1.378	1.365	1.369	1.372
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.840	0.703	0.621	0.865	0.739	0.664	0.899	0.790	0.725
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.897	0.897	0.897	0.905	0.897	0.897	0.897	0.897	0.897
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.711	0.623	0.570	0.741	0.668	0.624	0.751	0.682	0.641
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.800	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.796	0.796
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.960	0.979	0.982	0.930	0.952	0.955	0.942	0.968	0.974
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.696	0.696	0.696	0.712	0.696	0.696	0.704	0.696	0.696
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.795	0.798	0.800	0.796	0.799	0.802	0.794	0.797	0.798
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.638	0.565	0.550	0.667	0.608	0.573	0.671	0.615	0.581
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.755	0.762	0.767	0.757	0.757	0.770	0.753	0.758	0.762
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.832	0.862	0.873	0.813	0.851	0.866	0.811	0.845	0.857
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.731	0.753	0.757	0.694	0.721	0.724	0.710	0.740	0.747
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.996	1.085	1.113	0.910	1.023	1.058	0.926	1.034	1.068
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.647	0.674	0.692	0.655	0.684	0.702	0.639	0.659	0.672
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.730	0.817	0.877	0.755	0.850	0.910	0.702	0.768	0.812
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.449	0.384	0.345	0.465	0.408	0.373	0.477	0.426	0.396

Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; 95 Percent Protection -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round			GDP Blend			0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
	Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Share 3/	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.488	0.414	0.402	0.489	0.446	0.420	0.492	0.451	0.426			
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488	0.488			
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.654	0.733	0.788	0.677	0.763	0.818	0.629	0.689	0.728			
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.433	0.392	0.392	0.454	0.417	0.396	0.454	0.419	0.397			
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.386	0.329	0.295	0.399	0.349	0.319	0.410	0.366	0.339			
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.365	0.311	0.279	0.377	0.330	0.302	0.388	0.346	0.321			
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.488	0.503	0.514	0.492	0.509	0.520	0.483	0.495	0.502			
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.389	0.389	0.389	0.399	0.389	0.389	0.394	0.389	0.389			
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.392	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388	0.388			
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.429	0.427	0.424	0.420	0.416	0.411	0.429	0.428	0.426			
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.364	0.362	0.362	0.383	0.362	0.362	0.380	0.362	0.362			
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.436	0.438	0.440	0.436	0.439	0.440	0.435	0.437	0.438			
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.428	0.428	0.429	0.428	0.429	0.429	0.428	0.428	0.428			
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.443	0.457	0.467	0.447	0.463	0.472	0.439	0.449	0.456			
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.423	0.429	0.429	0.413	0.420	0.421	0.417	0.425	0.427			
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.303	0.266	0.249	0.316	0.286	0.268	0.319	0.291	0.274			
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.363	0.366	0.368	0.364	0.367	0.369	0.362	0.364	0.366			
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.413	0.433	0.437	0.385	0.409	0.413	0.396	0.421	0.428			
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.420	0.485	0.529	0.439	0.509	0.554	0.399	0.448	0.481			
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.212	0.184	0.167	0.220	0.196	0.181	0.224	0.202	0.189			
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.278	0.280	0.281	0.274	0.277	0.277	0.276	0.279	0.280			
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.202	0.179	0.176	0.211	0.193	0.182	0.212	0.194	0.184			
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224			
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224			
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205			
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.157	0.137	0.125	0.163	0.147	0.137	0.165	0.150	0.141			
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.232	0.242	0.247	0.230	0.243	0.251	0.226	0.237	0.241			
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.230	0.243	0.250	0.228	0.246	0.258	0.223	0.236	0.242			
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.198	0.210	0.218	0.202	0.214	0.223	0.194	0.203	0.209			
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.251	0.298	0.330	0.265	0.316	0.349	0.236	0.272	0.295			
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.133	0.114	0.102	0.138	0.120	0.110	0.142	0.126	0.117			
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.137	0.136	0.136	0.144	0.136	0.136	0.143	0.136	0.136			
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155			
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143			
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.102	0.079	0.065	0.103	0.080	0.066	0.111	0.093	0.082			

Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; 95 Percent Protection -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/				
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%		
				Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.135	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.293	0.222	0.239	0.243	0.200	0.221	0.225	0.207	0.229	0.235		
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.049	0.107	0.090	0.079	0.110	0.094	0.085	0.114	0.100	0.092		
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.054	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.117	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.062	0.101	0.087	0.079	0.105	0.093	0.086	0.107	0.096	0.090		
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.156	0.149	0.154	0.159	0.148	0.156	0.163	0.145	0.151	0.154		
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.103	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.109	0.109		
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.142	0.142	0.155	0.164	0.146	0.160	0.170	0.139	0.148	0.154		
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.078	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116		
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.102	0.120	0.123	0.125	0.121	0.124	0.126	0.119	0.121	0.123		
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.036	0.086	0.072	0.063	0.088	0.075	0.067	0.092	0.081	0.074		
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.078	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114		
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.068	0.125	0.133	0.138	0.127	0.136	0.142	0.122	0.128	0.132		
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.072	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108		
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.072	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102		
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.106	0.109	0.114	0.118	0.110	0.116	0.120	0.107	0.111	0.100		
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.105	0.099	0.100	0.101	0.097	0.099	0.099	0.097	0.099	0.100		
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.027	0.069	0.058	0.051	0.071	0.061	0.055	0.073	0.065	0.060		
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.092	0.090	0.090	0.090	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.090		
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.053	0.075	0.075	0.075	0.078	0.075	0.075	0.077	0.075	0.075		
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.058	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083		
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.069	0.074	0.074	0.074	0.074	0.074	0.074	0.074	0.074	0.074		
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078		
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.095	0.090	0.093	0.094	0.089	0.093	0.095	0.088	0.091	0.092		
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.044	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076		
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.045	0.079	0.083	0.085	0.080	0.084	0.086	0.078	0.081	0.083		
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.050	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072		
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.059	0.060	0.057	0.057	0.063	0.059	0.057	0.063	0.058	0.057		
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.047	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072		
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.042	0.058	0.053	0.053	0.061	0.056	0.053	0.061	0.056	0.054		
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	0.068	0.041	0.029	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068		
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.033	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068		
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.089	0.080	0.083	0.083	0.077	0.081	0.082	0.077	0.081	0.082		
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.046	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062		

Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; 95 Percent Protection -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/			
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	
				Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.032	0.033	0.033	0.032	0.032	0.033
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.022	0.018	0.016	0.022	0.023	0.019	0.023	0.024	0.021	0.019
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.029	0.030	0.030	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.022	0.018	0.016	0.022	0.019	0.017	0.023	0.023	0.020	0.019
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.029	0.030	0.030	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.028	0.029	0.029	0.028	0.028	0.029	0.029
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.020	0.017	0.016	0.021	0.018	0.017	0.021	0.021	0.019	0.018
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.029	0.033	0.036	0.030	0.035	0.038	0.028	0.028	0.031	0.033
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.018	0.017	0.016	0.018	0.018	0.017	0.016
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.010	0.010	0.011	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Timor Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004

Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on the GDP Blend; 95 Percent Protection -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/			0/75/25 4/			20/50/30 4/		
				50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%	50%	100%	150%
				Comoros	0.0037	0.0019	0.0014	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037	0.0037
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.0037	0.0022	0.0015	0.0029	0.0025	0.0023	0.0030	0.0027	0.0025	0.0031	0.0028	0.0026
Bhutan	0.0036	0.0050	0.0044	0.0041	0.0043	0.0043	0.0041	0.0043	0.0044	0.0040	0.0042	0.0043
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.0035	0.0024	0.0018	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035	0.0035
Dominica	0.0034	0.0017	0.0012	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034	0.0034
Sao Tome and Principe	0.0031	0.0016	0.0005	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031	0.0031
Tonga	0.0029	0.0013	0.0009	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029	0.0029
Kiribati	0.0023	0.0018	0.0008	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023	0.0023
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.0021	0.0014	0.0011	0.0017	0.0015	0.0014	0.0018	0.0016	0.0015	0.0018	0.0016	0.0015
Marshall Islands	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0012	0.0010	0.0009	0.0012	0.0011	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011
Palau, Republic of	0.0015	0.0010	0.0007	0.0012	0.0010	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0010	0.0012	0.0011	0.0011
Tuvalu	0.0008	0.0004	0.0001	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005	0.0006	0.0005	0.0005	0.0006	0.0006	0.0005

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend (see footnote 3). Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lininess based on the GDP blend. Eligible advanced countries are capped at their post second round or post-selective quota share, whichever is greater. Over-represented countries that would become under-represented as a result of the overall quota increase are capped at 95 percent of their calculated quota share. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share. The quota shares of EMDCs and advanced economies that are under-represented under the formula but not eligible for the ad hoc are protected at their post-selective quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo which became a member on June 29, 2009 and Tuvalu in anticipation of its forthcoming membership. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

**Table A7. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend;
Alternative Protection Mechanisms for Poorest Members -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Individual PRGT protection 4/		Group PRGT protection 5/		Individual PCDR protection 6/	
				0/75/25 7/	20/50/30 7/	0/75/25 7/	20/50/30 7/	0/75/25 7/	20/50/30 7/
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.572	4.551	4.572	4.551	4.572	4.551
China 8/	3.996	7.917	8.128	6.177	6.026	6.199	6.048	6.255	6.104
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.214	3.263	3.216	3.264	3.221	3.267
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	1.966	2.092	1.966	2.092	1.966	2.092
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.736	2.717	2.738	2.719	2.744	2.725
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.548	2.606	2.554	2.611	2.567	2.622
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.462	1.490	1.462	1.490	1.462	1.490
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.087	2.116	2.093	2.122	2.109	2.136
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.923	1.849	1.923	1.849	1.923	1.849
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.728	1.742	1.732	1.746	1.742	1.755
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.792	1.761	1.795	1.765	1.804	1.774
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.374	1.369	1.374	1.369	1.374	1.369
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.739	0.790	0.739	0.790	0.739	0.790
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.668	0.682	0.668	0.682	0.668	0.682
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.919	0.932	0.921	0.933	0.925	0.936
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.799	0.797	0.799	0.797	0.799	0.797
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.608	0.615	0.608	0.615	0.608	0.615
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.770	0.768	0.771	0.769	0.771	0.769
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735	0.735	0.718	0.710	0.546	0.560
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.839	0.829	0.841	0.830	0.844	0.833
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.682	0.697	0.684	0.699	0.688	0.702
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.934	0.924	0.938	0.928	0.948	0.938
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.705	0.697	0.706	0.698	0.709	0.701
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.920	0.894	0.923	0.897	0.931	0.905
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.408	0.426	0.408	0.426	0.408	0.426

Table A7. Illustrative Scenarios: Ad hoc Increase Allocated Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend; Alternative Protection Mechanisms for Poorest Members -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Individual PRGT protection 4/		Group PRGT protection 5/		Individual PCDR protection 6/	
	Quota Share 2/	Quota Share			20/50/30 7/		20/50/30 7/		20/50/30 7/	
					0/75/25 7/	0/75/25 7/	0/75/25 7/	0/75/25 7/	0/75/25 7/	0/75/25 7/
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.446	0.451	0.446	0.451	0.446	0.451	
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.763	0.689	0.763	0.689	0.763	0.689	
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.417	0.419	0.417	0.419	0.417	0.419	
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.349	0.366	0.349	0.366	0.349	0.366	
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.330	0.346	0.330	0.346	0.330	0.346	
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.509	0.495	0.509	0.495	0.509	0.495	
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.405	0.419	0.406	0.419	0.407	0.420	
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.439	0.437	0.439	0.437	0.439	0.437	
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429	
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.474	0.470	0.475	0.470	0.476	0.472	
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.410	0.414	0.410	0.414	0.412	0.415	
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.286	0.291	0.286	0.291	0.286	0.291	
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.369	0.368	0.369	0.368	0.369	0.368	
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.380	0.388	0.381	0.389	0.384	0.392	
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.562	0.542	0.564	0.544	0.570	0.550	
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.196	0.202	0.196	0.202	0.196	0.202	
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.273	0.275	0.273	0.275	0.274	0.275	
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.193	0.194	0.193	0.194	0.193	0.194	
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224	0.274	0.275	0.224	0.224	
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224	0.164	0.181	0.224	0.224	
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205	0.154	0.168	0.205	0.205	
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.147	0.150	0.147	0.150	0.147	0.150	
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.253	0.248	0.333	0.315	0.255	0.250	
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.260	0.254	0.261	0.255	0.263	0.257	
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.224	0.220	0.224	0.221	0.225	0.222	
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.316	0.272	0.316	0.272	0.316	0.272	
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.120	0.126	0.120	0.126	0.120	0.126	
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155	0.126	0.133	0.155	0.155	
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.080	0.093	0.080	0.093	0.148	0.148	

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

**Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares:
Further Considerations—Simulation Requests**

Prepared by the Finance Department

Approved by Andrew Tweedie

August 27, 2010

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Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Simulation Requests from Executive Directors¹

This paper presents quota simulations that were requested by Executive Directors either at the July 7 meeting of the Committee of the Whole for the 14th General Review of Quotas or communicated shortly thereafter. To further clarify these requests, staff followed up with Executive Directors and their offices. With a view to keep the number of simulations at a manageable level, the simulations presented here typically focus on a representative subset of the requests. The main assumptions, per the requests of Executive Directors, are discussed below. The requests were often made with respect to staff's illustrative simulations for the July 7 Committee meeting; for ease of reference, the assumptions underlying these illustrative simulations are also attached.²

(i) A smaller overall quota increase—Mr. Alazzaz (Tables 1 and A1)

An overall quota increase of 30 percent is assumed, using Sets 1, 2 and 3 from the June Paper (*Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations*), with 0/60/40 allocation (equiproportional/selective/ad hoc), and full protection for over-represented countries against becoming under-represented.

(ii) Formula-based approach with a large selective increase—Mr. Callesen (Tables 2 and A2)

Assuming overall increases of 50%, 100%, and 150%, an initial ad hoc increase is applied to all under-represented countries to ensure that two-thirds of their out-of-lineness (difference between calculated and post second round quota share) is eliminated. The remaining increase is then distributed selectively and as an additional ad hoc to ensure that over-represented countries are protected at their calculated quota share and PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

(iii) Sets 2 in the June paper with full protection at calculated quota share or the GDP blend share, whichever is greater—Mr. Fayolle and Mr. Gibbs (Tables 3 and A3)

Assuming an overall increase of 100 percent, Set 2 in the June paper is modified so that countries that are over-represented with respect to the quota formula or with respect to the

¹ Prepared by a staff team led by S. Bassett and comprising H. Lin, R. Rozenov, L. Kohler, H. Treichel, C. Visconti, B. Wennerholm, and C. Reinisch. T. Krueger (all FIN) also contributed.

² See also *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations* (6/22/2010).

GDP blend are protected at the calculated quota share or the GDP blend share, whichever is greater.

- (iv) Update the simulations in the March paper (*Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares—Initial Considerations*), using the data set through 2008—Mr. Guzmán and Mr. Stein (Tables 4 and A4)**

Using the updated quota data set through 2008, this simulation set updates the simulations in Tables 7, 9 and 11 of the March paper (*Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares—Initial Considerations*) which allocate the ad hoc quota increase to all under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs based on an overall increase of 100 percent. See Attachment II for further information on assumptions in the March paper.

- (v) Sets 2 and 3 in *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations*, assuming all countries, including advanced, participate fully in the ad hoc increase—Mr. Hockin (Tables 5 and A5)**

Assuming an overall quota increase of 100 percent, Sets 2 and 3 in the June paper are modified so that all eligible countries participate fully in the ad hoc quota increases. The simulations assume full protection for over-represented countries at their calculated quota share. In particular:

- For Set 2, Emerging Market and Developing Countries (EMDCs) and advanced countries that are under-represented under the quota formula or the GDP blend receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the quota formula or the GDP blend, whichever is greater.
- For Set 3, EMDCs and advanced countries receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the GDP blend variable; EMDCs and advanced countries that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula but not with respect to the GDP blend are protected at their post selective quota share (as before).

- (vi) Formula-based approach with large selective increase—Mr. Kiekens (Tables 6 and A6)**

Overall increases of 50%, 100%, and 150% are assumed which are primarily selective (i.e., allocated on the basis of members' calculated quota shares). A small ad hoc increase is applied so that the simulated quota shares of all under-represented countries are at least 85 percent of their calculated quota share; over-represented countries are protected at their calculated quota share; and PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

(vii) Set 2 in the June paper with additional protection for countries that contribute more than proportionally (based on their quota share) to the non-GRA financed activities and the NAB—Mr. Kotegawa (Tables 7 and A7)

The simulations are based on Set 2 in *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations* (Table 4A) with an overall increase of 100% and distributed in the proportion of 0/60/40 and 0/75/25. An additional amount is allocated to countries based on their contributions provided: (1) the country contributes to all of the following activities: PRGT, externally financed Fund technical assistance and the NAB; and (2) its average share in contributions relative to its post second round quota share (the Average Misalignment Factor (AMF), as defined in Mr. Weber’s scenario) is greater than 2. The eligible member may be either over-represented or under-represented under the formula. In cases where the eligible country was “capped” in Set 2, the cap is removed. For the eligible countries, their new quota share would be equal to the average of their post second round quota share (PSRQS) and the quota share that results from the selective and ad hoc increases as in Set 2 (SET2QS) increased by the AMF in percentage points (e.g. an AMF of 2 would imply a 2 percent increase in SET2QS): $(PSRQS + SET2QS * (1 + AMF/100))/2$.

(viii) Sets 2 and 3 in the June paper with a higher ad hoc element, the GDP blend without compression, and a wider range of overall increases—Ms. Lundsager (Tables 8a, 8b, A8a, and A8b)

Sets 2 and 3 in the June paper are modified so that the ad hoc increase uses an uncompressed GDP blend (instead of the compressed GDP blend) as a distribution key. Overall quota increases of 35%, 50%, 75% and 100% are allocated between equiproportional/selective/ad hoc in the proportion of 0/30/70 percent, respectively. In addition, countries that would become under-represented are provided full protection at their calculated quota share.

(ix) Increases allocated on the basis of members’ calculated quota share and PPP GDP share—Mr. Mozhin and Mr. Virmani (Tables 9 and A9)

The simulation assumes an overall quota increase of 100 percent. An increase of 15 percent is allocated on the basis of members’ calculated quota shares. The remaining 85 percent is allocated on the basis of members’ PPP GDP share, compressed by a factor of 0.95, and to ensure that PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round quota share.

(x) Set 3 in the June paper using compressed PPP GDP as the distribution key, 85 percent protection for countries that are over-represented under the formula or PPP GDP —Mr. Virmani (Tables 10 and A10)

Set 3 in the June paper (*Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations*) is modified so that the ad hoc increase uses compressed PPP GDP (using a compression factor of 0.95) as the distribution key instead of the compressed GDP

blend. The caps and floors are modified as follows: (i) countries that are over-represented with respect to the quota formula or with respect to PPP GDP are allowed to become under-represented with respect to the quota formula or PPP GDP share by up to 15 percent (or protected at 85 percent of their calculated quota share or 85 percent of the PPP GDP share), respectively; (ii) eligible advanced countries (those which are under-represented with respect to PPP GDP) are capped at their post selective or post-second round quota share, whichever is greater. Two variations are shown, one in which advanced countries and EMDCs that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula but not eligible for an ad hoc increase are protected at their post selective quota share (as in Set 3 in *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations*) and one without this protection. Four simulations are run with an overall increase of 100 percent distributed in the proportion of 0/60/40 and 0/40/60.

(xi) Set 2 in the June paper with additional protection for countries that contribute more than proportionally (based on their quota share) to the non-GRA financed activities and the NAB—Mr. Weber (Tables 11 and A11)

Simulations based on Set 2 in *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations* are included, with an overall quota increase of 100 percent and a 0/60/40 (equiproportional/selective/ad hoc) distribution. A country would need to meet the following criteria to qualify for additional protection based on contributions: (1) Contribute to all of the following activities: PRGT, externally financed Fund technical assistance and the NAB; (2) The country's average share in contributions is greater than its post second round quota share; and (3) The country is over-represented and will lose quota share relative to its post second round quota share. The maximum loss in quota share for an over-represented country (AQS-CQS) is reduced in proportion to the country's average out-of-lineness (AMF) with respect to the four categories of financial contributions (PRGT loans, PRGT subsidies, technical assistance and the NAB). The out-of-lineness (AMF) is defined as the country's share in the financial contribution divided by its post second round quota share.

Attachment 1. Assumptions for Ad hoc Increases in June Quota Paper (*Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations*)

Methods used for allocating ad hoc increases:

Set 1: Ad hoc increases to dynamic EMDCs (Tables 3A and 3B, and Tables A1 and A2).

The ad hoc increases are allocated mainly to under-represented EMDCs and other EMDCs that meet the dynamic criterion based on their share in PPP GDP (see Box 1 of *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares: Further Considerations*). Eligible over-represented EMDCs receive a given fixed percentage increase over their post selective nominal quota — “the minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs;” eligible under-represented EMDCs receive the uniform reduction of out-of-lineness or the minimum ad hoc increase allocated to dynamic EMDCs, whichever is greater; advanced countries that are under-represented under the quota formula are protected at their post selective quota share.

Set 2: Ad hoc increases to countries that are under-represented either with respect to the quota formula or with respect to the GDP blend variable.³ A country is under-represented with respect to the GDP blend if its post selective quota share⁴ is smaller than its share in the GDP blend variable.

EMDCs that are under-represented under the quota formula only, receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the quota formula; EMDCs that are under-represented under the GDP blend only, receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the GDP blend variable; EMDCs that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula as well as with respect to the GDP blend variable, receive the greater of the two uniform reductions; advanced countries that are under-represented under the GDP blend only are capped at their post second round quota share; advanced countries that are under-represented under the quota formula only or under both criteria, are capped at their post selective quota share.

Set 3: Ad hoc increases to countries that are under-represented with respect to the GDP blend variable.

Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the GDP blend variable; eligible advanced countries that are over-represented with respect to the quota formula are capped at their post second round quota share; eligible advanced countries that

³ Consistent with the quota formula, the GDP blend variable is a weighted average of GDP at market prices (60 percent) and PPP GDP (40 percent), compressed by a factor of 0.95.

⁴ A country’s post selective quota share is the simulated quota share that would result if only the equiproportional and selective increase were implemented.

are under-represented with respect to the quota formula are capped at their post selective quota share; countries that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula but not with respect to the GDP blend are protected at their post selective quota share

Protection for over-represented countries: countries that are over-represented with respect to the quota formula are either fully or partially protected against becoming under-represented. With full protection, the simulated quota share of an over-represented country cannot fall below its calculated quota share. With partial protection, the simulated quota share of an over-represented country cannot fall below 95 percent of its calculated quota share.⁵

Protection for the poorest: PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

⁵ Specifically, to ensure that countries do not become out-of-line by more than 5 percent, the lower limit is set at $CQS/(1+0.05)$ which is equal to 95.24 percent of calculated quota share.

Attachment 2. Assumptions for Ad hoc Increases in March Quota Paper (*Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares—Initial Considerations*)

In addition to purely selective increases (Tables 5 and 3a of *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares—Initial Considerations*), ad hoc increases were illustrated based on three different groups of countries:

- (i) **all under-represented countries:** all eligible under-represented advanced countries and EMDCs receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness (as measured by the difference between its calculated and post-selective/equiproportional quota share). Table 6 and 4a of *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares—Initial Considerations*;
- (ii) **all under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs:** In case (ii), eligible under-represented advanced countries receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness. Eligible under-represented EMDCs receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota, whichever is greater; eligible over-represented EMDCs receive the minimum percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota. Tables 7, 9, 11, 5a, 7a, and 9a of *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares—Initial Considerations*.
- (iii) **dynamic EMDCs:** dynamic EMDCs include all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and not over-represented by more than 25 percent. Eligible under-represented EMDCs receive a uniform proportionate reduction in out-of-lineness or the minimum percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota, whichever is greater; eligible over-represented EMDCs receive the minimum percentage increase above their post selective nominal quota. For under-represented advanced economies, which are assumed to forego ad hoc increases, their final quota share cannot fall below their post second round quota share. Tables 8, 10, 12, 6a, 8a, and 10a of *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares—Initial Considerations*.

Protection of over-represented countries: countries are protected against becoming under-represented (they receive at least their calculated quota share) except in the simulations which included an equiproportional element and a small ad hoc quota increase (Tables 11-12 and 9a-10a of *Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares—Initial Considerations*).

Protection of the Poorest: PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

**Table 1. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Alazzaz 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Ad hoc Increase to		
				Dynamic EMDCs 4/	Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 5/	the GDP Blend 6/
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	57.5	58.5	58.5
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	43.0	44.1	44.1
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.0	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.4	14.4	14.4
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	42.5	41.5	41.5
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	35.0	34.2	34.3
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.8	4.7	4.7
Asia 7/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.5	14.7	14.8
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	7.1	7.0	7.0
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.6	7.7	7.8
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.5	7.3	7.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:						
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	30.3	30.5	30.5
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.2	3.2	3.2
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)				4.9	3.8	3.8
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				4.6	3.5	3.5
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 8/				4.7	3.6	3.6
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				3.0	1.9	1.9
Uniform reduction factor 9/				41.4	23.2	29.6
Minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs				15.0		

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 30 percent increase of post second round quotas. The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of 0/60/40, respectively. Overrepresented countries are protected at their calculated quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ Corresponds to Set 1 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 3A).

5/ Corresponds to Set 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A).

6/ Corresponds to Set 3 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 5A).

7/ Including Korea and Singapore.

8/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

9/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share or GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share, whichever is applicable.

**Table 2. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Callesen 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	57.6	57.6	57.6
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	42.7	42.7	42.7
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	14.9	14.9	14.9
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	42.4	42.4	42.4
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	35.0	34.9	34.9
Africa	4.9	3.1	4.7	4.6	4.6
Asia 3/	12.6	17.7	16.0	16.3	16.5
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	7.0	6.7	6.5
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	7.4	7.3	7.2
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	7.4	7.5	7.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:					
EU 27	31.9	31.3	30.6	30.6	30.7
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	4.3	4.3	4.4
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	3.2	3.2	3.2
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)			6.2	7.0	7.4
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)			5.4	6.0	6.4
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 4/			5.3	5.9	6.3
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)			2.9	2.9	2.8
Size of					
Initial ad hoc increase			11.5	11.5	11.5
Selective increase			31.8	80.0	128.2
Additional ad hoc increase			6.7	8.5	10.3

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. An initial ad hoc increase is applied to all under-represented countries to ensure that two-thirds of their respective out-of-lineness (difference between calculated and post second round quota share) is reduced. A selective approach is then applied for any additional quota increases. An additional ad hoc increase ensures that over-represented countries are protected at their calculated quota share and PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ Including Korea and Singapore.

4/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

**Table 3. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Fayolle and Mr. Gibbs 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/	20/50/30 4/
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	58.4	58.6	58.4
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	44.1	44.1	44.1
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.7	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.3	14.5	14.3
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	41.6	41.4	41.6
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	34.2	34.0	34.2
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.6	4.6	4.6
Asia 5/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.8	15.5	15.4
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.4	6.5	6.7
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.5	7.4	7.5
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.3	7.4	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:						
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	30.6	30.7	30.6
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.2	3.1	3.2
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)				6.0	5.7	5.2
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				5.3	4.9	4.7
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 6/				5.5	5.0	4.8
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				2.1	1.9	2.0
Uniform reduction factor 7/				27.2	16.3	25.9

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The assumptions correspond to Set 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A) except that countries that are over-represented with respect to the quota formula or with respect to the GDP blend are protected at the calculated quota share or their GDP blend share, whichever is greater.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Including Korea and Singapore.

6/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

7/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share or GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share, whichever is applicable.

**Table 4. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Guzmán and Mr. Stein 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Ad hoc Increase to all under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs 3/					
			0/40/60 4/ 7/	0/50/50 4/ 7/	0/87.5/12.5 5/ 7/	0/90/10 5/ 7/	20/70/10 6/ 7/	20/72.5/7.5 6/ 7/
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	57.6	57.6	57.9	58.1	57.5	58.0
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	42.8	42.9	43.0	43.1	42.5	42.9
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0	16.5	16.8
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	14.7	14.8	14.9	15.0	15.1	15.1
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	42.4	42.4	42.1	41.9	42.5	42.0
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	34.8	34.8	34.5	34.4	34.9	34.5
Africa	4.9	3.1	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.7	4.7
Asia 8/	12.6	17.7	16.5	16.5	15.8	15.7	15.7	15.4
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	6.3	6.4	6.7	6.7	6.9	6.9
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	7.5	7.4	7.5	7.4	7.6	7.5
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	7.7	7.6	7.5	7.5	7.6	7.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:								
EU 27	31.9	31.3	30.6	30.6	30.8	30.9	31.0	31.2
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)			7.7	7.6	6.3	6.2	6.1	5.6
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)			6.6	6.4	5.3	5.1	5.1	4.6
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 9/			6.9	6.7	5.4	5.1	5.2	4.6
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)			2.9	2.9	2.5	2.4	2.9	2.4
Uniform reduction factor 10/			49.1	49.5	19.6	18.0	28.4	22.3
Minimum ad hoc increase to dynamic EMDCs			60.0	45.0	10.0	7.0	10.0	5.0

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ See footnote 9 for definition of other dynamic EMDCs.

4/ Corresponds to Table 7 in Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Initial Considerations.

5/ Corresponds to Table 9 in Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Initial Considerations.

6/ Corresponds to Table 11 in Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Initial Considerations.

7/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

8/ Including Korea and Singapore.

9/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

10/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share.

Table 5. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Hockin 1/

(In percent)

	Post-Second Round Quota Share 2/	GDP Blend 3/	GDP Blend 3/	Ad hoc Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 4/			Ad hoc Based on the GDP Blend 5/		
				0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/	0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	59.1	58.8	59.1	59.2	58.9	59.2
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	44.5	44.1	44.5	44.7	44.3	44.7
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	18.3	18.0	18.2	18.4	18.1	18.4
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.6	14.7	14.6	14.5	14.7	14.5
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	40.9	41.2	40.9	40.8	41.1	40.8
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	33.6	33.8	33.6	33.6	33.8	33.6
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.6
Asia 7/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.4	15.4	15.0	15.4	15.4	15.0
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.3	6.5	6.6	6.3	6.5	6.5
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.3	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.5
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.3	7.3	7.3	7.2	7.3	7.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:									
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	30.6	30.6	30.5	30.4	30.6	30.4
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)				5.8	5.7	4.9	5.5	5.6	4.7
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				4.8	4.7	4.1	4.7	4.7	4.0
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 8/				4.9	4.8	4.2	4.8	4.7	4.1
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				1.4	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.6	1.3
Uniform reduction factor 9/				19.8	13.4	18.4	23.9	16.1	22.3

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ EMDCs and advanced countries that are under-represented under the formula or the GDP blend receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the quota formula or the GDP blend, whichever is greater. Other assumptions correspond to Set 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A).

5/ EMDCs and advanced countries receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the GDP blend variable; Other assumptions correspond to Set 3 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 5A).

6/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

7/ Including Korea and Singapore.

8/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

9/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share or GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share, whichever is applicable.

**Table 6. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kiekens 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	57.8	58.0	58.1
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	42.9	43.0	43.1
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	17.0	17.0	17.0
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	15.0	15.0	15.0
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	42.2	42.0	41.9
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	35.0	34.7	34.5
Africa	4.9	3.1	4.8	4.7	4.6
Asia 3/	12.6	17.7	16.0	16.0	16.1
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	7.1	6.8	6.6
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	7.2	7.2	7.2
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	7.2	7.3	7.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:					
EU 27	31.9	31.3	30.7	30.8	30.9
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	3.2	3.2	3.1
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)			5.3	5.9	6.4
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)			4.8	5.2	5.5
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 4/			4.7	5.1	5.4
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)			2.6	2.4	2.4
Size of					
Selective increase			40.5	92.7	143.6
Ad hoc increase			9.5	7.3	6.4

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas, mostly selective. The ad hoc increase is applied to ensure that (i) PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share; (ii) all under-represented countries (based on formula) receive at least 85% of their calculated quota share; and (iii) over-represented countries are protected against becoming under-represented.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ Including Korea and Singapore.

4/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

**Table 7. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kotegawa 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Booster Based on Contributions	
				0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	58.7	58.9
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	44.3	44.3
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.4	14.6
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	41.3	41.1
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	34.0	33.8
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.5	4.6
Asia 5/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.7	15.4
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.4	6.5
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.4	7.4
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.3	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:					
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	30.7	30.8
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.1	3.1
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)				5.8	5.4
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				5.2	4.7
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 6/				5.3	4.7
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				1.8	1.6
Uniform reduction factor 7/				24.8	12.9

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations are based on Set 2 in Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A) with an overall increase of 100% and distributed in the proportion of 0/60/40 and 0/75/25. An additional amount is allocated to countries based on their contributions provided: (1) the country contributes to all of the following activities: PRGT, externally financed Fund technical assistance and the NAB; and (2) its average share in contributions relative to its post second round quota share (the Average Misalignment Factor (AMF), as defined in Mr. Weber's scenario) is greater than 2. The eligible member may be either over-represented or under-represented under the formula. In cases where the eligible country was "capped" in Set 2, the cap is removed. For the eligible countries, their new quota share would be equal to the average of their post second round quota share (PSRQS) and the quota share that results from the selective and ad hoc increases as in Set 2 (SET2QS) increased by the AMF in percentage points (e.g. an AMF of 2 would imply a 2 percent increase in SET2QS): $(PSRQS + SET2QS * (1 + AMF/100))/2$.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Including Korea and Singapore.

6/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

7/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share or GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share, whichever is applicable.

**Table 8a. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
				35%	50%	75%	100%
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	61.9	57.9	57.8	57.8	57.9
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	50.8	43.8	43.8	43.8	43.8
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	23.9	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.2	14.1	14.0	14.0	14.0
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	38.1	42.1	42.2	42.2	42.1
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	31.8	34.8	34.8	34.8	34.7
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.4	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.5
Asia 5/	12.6	17.7	17.2	15.5	15.9	16.3	16.5
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	4.7	6.9	6.7	6.4	6.2
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	7.5	7.7	7.7	7.6	7.5
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.3	7.3	7.3	7.4	7.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:							
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.2	30.1	30.0	30.1	30.1
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.0	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.4	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)				5.0	5.7	6.4	6.9
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				4.8	5.5	6.1	6.4
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 6/				5.0	5.7	6.4	6.7
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				2.6	2.7	2.7	2.6
Uniform reduction factor 7/				40.4	45.4	49.6	50.9

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 35, 50, 75, and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. Ad hoc increase uses an uncompressed GDP blend as a distribution key in addition to the formula. Other assumptions correspond to Set 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A).

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, uncompressed.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Including Korea and Singapore.

6/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

7/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share or GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share, whichever is applicable.

**Table 8b. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
				35%	50%	75%	100%
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	61.9	57.9	57.8	57.8	57.9
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	50.8	43.8	43.8	43.8	43.8
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	23.9	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.2	14.1	14.0	14.0	14.0
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	38.1	42.1	42.2	42.2	42.1
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	31.8	35.0	35.1	35.1	35.0
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.4	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.5
Asia 5/	12.6	17.7	17.2	15.8	16.2	16.6	16.8
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	4.7	6.8	6.6	6.3	6.1
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	7.5	7.9	7.9	7.8	7.7
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.3	7.1	7.1	7.1	7.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:							
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.2	30.0	29.9	29.9	30.0
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.0	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.4	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)				4.9	5.6	6.4	6.8
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				4.7	5.4	6.0	6.3
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 6/				5.0	5.7	6.4	6.7
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				2.6	2.7	2.7	2.6
Uniform reduction factor 7/				53.6	60.3	66.0	67.9

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 35, 50, 75, and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. Ad hoc increase uses an uncompressed GDP blend as a distribution key. Other assumptions correspond to Set 3 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 5A).

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, uncompressed.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Including Korea and Singapore.

6/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

7/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between the GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share.

**Table 9. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Mozhin and Virmani 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Compressed PPP GDP Share	Simulated Shares
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	50.9	55.8
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	41.3	43.1
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	19.5	18.3
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	9.6	12.7
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	49.1	44.2
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	41.2	36.6
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	3.6	4.8
Asia 4/	12.6	17.7	17.3	22.7	17.2
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	5.8	6.5
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	9.1	8.2
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	8.0	7.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:					
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	23.3	28.0
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	3.3	4.4
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	2.4	3.3
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)					5.4
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)					6.0
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 5/					6.9
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)					4.6
Size of					
Selective increase based on formula					15.0
Selective increase based on compressed PPP GDP Share					84.3
Ad hoc increase to PRGT-eligible countries					0.7

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. 15 percent increase is allocated on the basis of members' calculated quota shares. The remaining 85 percent increase is allocated on the basis of members' PPP GDP share, compressed by a factor of 0.95, and protection of PRGT-eligible countries at the individual level.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For

the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ Including Korea and Singapore.

5/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

**Table 10. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Virmani 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Compressed PPP GDP Share 3/	Variant 1 4/		Variant 2 5/	
				0/60/40	0/40/60	0/60/40	0/40/60
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	50.9	54.4	53.9	52.7	51.6
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	41.3	40.8	40.7	39.9	39.3
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	19.5	17.7	17.7	17.7	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	9.6	13.5	13.2	12.8	12.2
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	49.1	45.6	46.1	47.3	48.4
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	41.2	38.0	38.5	39.7	40.8
Africa	4.9	3.1	3.6	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7
Asia 6/	12.6	17.7	22.7	18.4	19.0	19.6	20.7
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.8	6.7	6.6	6.7	6.6
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	9.1	8.2	8.3	8.6	8.8
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	8.0	7.6	7.6	7.6	7.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:							
EU 27	31.9	31.3	23.3	27.9	27.5	26.6	25.6
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	3.3	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	2.4	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)				8.8	9.2	8.3	8.5
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				8.1	8.6	9.2	10.3
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 7/				9.0	9.8	10.6	12.0
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				6.1	6.6	7.8	8.9
Uniform Reduction Factor 8/				43.7	53.2	61.1	76.3

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the compressed PPP GDP share. Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in their out-of-lineness with respect to the compressed PPP GDP share (see footnote 8). Countries that are over-represented with respect to the quota formula or with respect to PPP GDP are allowed to become under-represented with respect to the quota formula or PPP GDP share by up to 15 percent, respectively. Eligible advanced countries (those which are under-represented with respect to PPP GDP) are capped at their post selective or post-second round quota share whichever is greater. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post-second round quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For

the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ Compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ Advanced countries and EMDCs that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula but not eligible for an ad hoc increase are protected at their post selective quota share (as in Set 3 in Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations).

5/ Without the protection noted in footnote 4.

6/ Including Korea and Singapore.

7/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

8/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between the compressed PPP GDP share and post-selective quota share.

**Table 11. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Weber 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/
Advanced economies	60.5	58.2	60.0	59.1
Major advanced economies	45.3	42.9	48.0	44.4
Of which: United States	17.7	17.0	21.6	17.7
Other advanced economies	15.1	15.3	11.9	14.7
Emerging Market and Developing Countries	39.5	41.8	40.0	40.9
Developing countries	32.4	34.1	33.2	33.6
Africa	4.9	3.1	2.9	4.5
Asia 5/	12.6	17.7	17.3	15.4
Middle East, Malta & Turkey	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.3
Western Hemisphere	7.7	7.0	8.0	7.3
Transition economies	7.1	7.7	6.8	7.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Memorandum items:				
EU 27	31.9	31.3	27.8	31.0
LICs (PRGT-eligible)	4.3	2.6	2.4	4.3
LICs (proposed PCDR eligibility)	3.2	1.8	1.7	3.1
Under-represented countries (shift in p.p.)				5.5
Under-represented EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				4.8
Dynamic EMDCs (shift in p.p.) 6/				4.9
EMDCs (shift in p.p.)				1.4
Uniform reduction factor 7/				20.1

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. Simulations are based on Set 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A) except that additional protection is provided to members that meet the following criteria: (i) contribute to all of the following activities: PRGT, externally financed Fund technical assistance and the NAB; (ii) the country's average share in contributions is greater than its post second round quota share; and (iii) the country is over-represented and will lose quota share relative to its post second round quota share.

The maximum loss in quota share (difference between post second round and calculated quota share) for all eligible over-represented countries is reduced in proportion to the country's average out-of-lineness with respect to the 4 categories of financial contributions (PRGT loans, PRGT subsidies, technical assistance and the NAB). The out-of-lineness is defined as the country's share in the financial contributions divided by its post second round quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Including Korea and Singapore.

6/ Includes all under-represented EMDCs plus other dynamic EMDCs defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

7/ Uniform proportional reduction in the gap between calculated and post-selective quota share or GDP blend (see footnote 3) and post-selective quota share, whichever is applicable.

**Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Alazzaz -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Dynamic EMDCs 4/	Ad hoc increase to	
					Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 5/	the GDP Blend 6/
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	16.987	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.493	6.556	6.556
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.678	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	3.990	3.990	3.990
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.529	4.529	4.529
China 7/	3.996	7.917	8.128	5.970	5.415	5.639
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	2.992	3.286	3.294
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	2.439	2.439	2.439
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.374	2.374	2.374
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.717	2.649	2.616
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.543	2.573	2.611
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.923	1.923	1.923
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.669	1.669	1.669
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	1.969	2.028	2.080
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.771	1.771	1.771
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.658	1.683	1.716
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.286	1.286	1.286
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.763	1.655	1.634
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.364	1.364	1.364
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.925	0.925	0.925
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.942	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.766	0.766	0.766
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.915	0.918	0.929
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.731	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.793	0.793	0.793
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.683	0.683	0.683
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.784	0.761	0.751
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.829	0.792	0.794
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.660	0.681	0.694
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.881	0.833	0.871
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.697	0.669	0.634
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.895	0.802	0.683
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.489	0.489	0.489

Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Alazzaz -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Ad hoc Increase to		
				Dynamic EMDCs 4/	Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 5/	the GDP Blend 6/
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.501	0.501	0.501
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.513	0.513	0.513
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.611	0.611	0.611
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.462	0.462	0.462
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.420	0.420	0.420
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.398	0.398	0.398
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.479	0.479	0.479
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.408	0.408	0.408
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.407	0.407	0.407
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.381	0.426	0.428
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.385	0.385	0.385
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.434	0.434	0.434
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.447	0.428	0.428
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.470	0.455	0.435
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.414	0.410	0.413
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.325	0.325	0.325
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.378	0.365	0.362
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.353	0.372	0.383
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.543	0.473	0.384
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.229	0.229	0.229
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.280	0.273	0.274
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.215	0.215	0.215
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.169	0.169	0.169
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.248	0.232	0.221
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.254	0.231	0.216
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.220	0.208	0.192
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.225	0.225	0.225
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.146	0.146	0.146
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.166	0.144	0.144
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.150	0.150	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.116	0.116	0.116

Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Alazzaz -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Dynamic EMDCs 4/	Ad hoc increase to	
					Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 5/	the GDP Blend 6/
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.135	0.152	0.146	0.146
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.293	0.177	0.187	0.196
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.049	0.117	0.117	0.117
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.054	0.136	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.117	0.132	0.132	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.062	0.110	0.110	0.110
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.156	0.161	0.151	0.143
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.103	0.114	0.114	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.142	0.167	0.153	0.136
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.078	0.116	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.102	0.126	0.122	0.118
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.036	0.095	0.095	0.095
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.078	0.114	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.068	0.140	0.131	0.120
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.072	0.108	0.108	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.072	0.102	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.106	0.119	0.113	0.106
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.105	0.097	0.096	0.096
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.027	0.075	0.075	0.075
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.092	0.092	0.089	0.089
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.053	0.079	0.079	0.079
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.058	0.083	0.083	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.069	0.077	0.077	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.078	0.078	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.095	0.094	0.089	0.086
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.044	0.076	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.045	0.086	0.082	0.078
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.050	0.072	0.072	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.059	0.064	0.064	0.064
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.047	0.075	0.072	0.072
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.042	0.062	0.062	0.062
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.029	0.068	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.033	0.068	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.089	0.077	0.075	0.076
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.046	0.065	0.065	0.065

Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Alazzaz -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Ad hoc Increase to	
				Dynamic EMDCs 4/	Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 5/ the GDP Blend 6/
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.033	0.055	0.055
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.030	0.063	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.066	0.073	0.069
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.021	0.047	0.047
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.070	0.058	0.059
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.020	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.018	0.045	0.045
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.021	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.041	0.054	0.054
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.002	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.015	0.052	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.025	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.034	0.057	0.057
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.025	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.013	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.006	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.018	0.038	0.038
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.022	0.037	0.037
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.039	0.044	0.042
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.051	0.052	0.049
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.049	0.055	0.050
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.022	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.006	0.031	0.031
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.026	0.039	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.004	0.038	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.014	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.036	0.043	0.041
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.033	0.038	0.037
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.015	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.024	0.035	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.018	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.013	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.004	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.008	0.031	0.031

Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Alazzaz -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Ad hoc Increase to		
				Dynamic EMDCs 4/	Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 5/	the GDP Blend 6/
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.032	0.031	0.032
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.024	0.024	0.024
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.030	0.029	0.029
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.024	0.024	0.024
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.030	0.029	0.029
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.028	0.027	0.027
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.021	0.021	0.021
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.037	0.032	0.027
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.019	0.019	0.019
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.012
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.010	0.010	0.010
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.007	0.007	0.007
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.006	0.005	0.005
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.004

**Table A1. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Alazzaz -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Ad hoc Increase to		
				Dynamic EMDCs 4/	Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 5/	the GDP Blend 6/
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 30 percent increase of post second round quotas. The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of 0/60/40, respectively. Overrepresented countries are protected at their calculated quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ Corresponds to Set 1 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 3A).

5/ Corresponds to Set 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A).

6/ Corresponds to Set 3 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 5A).

7/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

**Table A2. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Callesen -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
United States	17.670	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987
Japan	6.556	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	3.806	3.789	3.789
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.416	4.436	4.447
China 3/	3.996	7.917	6.593	6.853	7.008
Italy	3.306	2.992	2.992	2.992	2.992
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	2.237	2.000	1.857
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.697	2.731	2.751
India	2.442	2.403	2.403	2.403	2.403
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857
Belgium	1.932	1.324	1.568	1.495	1.451
Brazil	1.783	2.153	1.965	1.993	2.009
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.001	2.040	2.063
Mexico	1.521	1.793	1.645	1.666	1.678
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.842	1.889	1.918
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.324	1.330	1.333
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.846	0.751	0.694
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.719	0.683	0.661
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	0.854	0.858	0.860
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.770	0.773	0.775
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.645	0.623	0.610
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.745	0.750	0.752
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.847	0.864	0.874
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.621	0.624	0.626
Turkey	0.611	1.148	0.964	1.000	1.021
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.708	0.721	0.729
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.992	1.032	1.056
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.453	0.416	0.393

**Table A2. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Callesen -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.473	0.457	0.447
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.893	0.929	0.951
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.438	0.428	0.421
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.389	0.356	0.336
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.368	0.337	0.318
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.519	0.527	0.532
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.361	0.353	0.349
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.424	0.426	0.427
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.410	0.411	0.412
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.471	0.478	0.483
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.384	0.385	0.386
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.306	0.292	0.284
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.358	0.359
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.350	0.354	0.357
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.621	0.650	0.668
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.214	0.200	0.192
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.258	0.258	0.259
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.204	0.197	0.194
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.224	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.158	0.150	0.145
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.262	0.270	0.274
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.276	0.286	0.292
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.229	0.235	0.238
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.399	0.420	0.433
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.135	0.122	0.115
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.102	0.080	0.067

**Table A2. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Callesen -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.140	0.141	0.141
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.183	0.187	0.190
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.107	0.096	0.089
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.136	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.132	0.132	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.102	0.095	0.091
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.169	0.174	0.176
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.181	0.187	0.191
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.116	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.125	0.126	0.127
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.087	0.076	0.070
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.114	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.147	0.151	0.153
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.108	0.108	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.102	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.123	0.126	0.127
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.092	0.092	0.092
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.069	0.062	0.058
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.083	0.083	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.078	0.078	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.098	0.100	0.101
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.076	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.087	0.089	0.090
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.072	0.072	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.061	0.060	0.060
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.069	0.069	0.070
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.059	0.058	0.057
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.068	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.068	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.078	0.079	0.080
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065

**Table A2. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Callesen -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.052	0.048	0.046
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.063	0.063	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.076	0.078	0.079
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.043	0.038	0.035
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.056	0.056	0.056
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.055	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.041	0.036	0.033
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.055	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.054	0.054	0.054
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.054	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.052	0.052	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.051	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.083	0.087	0.089
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.048	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.045	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.044	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.036	0.036	0.035
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.034	0.032	0.031
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.041	0.041	0.041
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.054	0.056	0.057
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.060	0.062	0.063
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.039	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.028	0.023	0.021
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.039	0.039	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.038	0.038	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.037	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.044	0.045	0.045
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.037	0.037	0.037
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.036	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.034	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.034	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.034	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.032	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.031	0.031	0.031

**Table A2. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Callesen -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.030	0.030	0.030
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.022	0.020	0.018
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.029	0.029	0.029
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.022	0.020	0.018
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.029	0.030	0.030
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.028	0.028	0.029
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.020	0.019	0.018
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.042	0.044	0.045
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.018	0.017	0.017
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.013	0.013	0.014
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.011	0.011	0.011
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005

**Table A2. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Callesen -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas. An initial ad hoc increase is applied to all under-represented countries to ensure that two-thirds of their respective out-of-lineness (difference between calculated and post second round quota share) is reduced. A selective approach is then applied for any additional quota increases. An additional ad hoc increase ensures that over-represented countries are protected at their calculated quota share and PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table A3. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Fayolle and Mr. Gibbs -- by Member 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/	20/50/30 4/
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	17.670	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.556	6.556	6.556
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.678	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	4.036	4.036	4.036
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.564	4.572	4.551
China 5/	3.996	7.917	8.128	6.190	6.076	5.921
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.240	3.205	3.257
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	1.866	1.966	2.092
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.345	2.345	2.345
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.736	2.725	2.706
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.590	2.523	2.585
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.857	1.857	1.857
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.363	1.462	1.490
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.120	2.057	2.089
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.894	1.923	1.849
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.747	1.710	1.725
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.227	1.227	1.227
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.791	1.775	1.744
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.372	1.374	1.369
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.703	0.739	0.790
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.942	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.669	0.669	0.682
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.930	0.912	0.926
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.731	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.798	0.799	0.797
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.640	0.640	0.640
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.770	0.769	0.767
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.839	0.834	0.823
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.694	0.673	0.690
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.944	0.915	0.905
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.705	0.701	0.693
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.920	0.906	0.879
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.384	0.408	0.426

Table A3. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Fayolle and Mr. Gibbs -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/	20/50/30 4/
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.422	0.446	0.451
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.513	0.513	0.513
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.733	0.763	0.689
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.411	0.417	0.419
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.329	0.349	0.366
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.311	0.330	0.346
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.503	0.509	0.495
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.408	0.408	0.408
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.407	0.407	0.407
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.413	0.403	0.418
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.380	0.380	0.380
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.438	0.439	0.437
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.429	0.429	0.429
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.474	0.472	0.467
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.413	0.408	0.412
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.266	0.286	0.291
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.369	0.368	0.368
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.388	0.373	0.382
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.561	0.551	0.531
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.184	0.196	0.202
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.274	0.272	0.274
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.188	0.193	0.194
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.137	0.147	0.150
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.253	0.250	0.246
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.260	0.257	0.250
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.224	0.222	0.218
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.298	0.316	0.272
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.114	0.120	0.126
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.143	0.143	0.143
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.150	0.150	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.079	0.080	0.093

Table A3. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Fayolle and Mr. Gibbs -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/	20/50/30 4/
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.135	0.147	0.146	0.146
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.293	0.203	0.192	0.197
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.049	0.090	0.094	0.100
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.054	0.136	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.117	0.132	0.132	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.062	0.087	0.093	0.096
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.156	0.164	0.162	0.159
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.103	0.114	0.114	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.142	0.171	0.169	0.165
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.078	0.116	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.102	0.126	0.126	0.125
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.036	0.072	0.075	0.081
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.078	0.114	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.068	0.142	0.141	0.139
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.072	0.108	0.108	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.072	0.102	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.106	0.121	0.120	0.118
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.105	0.097	0.096	0.097
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.027	0.058	0.061	0.065
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.092	0.089	0.088	0.089
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.053	0.079	0.079	0.079
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.058	0.083	0.083	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.069	0.077	0.077	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.078	0.078	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.095	0.096	0.095	0.093
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.044	0.076	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.045	0.087	0.086	0.085
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.050	0.072	0.072	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.059	0.060	0.060	0.060
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.047	0.072	0.072	0.072
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.042	0.056	0.056	0.056
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.029	0.068	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.033	0.068	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.089	0.078	0.078	0.077
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.046	0.065	0.065	0.065

Table A3. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Fayolle and Mr. Gibbs -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/	20/50/30 4/
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.033	0.044	0.047	0.049
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.030	0.063	0.063	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.066	0.074	0.074	0.072
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.021	0.035	0.037	0.040
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.070	0.059	0.057	0.059
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.020	0.055	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.018	0.034	0.036	0.038
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.021	0.055	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.041	0.054	0.054	0.054
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.002	0.054	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.015	0.052	0.052	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.025	0.051	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.034	0.068	0.071	0.064
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.025	0.048	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.013	0.045	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.006	0.044	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.018	0.035	0.035	0.035
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.022	0.029	0.031	0.032
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.039	0.042	0.042	0.042
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.051	0.053	0.052	0.051
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.049	0.056	0.056	0.054
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.022	0.039	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.006	0.022	0.023	0.026
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.026	0.039	0.039	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.004	0.038	0.038	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.014	0.037	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.036	0.043	0.043	0.043
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.033	0.037	0.037	0.037
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.015	0.036	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.024	0.035	0.035	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.018	0.034	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.034	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.013	0.034	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.004	0.032	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.008	0.031	0.031	0.031

Table A3. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Fayolle and Mr. Gibbs -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/	20/50/30 4/
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.032	0.031	0.032
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.018	0.019	0.021
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.030	0.030	0.030
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.018	0.019	0.020
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.030	0.030	0.030
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.028	0.028	0.028
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.017	0.018	0.019
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.038	0.037	0.036
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.017	0.017
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.010	0.011	0.010
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005

**Table A3. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Fayolle and Mr. Gibbs -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/	20/50/30 4/
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The assumptions correspond to Set 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quotas Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A) except that countries that are over-represented with respect to the quota formula or with respect to the GDP blend are protected at their calculated quota share or their GDP blend share, whichever is greater.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table A4. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Guzmán and Mr. Stein -- by Member 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Ad hoc Increase to all under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs 3/						
			0/40/60 4/ 7/	0/50/50 4/ 7/	0/87.5/12.5 5/ 7/	0/90/10 5/ 7/	20/70/10 6/ 7/	20/72.5/7.5 6/ 7/	
United States	17.670	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.547	16.759
Japan	6.556	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.206	6.287
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.653	5.724
France	4.505	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.910	3.957	4.029	4.076
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.605	4.609	4.595	4.594	4.594	4.591	4.586
China 8/	3.996	7.917	6.493	6.596	6.236	6.225	6.225	6.144	6.018
Italy	3.306	2.992	2.992	2.992	2.992	3.000	3.000	3.031	3.068
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	1.732	1.799	2.050	2.067	2.226	2.243	2.243
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.344	2.372	2.409	2.438	2.438
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.935	2.873	2.785	2.749	2.777	2.723	2.723
India	2.442	2.403	2.723	2.642	2.500	2.464	2.537	2.453	2.453
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.895	1.919	1.949	1.949	1.973
Belgium	1.932	1.324	1.324	1.324	1.545	1.562	1.622	1.639	1.639
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.115	2.073	2.017	1.993	2.006	1.974	1.974
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.037	2.052	2.001	2.000	1.988	1.971	1.971
Mexico	1.521	1.793	1.790	1.753	1.699	1.677	1.694	1.661	1.661
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.262	1.278	1.300	1.315	1.315
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.855	1.874	1.810	1.808	1.793	1.771	1.771
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.382	1.383	1.380	1.380	1.379	1.378	1.378
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.655	0.679	0.770	0.776	0.839	0.845	0.845
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.933	0.944	0.944
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.597	0.597	0.705	0.713	0.742	0.749	0.749
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.825	0.835	0.835
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	0.986	0.959	0.914	0.901	0.923	0.893	0.893
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.732	0.741	0.741
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.804	0.805	0.803	0.802	0.802	0.801	0.801
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.578	0.578	0.645	0.652	0.672	0.680	0.680
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.849	0.827	0.791	0.780	0.796	0.770	0.770
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.870	0.868	0.846	0.845	0.840	0.832	0.832
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.713	0.694	0.662	0.653	0.668	0.646	0.646
Turkey	0.611	1.148	0.953	0.967	0.918	0.916	0.905	0.888	0.888
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.736	0.727	0.712	0.709	0.706	0.700	0.700
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.975	0.991	0.936	0.934	0.921	0.902	0.902
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.353	0.368	0.427	0.431	0.458	0.462	0.462

Table A4. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Guzmán and Mr. Stein -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		Ad hoc Increase to all under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs 3/									
	Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	0/40/60 4/ 7/	0/50/50 4/ 7/	0/87.5/12.5 5/ 7/	0/90/10 5/ 7/	20/70/10 6/ 7/	20/72.5/7.5 6/ 7/	0/493	0/478	0/497	0/498
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.422	0.472	0.478	0.493	0.498			
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.497	0.504			
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.877	0.892	0.841	0.841	0.840	0.828	0.811			
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.411	0.411	0.443	0.448	0.460	0.465	0.465			
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.303	0.316	0.366	0.369	0.393	0.396	0.396			
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.286	0.299	0.346	0.349	0.371	0.374	0.374			
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.532	0.535	0.525	0.522	0.522	0.519	0.519			
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.410	0.415	0.415			
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.404	0.409	0.409			
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.342	0.342	0.366	0.371	0.380	0.384	0.384			
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.382	0.387	0.392	0.397	0.397			
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.442	0.443	0.441	0.441	0.441	0.440	0.440			
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.480	0.466	0.442	0.436	0.448	0.433	0.433			
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.502	0.493	0.481	0.476	0.477	0.471	0.471			
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.446	0.433	0.412	0.406	0.417	0.403	0.403			
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.262	0.262	0.302	0.305	0.317	0.320	0.320			
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.408	0.397	0.379	0.374	0.382	0.370	0.370			
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.382	0.373	0.362	0.357	0.361	0.353	0.353			
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.603	0.615	0.573	0.572	0.563	0.548	0.548			
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.167	0.175	0.206	0.208	0.219	0.221	0.221			
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.301	0.292	0.277	0.273	0.281	0.272	0.272			
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.185	0.185	0.204	0.207	0.213	0.215	0.215			
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224			
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224			
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205			
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.129	0.130	0.155	0.156	0.163	0.165	0.165			
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.263	0.266	0.256	0.256	0.253	0.250	0.250			
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.274	0.278	0.264	0.264	0.261	0.256	0.256			
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.231	0.233	0.226	0.226	0.224	0.221	0.221			
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.384	0.392	0.362	0.361	0.355	0.344	0.344			
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.105	0.109	0.126	0.127	0.135	0.136	0.136			
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.175	0.169	0.158	0.156	0.162	0.157	0.157			
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155			
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.145	0.146	0.146			
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.077	0.078	0.081	0.081	0.094	0.095	0.095			

**Table A4. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Guzmán and Mr. Stein -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Ad hoc Increase to all under-represented countries and other dynamic EMDCs 3/					
			0/40/60 4/ 7/	0/50/50 4/ 7/	0/87.5/12.5 5/ 7/	0/90/10 5/ 7/	20/70/10 6/ 7/	20/72.5/7.5 6/ 7/
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ Other dynamic EMDCs are defined as those whose PPP GDP share divided by post second round quota share is greater than 1 and who are not over-represented by more than 25 percent.

4/ Corresponds to Table 7 in Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Initial Considerations.

5/ Corresponds to Table 9 in Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Initial Considerations.

6/ Corresponds to Table 11 in Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Initial Considerations.

7/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

8/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

**Table A5. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Hockin -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Ad hoc Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 4/			Ad hoc Based on the GDP Blend 5/		
				0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/	0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	18.252	17.951	18.236	18.423	18.063	18.400
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.681	6.630	6.674	6.711	6.650	6.703
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.583	4.584	4.572	4.564	4.572	4.551
China 7/	3.996	7.917	8.128	5.994	6.006	5.697	6.102	6.071	5.814
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.226	3.199	3.244	3.234	3.205	3.251
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	1.866	1.966	2.092	1.866	1.966	2.092
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.715	2.718	2.682	2.681	2.694	2.652
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.546	2.506	2.540	2.571	2.522	2.564
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.363	1.462	1.490	1.363	1.462	1.490
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.067	2.037	2.032	2.096	2.056	2.062
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.998	1.990	1.954	2.020	2.003	1.977
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.714	1.697	1.689	1.732	1.709	1.708
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.759	1.764	1.707	1.729	1.742	1.682
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.405	1.396	1.400	1.412	1.400	1.407
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.703	0.739	0.790	0.703	0.739	0.790
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.623	0.668	0.682	0.623	0.668	0.682
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.917	0.908	0.913	0.924	0.912	0.919
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.801	0.801	0.799	0.798	0.799	0.797
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.578	0.608	0.615	0.578	0.608	0.615
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.768	0.768	0.765	0.762	0.765	0.758
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.828	0.830	0.810	0.825	0.827	0.808
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.679	0.668	0.674	0.687	0.673	0.682
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.908	0.902	0.866	0.928	0.914	0.886
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.697	0.698	0.683	0.674	0.684	0.659
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.892	0.896	0.847	0.817	0.850	0.768
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.384	0.408	0.426	0.384	0.408	0.426

**Table A5. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Hockin -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Ad hoc Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 4/			Ad hoc Based on the GDP Blend 5/		
				0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/	0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.422	0.446	0.451	0.422	0.446	0.451
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.802	0.805	0.760	0.733	0.763	0.689
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.411	0.417	0.419	0.411	0.417	0.419
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.329	0.349	0.366	0.329	0.349	0.366
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.311	0.330	0.346	0.311	0.330	0.346
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.520	0.520	0.511	0.523	0.522	0.515
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.407	0.300	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.409	0.402	0.414	0.411	0.403	0.416
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.440	0.440	0.439	0.438	0.439	0.437
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.428	0.429	0.428
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.469	0.470	0.462	0.457	0.463	0.449
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.409	0.406	0.408	0.411	0.408	0.410
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.266	0.266	0.291	0.266	0.286	0.291
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.368	0.368	0.367	0.366	0.367	0.364
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.376	0.369	0.370	0.382	0.373	0.377
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.541	0.544	0.507	0.485	0.509	0.448
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.184	0.196	0.202	0.184	0.196	0.202
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.273	0.272	0.272	0.274	0.272	0.273
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.185	0.193	0.194	0.185	0.193	0.194
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.137	0.147	0.150	0.137	0.147	0.150
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.248	0.249	0.240	0.238	0.242	0.231
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.253	0.254	0.242	0.239	0.244	0.229
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.220	0.221	0.214	0.210	0.214	0.203
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.339	0.341	0.314	0.298	0.316	0.272
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.114	0.120	0.126	0.114	0.120	0.126
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.079	0.080	0.093	0.079	0.080	0.093

**Table A5. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Hockin -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Ad hoc Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 4/			Ad hoc Based on the GDP Blend 5/		
				0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/	0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.135	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.293	0.194	0.188	0.188	0.199	0.192	0.193
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.049	0.090	0.094	0.100	0.090	0.094	0.100
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.054	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.117	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.062	0.087	0.093	0.096	0.087	0.093	0.096
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.156	0.161	0.161	0.156	0.153	0.156	0.149
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.103	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.142	0.167	0.167	0.160	0.155	0.160	0.148
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.078	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.102	0.126	0.126	0.124	0.123	0.124	0.121
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.036	0.072	0.075	0.081	0.072	0.075	0.081
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.078	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.068	0.140	0.140	0.136	0.133	0.136	0.128
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.072	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.072	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.106	0.119	0.119	0.116	0.114	0.116	0.111
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.105	0.096	0.096	0.096	0.097	0.096	0.096
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.027	0.058	0.061	0.065	0.058	0.061	0.065
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.092	0.088	0.088	0.088	0.089	0.088	0.089
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.053	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.058	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.069	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.095	0.094	0.094	0.091	0.091	0.092	0.089
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.044	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.045	0.086	0.086	0.084	0.083	0.084	0.081
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.050	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.059	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.047	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.042	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.029	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.033	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.089	0.077	0.077	0.076	0.078	0.078	0.076
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.046	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065

**Table A5. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Hockin -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Ad hoc Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 4/			Ad hoc Based on the GDP Blend 5/		
				0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/	0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.033	0.044	0.047	0.049	0.044	0.047	0.049
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.030	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.066	0.073	0.073	0.071	0.070	0.071	0.068
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.021	0.035	0.037	0.040	0.035	0.037	0.040
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.070	0.058	0.057	0.058	0.059	0.057	0.059
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.020	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.018	0.034	0.036	0.038	0.034	0.036	0.038
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.021	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.041	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.002	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.015	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.025	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.034	0.075	0.075	0.071	0.068	0.071	0.064
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.025	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.013	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.006	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.018	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.022	0.029	0.031	0.032	0.029	0.031	0.032
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.039	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.051	0.052	0.052	0.050	0.050	0.050	0.048
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.049	0.065	0.055	0.053	0.051	0.053	0.049
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.022	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.006	0.022	0.023	0.026	0.022	0.023	0.026
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.026	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.004	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.014	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.036	0.043	0.043	0.042	0.041	0.042	0.040
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.033	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.015	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.024	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.018	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.013	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.004	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.008	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031

Table A5. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Hockin -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Ad hoc Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 4/			Ad hoc Based on the GDP Blend 5/			
				0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/	0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/	
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.032	0.031	0.031	0.031
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.018	0.019	0.021	0.018	0.019	0.019	0.021
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.030	0.030	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.030	0.029
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.018	0.019	0.020	0.018	0.019	0.019	0.020
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.029	0.030	0.030	0.029
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.017	0.018	0.019	0.017	0.018	0.018	0.019
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.037	0.037	0.034	0.033	0.035	0.035	0.031
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.017	0.017	0.016	0.017	0.017	0.017
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.012
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.010
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004

Table A5. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Hockin -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)

Country	Post-2009 Quota Share 2/	2010 Quota Share	GDP Blend	Ad hoc Based on Either the Formula or the GDP Blend 4/			Ad hoc Based on the GDP Blend 5/		
				0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/	0/60/40 6/	0/75/25 6/	20/50/30 6/
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ EMDCs and advanced countries that are under-represented under the formula or the GDP blend receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the quota formula or the GDP blend, whichever is greater. Other assumptions correspond to Set 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A).

5/ EMDCs and advanced countries receive a uniform reduction in out-of-lineness with respect to the GDP blend variable; Other assumptions correspond to Set 3 of Fourteenth General of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 5A).

6/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

7/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

**Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kiekens -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
United States	17.670	16.987	16.987	16.987	16.987
Japan	6.556	6.493	6.493	6.493	6.493
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.678	5.688	5.705
France	4.505	3.789	4.025	4.009	3.978
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.260	4.414	4.480
China 3/	3.996	7.917	6.730	6.730	6.730
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.011	3.040	3.041
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	2.314	2.085	1.940
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.402	2.404	2.392
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.497	2.609	2.685
India	2.442	2.403	2.403	2.403	2.403
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.945	1.944	1.933
Belgium	1.932	1.324	1.645	1.580	1.533
Brazil	1.783	2.153	1.830	1.890	1.949
Spain	1.688	2.236	1.901	1.901	1.960
Mexico	1.521	1.793	1.524	1.592	1.638
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	1.298	1.294	1.285
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.792	1.792	1.792
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.282	1.326	1.345
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.874	0.782	0.724
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.943
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.753	0.721	0.698
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	0.825	0.854	0.867
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.731	0.736	0.737
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.746	0.772	0.782
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.678	0.660	0.645
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.710	0.739	0.753
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.806	0.806	0.828
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.596	0.619	0.629
Turkey	0.611	1.148	0.976	0.976	0.976
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.671	0.671	0.695
Singapore	0.591	1.195	1.015	1.015	1.015
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.471	0.436	0.412

**Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kiekens -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.497	0.483	0.473
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.915	0.915	0.915
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.462	0.454	0.447
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.404	0.373	0.353
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.382	0.353	0.334
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.486	0.496	0.513
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.408	0.412	0.413
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.408
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.381	0.375	0.370
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.391	0.392	0.391
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.409	0.424	0.430
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.401	0.413	0.418
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.441	0.451	0.466
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.373	0.385	0.390
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.321	0.309	0.301
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.341	0.354	0.360
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.323	0.339	0.348
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.652	0.652	0.652
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.223	0.210	0.202
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.251	0.259	0.262
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.214	0.209	0.205
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.224	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.166	0.158	0.153
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.258	0.258	0.258
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.278	0.278	0.278
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.222	0.222	0.222
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.427	0.427	0.427
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.140	0.128	0.121
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.147	0.147	0.147
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.103	0.081	0.068

**Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kiekens -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.137	0.141	0.143
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.177	0.177	0.177
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.111	0.100	0.093
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.136	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.132	0.132	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.106	0.100	0.096
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.165	0.165	0.165
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.182	0.182	0.182
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.116	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.115	0.121	0.124
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.089	0.079	0.073
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.114	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.143	0.143	0.143
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.108	0.108	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.102	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.118	0.118	0.119
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.087	0.091	0.093
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.072	0.065	0.060
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.079	0.080	0.080
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.083	0.083	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.078	0.078	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.094	0.094	0.095
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.076	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.083	0.083	0.086
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.072	0.072	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.064	0.064	0.063
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.067	0.069	0.070
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.062	0.061	0.060
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.068	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.068	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.073	0.074	0.076
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065

**Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kiekens -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.054	0.051	0.049
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.063	0.063	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.074	0.074	0.074
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.044	0.039	0.036
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.056	0.056	0.056
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.055	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.042	0.038	0.035
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.055	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.054	0.054	0.054
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.054	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.052	0.052	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.051	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.085	0.085	0.085
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.048	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.045	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.044	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.038	0.038	0.037
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.036	0.034	0.032
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.039	0.041	0.041
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.053	0.053	0.053
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.060	0.060	0.060
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.039	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.029	0.024	0.021
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.039	0.039	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.038	0.038	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.037	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.042	0.042	0.043
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.037	0.037	0.037
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.036	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.035	0.035	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.034	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.034	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.034	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.032	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.031	0.031	0.031

**Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kiekens -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.030	0.030	0.030
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.023	0.020	0.019
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.027	0.029	0.029
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.023	0.020	0.019
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.028	0.029	0.029
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.026	0.027	0.028
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.021	0.020	0.019
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.044	0.044	0.044
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.019	0.018	0.018
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.012	0.013	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.010	0.010	0.011
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004

**Table A6. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kiekens -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Overall Increases of		
			50%	100%	150%
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 50, 100, and 150 percent increase of post second round quotas, mostly selective. The ad hoc increase is applied to ensure that (i) PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post second round actual quota share; (ii) all under-represented countries (based on formula) receive at least 85% of their calculated quota share; and (iii) over-represented countries are protected against becoming under-represented.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table A7. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kotegawa -- by Member 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Booster Based on Contributions	
				0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.673	6.673
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	4.187	4.187
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.564	4.572
China 5/	3.996	7.917	8.128	6.126	5.992
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.236	3.198
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	1.866	1.966
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.303	2.303
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.729	2.717
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.576	2.503
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.857	1.857
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.363	1.462
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.103	2.033
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.894	1.923
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.736	1.694
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.359	1.359
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.781	1.762
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.372	1.374
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.703	0.739
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.623	0.668
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.063	0.926	0.907
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.802	0.803
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.578	0.608
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.770	0.768
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.836	0.829
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.689	0.667
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.932	0.900
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.702	0.697
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.911	0.894
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.384	0.408

Table A7. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kotegawa -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	PPP GDP Share 3/	Booster Based on Contributions	
				0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.422	0.446
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.513	0.513
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.733	0.763
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.411	0.417
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.329	0.349
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.311	0.330
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.503	0.509
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.408	0.408
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.407	0.407
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.411	0.401
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.380	0.380
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.438	0.439
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.429	0.429
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.472	0.470
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.412	0.406
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.266	0.286
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.369	0.368
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.384	0.368
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.555	0.542
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.184	0.196
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.274	0.271
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.185	0.193
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.137	0.147
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.251	0.248
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.258	0.254
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.223	0.220
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.241	0.250
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.114	0.120
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.143	0.143
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.150	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.079	0.080

Table A7. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kotegawa -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	PPP GDP Share 3/	Booster Based on Contributions	
				0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.135	0.147	0.146
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.293	0.200	0.188
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.049	0.090	0.094
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.054	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.117	0.132	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.062	0.087	0.093
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.156	0.163	0.161
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.103	0.114	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.142	0.170	0.167
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.078	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.102	0.126	0.126
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.036	0.072	0.075
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.078	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.068	0.142	0.140
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.072	0.108	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.072	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.106	0.120	0.119
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.105	0.097	0.096
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.027	0.058	0.061
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.092	0.089	0.088
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.053	0.079	0.079
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.058	0.083	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.069	0.077	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.078	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.095	0.095	0.094
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.044	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.045	0.086	0.086
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.050	0.072	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.059	0.060	0.060
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.047	0.072	0.072
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.042	0.056	0.056
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.029	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.033	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.089	0.078	0.077
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.046	0.065	0.065

Table A7. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kotegawa -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	PPP GDP Share 3/	Booster Based on Contributions	
				0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.033	0.044	0.047
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.030	0.063	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.066	0.074	0.073
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.021	0.035	0.037
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.070	0.059	0.057
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.020	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.018	0.034	0.036
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.021	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.041	0.054	0.054
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.002	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.015	0.052	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.025	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.034	0.068	0.071
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.025	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.013	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.006	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.018	0.035	0.035
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.022	0.029	0.031
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.039	0.042	0.042
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.051	0.052	0.052
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.049	0.056	0.055
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.022	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.006	0.022	0.023
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.026	0.039	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.004	0.038	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.014	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.036	0.043	0.043
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.033	0.037	0.037
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.015	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.024	0.035	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.018	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.013	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.004	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.008	0.031	0.031

Table A7. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kotegawa -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	PPP GDP Share 3/	Booster Based on Contributions	
				0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.032	0.031
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.018	0.019
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.030	0.030
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.018	0.019
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.030	0.030
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.028	0.028
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.017	0.018
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.023	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.038	0.037
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.016	0.017
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.013	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.010	0.011
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.006	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.006	0.006
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005

**Table A7. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Kotegawa -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	PPP GDP Share 3/	Booster Based on Contributions	
				0/60/40 4/	0/75/25 4/
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations are based on Set 2 in Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A) with an overall increase of 100% and distributed in the proportion of 0/60/40 and 0/75/25. An additional amount is allocated to countries based on their contributions provided:

(1) the country contributes to all of the following activities: PRGT, externally financed Fund technical assistance and the NAB; and (2) its average share in contributions relative to its post second round quota share (the Average Misalignment Factor (AMF), as defined in Mr. Weber's scenario) is greater than 2. The eligible member may be either over-represented or under-represented under the formula. In cases where the eligible country was "capped" in Set 2, the cap is removed. For the eligible countries, their new quota share would be equal to the average of their post second round quota share (PSRQS) and the quota share that results from the selective and ad hoc increases as in Set 2 (SET2QS) increased by the AMF in percentage points (e.g. an AMF of 2 would imply a 2 percent increase in SET2QS): $(PSRQS + SET2QS * (1 + AMF/100))/2$.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

**Table A8a. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round		Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
	Quota Share 2/	Quota Share 1/			35%	50%	75%	100%
United States	17.670	16.987	16.987	23.899	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	6.493	7.592	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.678	5.328	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	3.789	4.079	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.663	4.201	4.520	4.525	4.534	4.541
China 5/	3.996	7.917	7.917	8.524	6.046	6.330	6.604	6.745
Italy	3.306	2.992	2.992	3.383	3.306	3.306	3.306	3.306
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	1.337	0.783	2.275	2.087	1.846	1.666
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.938	2.720	2.698	2.727	2.755	2.770
India	2.442	2.403	2.403	3.014	2.671	2.699	2.722	2.729
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.857	1.246	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857
Belgium	1.932	1.324	1.324	0.727	1.534	1.420	1.324	1.324
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.153	2.624	2.143	2.191	2.234	2.253
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.236	2.383	1.740	1.759	1.789	1.814
Mexico	1.521	1.793	1.793	2.031	1.742	1.772	1.799	1.811
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	1.227	0.668	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227
Korea	1.412	2.108	2.108	1.855	1.733	1.778	1.822	1.845
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.396	1.477	1.361	1.363	1.365	1.367
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.484	0.470	0.864	0.792	0.700	0.630
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.942	0.687	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.597	0.615	0.704	0.652	0.597	0.597
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.836	0.597	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	0.902	0.992	0.922	0.929	0.934	0.937
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.731	0.460	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.812	0.579	0.792	0.793	0.794	0.795
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.578	0.587	0.626	0.580	0.578	0.578
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.792	0.425	0.766	0.769	0.772	0.774
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.477	0.367	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.949	0.851	0.819	0.835	0.850	0.858
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.658	0.783	0.692	0.701	0.708	0.710
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.148	1.234	0.893	0.932	0.969	0.989
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.789	0.583	0.689	0.701	0.713	0.719
Singapore	0.591	1.195	1.195	0.317	0.869	0.908	0.946	0.967
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.315	0.211	0.454	0.418	0.371	0.337

Table A8a. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
	Quota Share 2/	Quota Share 2/			35%	50%	75%	100%
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.422	0.352	0.459	0.426	0.422	0.422
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.513	0.378	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513
Ireland	0.528	1.077	1.077	0.385	0.580	0.599	0.628	0.654
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.411	0.286	0.422	0.411	0.411	0.411
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.267	0.138	0.390	0.359	0.319	0.289
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.252	0.128	0.369	0.339	0.302	0.274
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.572	0.535	0.473	0.477	0.482	0.488
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.408	0.304	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.407	0.265	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.342	0.404	0.348	0.342	0.342	0.342
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.380	0.329	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.448	0.382	0.433	0.434	0.435	0.436
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.430	0.339	0.429	0.429	0.429	0.429
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.519	0.345	0.466	0.472	0.478	0.482
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.404	0.407	0.401	0.401	0.402	0.402
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.262	0.202	0.298	0.276	0.262	0.262
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.377	0.316	0.367	0.369	0.370	0.370
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.381	0.453	0.380	0.387	0.393	0.396
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.767	0.340	0.523	0.552	0.581	0.596
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.164	0.097	0.212	0.195	0.175	0.164
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.270	0.255	0.269	0.269	0.269	0.269
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.185	0.161	0.197	0.185	0.185	0.185
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.169	0.207	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.035	0.023	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.039	0.023	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.129	0.089	0.155	0.144	0.129	0.129
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.303	0.217	0.244	0.251	0.258	0.262
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.328	0.218	0.248	0.257	0.267	0.272
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.261	0.149	0.217	0.222	0.227	0.230
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.503	0.077	0.207	0.218	0.236	0.251
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.135	0.125	0.111	0.100
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.143	0.117	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.050	0.035	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.150	0.112	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.016	0.008	0.111	0.100	0.087	0.076

Table A8a. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
	Quota Share 2/	Quota Share			35%	50%	75%	100%
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.147	0.114	0.146	0.147	0.147	0.147
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.208	0.258	0.195	0.201	0.207	0.210
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.064	0.039	0.109	0.100	0.089	0.080
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.056	0.043	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.089	0.098	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.077	0.050	0.101	0.093	0.083	0.077
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.194	0.133	0.158	0.162	0.167	0.169
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.114	0.086	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.214	0.120	0.163	0.169	0.175	0.178
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.071	0.064	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.136	0.085	0.125	0.126	0.127	0.128
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.047	0.029	0.089	0.081	0.072	0.064
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.076	0.064	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.168	0.056	0.138	0.141	0.145	0.147
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.057	0.059	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.100	0.059	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.139	0.088	0.118	0.120	0.123	0.124
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.097	0.088	0.094	0.095	0.095	0.095
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.042	0.021	0.070	0.064	0.057	0.051
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.086	0.076	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.079	0.043	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.046	0.047	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.077	0.057	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.047	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.111	0.079	0.093	0.095	0.097	0.098
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.055	0.035	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.098	0.036	0.085	0.086	0.088	0.089
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.047	0.040	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.060	0.048	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.073	0.037	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.056	0.034	0.057	0.056	0.056	0.056
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.041	0.023	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.032	0.026	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.086	0.073	0.076	0.077	0.078	0.079
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.065	0.037	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065

Table A8a. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
	Quota Share 2/	Quota Share 1/			35%	50%	75%	100%
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.040	0.026	0.051	0.047	0.042	0.040
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.030	0.023	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.086	0.053	0.072	0.074	0.075	0.076
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.023	0.016	0.044	0.040	0.036	0.032
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.054	0.057	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.030	0.015	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.022	0.014	0.042	0.039	0.034	0.031
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.026	0.016	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.052	0.033	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.013	0.002	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.021	0.011	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.026	0.019	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.100	0.027	0.054	0.056	0.059	0.061
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.031	0.020	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.014	0.010	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.035	0.014	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.027	0.017	0.034	0.031	0.028	0.027
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.043	0.031	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.062	0.041	0.051	0.052	0.054	0.054
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.071	0.039	0.054	0.056	0.058	0.059
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.032	0.017	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.010	0.004	0.029	0.027	0.023	0.021
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.025	0.020	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.007	0.003	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.017	0.011	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.049	0.028	0.042	0.043	0.044	0.044
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.034	0.026	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.019	0.012	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.034	0.018	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.016	0.014	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.010	0.006	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031

Table A8a. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
	Quota Share 2/	Quota Share 2/			35%	50%	75%	100%
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.027	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.006	0.023	0.021	0.018	0.017	0.017
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.009	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.019	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.007	0.022	0.020	0.018	0.016	0.016
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.018	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.011	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.007	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.014	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.018	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.024	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.012	0.020	0.018	0.016	0.016	0.016
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.004	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.012	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.023	0.036	0.037	0.039	0.040	0.040
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.010	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.007	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.016	0.016
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.004	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.002	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.008	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.003	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.001	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.002	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.002	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.002	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005

**Table A8a. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
				35%	50%	75%	100%
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.000	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 35, 50, 75, and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. Ad hoc increase uses an uncompressed GDP blend as a distribution key in addition to the formula. Other assumptions correspond to Set 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realignment Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A).

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, uncompressed.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

**Table A8b. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
				35%	50%	75%	100%
United States	17.670	16.987	23.899	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.592	6.556	6.556	6.556	6.556
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.328	5.678	5.678	5.678	5.678
France	4.505	3.789	4.079	3.789	3.789	3.789	3.789
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.201	4.520	4.525	4.534	4.541
China 5/	3.996	7.917	8.524	6.597	6.930	7.230	7.360
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.383	3.306	3.306	3.306	3.306
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.783	2.275	2.087	1.846	1.666
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303	2.303
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.720	2.635	2.653	2.671	2.680
India	2.442	2.403	3.014	2.747	2.785	2.817	2.827
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.246	1.857	1.857	1.857	1.857
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.727	1.534	1.420	1.324	1.324
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.624	2.250	2.309	2.361	2.381
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.383	1.740	1.759	1.789	1.814
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.031	1.806	1.842	1.874	1.887
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.668	1.227	1.227	1.227	1.227
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.855	1.680	1.715	1.748	1.764
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.477	1.361	1.363	1.365	1.367
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.470	0.864	0.792	0.700	0.630
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.687	0.942	0.942	0.942	0.942
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.615	0.704	0.652	0.597	0.597
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.597	0.836	0.836	0.836	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	0.992	0.938	0.946	0.953	0.956
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.460	0.731	0.731	0.731	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.579	0.792	0.793	0.794	0.795
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.587	0.626	0.580	0.578	0.578
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.425	0.749	0.750	0.753	0.755
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.367	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.851	0.796	0.807	0.818	0.823
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.783	0.713	0.723	0.732	0.736
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.234	0.968	1.014	1.055	1.073
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.583	0.622	0.628	0.638	0.647
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.317	0.648	0.669	0.702	0.730
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.211	0.454	0.418	0.371	0.337

Table A8b. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/				
	Quota Share 2/	Quota Share 1/			35%	50%	75%	100%	
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.422	0.352	0.459	0.426	0.422	0.422	
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.513	0.378	0.513	0.513	0.513	0.513	
Ireland	0.528	1.077	1.077	0.385	0.580	0.599	0.628	0.654	
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.411	0.286	0.422	0.411	0.411	0.411	
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.267	0.138	0.390	0.359	0.319	0.289	
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.252	0.128	0.369	0.339	0.302	0.274	
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.572	0.535	0.473	0.477	0.482	0.488	
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.408	0.304	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.407	0.265	0.407	0.407	0.407	0.407	
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.342	0.404	0.348	0.342	0.342	0.342	
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.380	0.329	0.380	0.380	0.380	0.380	
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.448	0.382	0.433	0.434	0.435	0.436	
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.430	0.339	0.428	0.428	0.428	0.428	
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.519	0.345	0.430	0.433	0.438	0.443	
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.404	0.407	0.402	0.403	0.404	0.404	
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.262	0.202	0.298	0.276	0.262	0.262	
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.377	0.316	0.361	0.361	0.362	0.363	
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.381	0.453	0.396	0.405	0.413	0.416	
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.767	0.340	0.359	0.374	0.398	0.420	
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.164	0.097	0.212	0.195	0.175	0.164	
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.270	0.255	0.268	0.268	0.268	0.268	
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.185	0.161	0.197	0.185	0.185	0.185	
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.169	0.207	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.035	0.023	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224	
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.039	0.023	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205	
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.129	0.089	0.155	0.144	0.129	0.129	
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.303	0.217	0.211	0.213	0.216	0.219	
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.328	0.218	0.207	0.210	0.214	0.217	
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.261	0.149	0.187	0.190	0.194	0.198	
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.503	0.077	0.207	0.218	0.236	0.251	
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.135	0.125	0.111	0.100	
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.143	0.117	0.143	0.143	0.143	0.143	
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.050	0.035	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155	
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.150	0.112	0.150	0.150	0.150	0.150	
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.016	0.008	0.111	0.100	0.087	0.076	

Table A8b. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
	Quota Share 2/	Quota Share 2/			35%	50%	75%	100%
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.147	0.114	0.146	0.146	0.146	0.146
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.208	0.258	0.209	0.217	0.224	0.227
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.064	0.039	0.109	0.100	0.089	0.080
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.056	0.043	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.089	0.098	0.132	0.132	0.132	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.077	0.050	0.101	0.093	0.083	0.077
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.194	0.133	0.133	0.136	0.139	0.143
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.114	0.086	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.214	0.120	0.129	0.132	0.137	0.142
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.071	0.064	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.136	0.085	0.117	0.118	0.119	0.120
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.047	0.029	0.089	0.081	0.072	0.064
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.076	0.064	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.168	0.056	0.117	0.119	0.122	0.125
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.057	0.059	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.100	0.059	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.139	0.088	0.103	0.105	0.107	0.109
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.097	0.088	0.092	0.093	0.093	0.093
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.042	0.021	0.070	0.064	0.057	0.051
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.086	0.076	0.086	0.086	0.086	0.086
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.079	0.043	0.079	0.079	0.079	0.079
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.046	0.047	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.077	0.057	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.047	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.111	0.079	0.080	0.082	0.083	0.085
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.055	0.035	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.098	0.036	0.076	0.077	0.078	0.079
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.047	0.040	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.060	0.048	0.060	0.060	0.060	0.060
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.073	0.037	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.072
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.056	0.034	0.057	0.056	0.056	0.056
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.041	0.023	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.032	0.026	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.086	0.073	0.071	0.072	0.073	0.073
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.065	0.037	0.065	0.065	0.065	0.065

Table A8b. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round		Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
	Quota Share 2/	Quota Share 1/			35%	50%	75%	100%
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.026	0.051	0.047	0.042	0.040	
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.023	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063	
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.053	0.062	0.063	0.065	0.066	
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.016	0.044	0.040	0.036	0.032	
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.057	0.056	0.057	0.057	0.057	
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.015	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.014	0.042	0.039	0.034	0.031	
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.016	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055	
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.033	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.002	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054	
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.011	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.019	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051	
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.027	0.054	0.056	0.059	0.061	
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.020	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048	
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.010	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045	
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.004	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.014	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.017	0.034	0.031	0.028	0.027	
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.031	0.042	0.042	0.042	0.042	
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.041	0.043	0.044	0.045	0.046	
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.039	0.042	0.043	0.045	0.047	
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.017	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.004	0.029	0.027	0.023	0.021	
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.020	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039	
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.003	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038	
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.011	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.028	0.038	0.038	0.039	0.040	
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.026	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037	
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.012	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.018	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035	
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.014	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.001	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.010	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034	
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.003	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032	
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.006	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	

Table A8b. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/				
				35%	50%	75%	100%	
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.027	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030	
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.006	0.023	0.021	0.018	0.017	
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.009	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.019	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029	
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.007	0.022	0.020	0.018	0.016	
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.018	0.028	0.028	0.029	0.029	
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.011	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.007	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.014	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.018	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.025	
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.024	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026	
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.012	0.020	0.018	0.016	0.016	
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.004	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.012	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.023	0.025	0.026	0.027	0.029	
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.010	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.007	0.017	0.016	0.016	0.016	
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.004	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.002	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.008	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.003	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.001	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.002	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.002	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	

**Table A8b. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Ms. Lundsager -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Uncompressed GDP Blend Share 3/	0/30/70 4/			
				35%	50%	75%	100%
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.000	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 35, 50, 75, and 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. Ad hoc increase uses an uncompressed GDP blend as a distribution key. Other assumptions correspond to Set 3 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 5A).

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, uncompressed.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Includes China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table A9. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Mozhin and Mr. Virmani -- by Member 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Compressed PPP GDP Share	Simulated Shares
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	19.519	18.265
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.293	6.393
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	4.246	5.251
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	3.169	3.858
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	3.296	3.976
China 4/	3.996	7.917	8.128	10.577	7.022
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	2.756	3.027
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	0.914	1.943
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	1.980	2.334
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	3.198	2.804
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	4.509	3.289
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	1.052	1.659
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	0.628	1.325
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.849	2.245
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	2.105	1.892
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	2.321	1.866
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	0.510	1.029
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	2.006	1.703
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.226	1.295
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.558	0.826
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.560	0.806
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.859	0.848
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.532	0.728
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	1.348	1.068
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.346	0.595
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.420	0.630
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.770	0.757
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.600	0.682
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.498	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	1.011	0.848
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	1.221	0.875
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	1.405	0.980
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.852	0.718
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.389	0.547
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.226	0.407

Table A9. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Mozhin and Mr. Virmani -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Compressed PPP GDP Share	Simulated Shares
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.535	0.543
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.318	0.436
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.316	0.476
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.381	0.453
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.173	0.341
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.149	0.316
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.545	0.502
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.329	0.390
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.330	0.386
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.667	0.522
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.424	0.422
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.393	0.414
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.502	0.456
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.421	0.425
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.675	0.511
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.199	0.290
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.394	0.372
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.624	0.452
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.295	0.338
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.156	0.211
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.379	0.313
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.226	0.232
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.359	0.275
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.037	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.031	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.134	0.164
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.379	0.278
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.289	0.235
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.193	0.190
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.072	0.155
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.153	0.157
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.190	0.171
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.059	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.141	0.147
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.007	0.078

Table A9. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Mozhin and Mr. Virmani -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Compressed PPP GDP Share	Simulated Shares
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.135	0.180	0.159
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.293	0.159	0.155
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.049	0.048	0.095
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.054	0.062	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.117	0.144	0.133
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.062	0.072	0.100
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.156	0.145	0.138
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.103	0.139	0.127
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.142	0.161	0.143
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.078	0.117	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.102	0.102	0.111
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.036	0.046	0.080
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.078	0.105	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.068	0.083	0.103
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.072	0.114	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.072	0.097	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.106	0.114	0.108
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.105	0.128	0.107
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.027	0.038	0.064
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.092	0.115	0.099
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.053	0.065	0.076
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.058	0.091	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.069	0.085	0.081
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.074	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.095	0.109	0.092
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.044	0.062	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.045	0.047	0.064
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.050	0.076	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.059	0.077	0.073
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.047	0.056	0.064
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.042	0.054	0.062
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.029	0.038	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.033	0.040	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.089	0.117	0.089
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.046	0.041	0.055

Table A9. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Mozhin and Mr. Virmani -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Compressed PPP GDP Share	Simulated Shares
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.033	0.039	0.051
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.030	0.039	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.066	0.071	0.066
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.021	0.025	0.041
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.070	0.114	0.080
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.020	0.024	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.018	0.019	0.037
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.021	0.031	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.041	0.058	0.055
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.002	0.003	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.015	0.020	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.025	0.036	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.034	0.024	0.042
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.025	0.034	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.013	0.020	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.006	0.008	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.018	0.019	0.032
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.022	0.028	0.035
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.039	0.052	0.046
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.051	0.051	0.047
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.049	0.052	0.047
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.022	0.028	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.006	0.008	0.024
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.026	0.033	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.004	0.006	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.014	0.021	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.036	0.048	0.042
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.033	0.049	0.042
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.015	0.024	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.024	0.027	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.018	0.022	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.013	0.018	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.004	0.006	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.008	0.011	0.031

Table A9. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Mozhin and Mr. Virmani -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Compressed PPP GDP Share	Simulated Shares
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.056	0.041
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.008	0.019
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.020	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.034	0.031
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.010	0.020
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.031	0.029
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.019	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.012	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.024	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.033	0.028
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.039	0.031
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.021	0.022
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.024	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.037	0.030
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.017	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.012	0.017
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.006	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.013	0.012
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.005	0.008
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.005	0.007
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.005
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.004
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.005	0.005
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.004

**Table A9. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Mozhin and Mr. Virmani -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	Compressed PPP GDP Share	Simulated Shares
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.003
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.007	0.005
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. 15 percent increase is allocated on the basis of members' calculated quota shares. The remaining 85 percent increase is allocated on the basis of members' PPP GDP share, compressed by a factor of 0.95, and protection of PRGT-eligible countries at the individual level.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For

the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ Including China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

Table A10. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Virmani -- by Member 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Compressed PPP GDP Share 3/	Variant 1 4/		Variant 2 5/	
				0/60/40	0/40/60	0/60/40	0/40/60
United States	17.670	16.987	19.519	17.670	17.670	17.670	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	6.293	5.646	5.646	5.646	5.646
Germany	6.110	5.678	4.246	4.938	4.938	4.938	4.938
France	4.505	3.789	3.169	3.389	3.295	3.389	3.295
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	3.296	4.564	4.550	3.651	3.185
China 6/	3.996	7.917	10.577	7.701	8.019	8.587	9.281
Italy	3.306	2.992	2.756	2.601	2.601	2.601	2.601
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.914	1.866	1.732	1.866	1.732
Canada	2.672	2.303	1.980	2.027	2.003	2.027	2.003
Russia	2.494	2.938	3.198	2.895	2.928	2.989	3.061
India	2.442	2.403	4.509	3.338	3.536	3.698	4.016
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.052	1.640	1.615	1.640	1.615
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.628	1.363	1.231	1.363	1.231
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.849	2.327	2.399	2.488	2.621
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.105	1.894	1.845	1.894	1.845
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.321	1.928	1.983	2.049	2.150
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.510	1.093	1.067	1.093	1.067
Korea	1.412	2.108	2.006	1.819	1.821	1.876	1.912
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.226	1.372	1.369	1.098	1.066
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.558	0.703	0.655	0.703	0.655
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.560	0.819	0.819	0.819	0.819
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.859	0.814	0.834	0.828	0.846
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.532	0.727	0.727	0.727	0.727
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.348	1.086	1.129	1.167	1.237
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.346	0.636	0.636	0.636	0.636
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.420	0.798	0.796	0.639	0.557
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.770	0.734	0.749	0.745	0.759
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.600	0.762	0.758	0.610	0.531
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.498	0.735	0.735	0.735	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	1.011	0.892	0.902	0.928	0.956
Iran	0.628	0.658	1.221	0.893	0.947	0.994	1.082
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.405	1.071	1.105	1.174	1.253
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.852	0.752	0.761	0.783	0.806
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.889	0.817	0.763	0.654	0.534
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.226	0.384	0.353	0.384	0.353

Table A10. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Virmani -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Compressed PPP GDP Share 3/	Variant 1 4/		Variant 2 5/	
				0/60/40	0/40/60	0/60/40	0/40/60
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.535	0.526	0.534	0.529	0.534
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.318	0.446	0.446	0.446	0.446
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.316	0.733	0.684	0.587	0.479
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.381	0.386	0.357	0.386	0.357
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.173	0.329	0.303	0.329	0.303
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.149	0.311	0.286	0.311	0.286
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.545	0.503	0.494	0.503	0.494
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.329	0.355	0.355	0.355	0.355
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.330	0.354	0.354	0.354	0.354
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.667	0.516	0.546	0.563	0.606
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.424	0.417	0.421	0.419	0.422
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.393	0.438	0.437	0.350	0.342
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.502	0.461	0.467	0.473	0.484
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.421	0.457	0.448	0.366	0.314
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.675	0.520	0.545	0.568	0.609
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.199	0.266	0.240	0.266	0.240
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.394	0.378	0.380	0.383	0.387
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.624	0.467	0.491	0.516	0.557
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.295	0.485	0.444	0.388	0.311
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.156	0.184	0.167	0.184	0.167
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.379	0.317	0.327	0.336	0.352
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.226	0.225	0.197	0.225	0.197
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.359	0.271	0.288	0.298	0.323
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.037	0.224	0.224	0.224	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.031	0.205	0.205	0.205	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.134	0.137	0.124	0.137	0.124
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.379	0.297	0.307	0.322	0.342
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.289	0.258	0.257	0.268	0.273
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.193	0.210	0.203	0.168	0.142
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.072	0.298	0.269	0.239	0.188
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.153	0.147	0.151	0.149	0.152
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.190	0.170	0.174	0.176	0.182
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.059	0.155	0.155	0.155	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.141	0.131	0.131	0.131	0.131
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.007	0.079	0.077	0.079	0.077

Table A10. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Virmani -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Compressed PPP GDP Share 3/	Variant 1 4/		Variant 2 5/	
				0/60/40	0/40/60	0/60/40	0/40/60
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.180	0.161	0.164	0.167	0.172
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.159	0.169	0.163	0.135	0.114
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.048	0.090	0.083	0.090	0.083
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.062	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.144	0.132	0.133	0.133	0.139
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.072	0.087	0.080	0.087	0.080
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.145	0.152	0.146	0.122	0.102
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.139	0.127	0.129	0.131	0.134
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.161	0.158	0.154	0.159	0.158
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.117	0.116	0.116	0.116	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.102	0.123	0.121	0.098	0.089
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.046	0.072	0.067	0.072	0.067
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.105	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.083	0.133	0.128	0.106	0.089
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.114	0.108	0.108	0.108	0.109
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.097	0.102	0.102	0.102	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.114	0.114	0.112	0.091	0.113
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.128	0.109	0.112	0.115	0.120
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.038	0.058	0.054	0.058	0.054
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.115	0.099	0.102	0.104	0.108
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.065	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.069
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.091	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.087
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.085	0.081	0.082	0.082	0.083
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.074	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.109	0.098	0.099	0.102	0.104
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.062	0.076	0.076	0.076	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.047	0.083	0.081	0.066	0.057
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.076	0.072	0.072	0.072	0.073
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.077	0.072	0.073	0.074	0.075
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.056	0.072	0.072	0.058	0.050
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.054	0.052	0.048	0.052	0.048
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.038	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.040	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.117	0.093	0.096	0.100	0.106
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.041	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.056

Table A10. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Virmani -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Compressed PPP GDP Share 3/	Variant 1 4/		Variant 2 5/	
				0/60/40	0/40/60	0/60/40	0/40/60
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.039	0.044	0.040	0.044	0.040
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.039	0.063	0.063	0.063	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.071	0.070	0.069	0.071	0.070
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.025	0.035	0.033	0.035	0.033
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.114	0.081	0.087	0.091	0.100
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.024	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.019	0.034	0.032	0.034	0.032
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.031	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.058	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.057
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.003	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.020	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.036	0.051	0.051	0.051	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.024	0.068	0.064	0.055	0.045
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.034	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.020	0.045	0.045	0.045	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.008	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.019	0.032	0.031	0.032	0.031
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.028	0.029	0.027	0.029	0.027
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.052	0.046	0.047	0.048	0.050
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.051	0.050	0.049	0.050	0.050
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.052	0.051	0.050	0.051	0.051
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.028	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.008	0.022	0.021	0.022	0.021
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.033	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.006	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.021	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.048	0.044	0.044	0.045	0.046
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.049	0.042	0.043	0.044	0.046
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.024	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.027	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.022	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.018	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.006	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.011	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031

Table A10. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Virmani -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Compressed PPP GDP Share 3/	Variant 1 4/		Variant 2 5/	
				0/60/40	0/40/60	0/60/40	0/40/60
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.056	0.042	0.044	0.046	0.050
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.018	0.017	0.018	0.017
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.020	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.034	0.031	0.032	0.032	0.033
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.010	0.018	0.017	0.018	0.017
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.031	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.031
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.019	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.012	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.024	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.033	0.027	0.028	0.029	0.030
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.039	0.032	0.033	0.034	0.036
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.021	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.018
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.007	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023
Laos, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.024	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.023
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.037	0.035	0.034	0.036	0.036
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.017	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.012	0.016	0.014	0.016	0.014
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.006	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.005	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.010	0.010	0.008	0.007
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.006	0.005
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.004	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.002	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.003
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004

**Table A10. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Virmani -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	Compressed PPP GDP Share 3/	Variant 1 4/		Variant 2 5/	
				0/60/40	0/40/60	0/60/40	0/40/60
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.006
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. The ad hoc increase is distributed to all countries that are under-represented with respect to the compressed PPP GDP share. Eligible EMDCs receive a uniform reduction in their out-of-lineness with respect to the compressed PPP GDP share (see footnote 8). Countries that are over-represented with respect to the quota formula or with respect to PPP GDP are allowed to become under-represented with respect to the quota formula or PPP GDP share by up to 15 percent, respectively. Eligible advanced countries (those which are under-represented with respect to PPP GDP) are capped at their post selective or post-second round quota share whichever is greater. PRGT-eligible countries receive at least their post-second round quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for, their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ Compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ Advanced countries and EMDCs that are under-represented with respect to the quota formula but not eligible for an ad hoc increase are protected at their post selective quota share (as in Set 3 in Fourteenth General of Quotas-Realigining Quota Shares-Further Considerations).

5/ Without protection noted in footnote 4.

6/ Including China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

**Table A11. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Weber -- by Member 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/
United States	17.670	16.987	21.645	17.670
Japan	6.556	6.493	7.282	6.556
Germany	6.110	5.678	5.201	5.757
France	4.505	3.789	4.036	4.172
United Kingdom	4.505	4.663	4.151	4.564
China 5/	3.996	7.917	8.128	6.002
Italy	3.306	2.992	3.379	3.227
Saudi Arabia	2.930	1.337	0.842	1.866
Canada	2.672	2.303	2.345	2.477
Russia	2.494	2.938	2.746	2.716
India	2.442	2.403	3.027	2.548
Netherlands	2.166	1.857	1.308	2.002
Belgium	1.932	1.324	0.784	1.376
Brazil	1.783	2.153	2.654	2.069
Spain	1.688	2.236	2.422	1.894
Mexico	1.521	1.793	2.080	1.715
Switzerland	1.451	1.227	0.724	1.381
Korea	1.412	2.108	1.909	1.761
Australia	1.358	1.396	1.537	1.372
Venezuela	1.115	0.484	0.518	0.703
Sweden	1.005	0.942	0.743	0.970
Argentina	0.888	0.597	0.669	0.623
Austria	0.887	0.836	0.650	0.836
Indonesia	0.872	0.902	1.053	0.918
Denmark	0.793	0.731	0.508	0.731
Norway	0.790	0.812	0.631	0.798
South Africa	0.784	0.578	0.640	0.578
Malaysia	0.744	0.792	0.471	0.768
Nigeria	0.735	0.477	0.410	0.735
Poland	0.708	0.949	0.911	0.829
Iran	0.628	0.658	0.842	0.680
Turkey	0.611	1.148	1.296	0.910
Thailand	0.604	0.789	0.636	0.697
Singapore	0.591	1.195	0.356	0.893
Kuwait	0.579	0.315	0.242	0.384

**Table A11. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Weber -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/
Ukraine	0.576	0.422	0.393	0.422
Finland	0.530	0.513	0.421	0.513
Ireland	0.528	1.077	0.428	0.733
Algeria	0.526	0.411	0.323	0.411
Iraq	0.499	0.267	0.162	0.329
Libya	0.471	0.252	0.150	0.311
Greece	0.462	0.572	0.586	0.503
Israel	0.445	0.408	0.343	0.408
Hungary	0.436	0.407	0.300	0.407
Pakistan	0.434	0.342	0.449	0.409
Romania	0.432	0.380	0.369	0.380
Portugal	0.432	0.448	0.426	0.438
Philippines	0.428	0.430	0.379	0.429
Czech Republic	0.420	0.519	0.387	0.470
Egypt	0.396	0.404	0.452	0.409
New Zealand	0.375	0.262	0.232	0.266
Chile	0.359	0.377	0.356	0.368
Colombia	0.325	0.381	0.500	0.377
United Arab Emirates	0.316	0.767	0.381	0.541
Bulgaria	0.269	0.164	0.116	0.184
Peru	0.268	0.270	0.290	0.273
Morocco	0.247	0.185	0.188	0.185
Bangladesh	0.224	0.169	0.238	0.224
Congo, Dem. Republic of	0.224	0.035	0.029	0.224
Zambia	0.205	0.039	0.030	0.205
Serbia	0.196	0.129	0.107	0.137
Vietnam	0.193	0.303	0.248	0.248
Kazakhstan	0.179	0.328	0.250	0.254
Slovak Republic	0.179	0.261	0.174	0.220
Luxembourg	0.176	0.503	0.093	0.298
Sri Lanka	0.173	0.089	0.107	0.114
Belarus	0.162	0.143	0.139	0.143
Ghana	0.155	0.050	0.045	0.155
Croatia	0.153	0.150	0.133	0.150
Zimbabwe	0.148	0.016	0.011	0.079

Table A11. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Weber -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/
Ecuador	0.146	0.147	0.135	0.146
Syrian Arab Republic	0.145	0.208	0.293	0.194
Trinidad and Tobago	0.141	0.064	0.049	0.090
Cote d'Ivoire	0.136	0.056	0.054	0.136
Sudan	0.132	0.089	0.117	0.132
Uruguay	0.129	0.077	0.062	0.087
Qatar	0.127	0.194	0.156	0.161
Tunisia	0.120	0.114	0.103	0.114
Angola	0.120	0.214	0.142	0.167
Uzbekistan	0.116	0.071	0.078	0.116
Slovenia	0.115	0.136	0.102	0.126
Jamaica	0.115	0.047	0.036	0.072
Kenya	0.114	0.076	0.078	0.114
Lebanon	0.112	0.168	0.068	0.140
Myanmar	0.108	0.057	0.072	0.108
Yemen, Republic of	0.102	0.100	0.072	0.102
Oman	0.099	0.139	0.106	0.119
Dominican Republic	0.092	0.097	0.105	0.096
Brunei Darussalam	0.090	0.042	0.027	0.058
Guatemala	0.088	0.086	0.092	0.088
Panama	0.087	0.079	0.053	0.079
Tanzania	0.083	0.046	0.058	0.083
Costa Rica	0.078	0.077	0.069	0.077
Cameroon	0.078	0.058	0.058	0.078
Lithuania	0.077	0.111	0.095	0.094
Uganda	0.076	0.055	0.044	0.076
Bahrain	0.074	0.098	0.045	0.086
Bolivia	0.072	0.047	0.050	0.072
El Salvador	0.072	0.060	0.059	0.060
Jordan	0.072	0.073	0.047	0.072
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.071	0.056	0.042	0.056
Afghanistan, Islamic Republic of	0.068	0.041	0.029	0.068
Senegal	0.068	0.032	0.033	0.068
Azerbaijan	0.067	0.086	0.089	0.077
Cyprus	0.066	0.065	0.046	0.065

**Table A11. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Weber -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/
Gabon	0.065	0.040	0.033	0.044
Georgia	0.063	0.030	0.030	0.063
Latvia	0.060	0.086	0.066	0.073
Namibia	0.057	0.023	0.021	0.035
Ethiopia	0.056	0.054	0.070	0.058
Papua New Guinea	0.055	0.030	0.020	0.055
Bahamas, The	0.055	0.022	0.018	0.034
Nicaragua	0.055	0.026	0.021	0.055
Honduras	0.054	0.052	0.041	0.054
Liberia	0.054	0.013	0.002	0.054
Moldova	0.052	0.021	0.015	0.052
Madagascar	0.051	0.026	0.025	0.051
Iceland	0.049	0.100	0.034	0.068
Mozambique	0.048	0.031	0.025	0.048
Guinea	0.045	0.014	0.013	0.045
Sierra Leone	0.044	0.006	0.006	0.044
Malta	0.043	0.035	0.018	0.035
Mauritius	0.043	0.027	0.022	0.029
Paraguay	0.042	0.043	0.039	0.042
Turkmenistan	0.041	0.062	0.051	0.052
Estonia	0.039	0.071	0.049	0.055
Mali	0.039	0.032	0.022	0.039
Suriname	0.039	0.010	0.006	0.022
Armenia	0.039	0.025	0.026	0.039
Guyana	0.038	0.007	0.004	0.038
Kyrgyz Republic	0.037	0.017	0.014	0.037
Botswana	0.037	0.049	0.036	0.043
Cambodia	0.037	0.034	0.033	0.037
Tajikistan	0.036	0.019	0.015	0.036
Congo, Republic of	0.035	0.034	0.024	0.035
Haiti	0.034	0.016	0.018	0.034
Somalia	0.034	0.002	0.002	0.034
Rwanda	0.034	0.011	0.013	0.034
Burundi	0.032	0.003	0.004	0.032
Togo	0.031	0.010	0.008	0.031

**Table A11. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Weber -- by Member (continued) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/
Nepal	0.030	0.032	0.035	0.031
Fiji	0.029	0.012	0.008	0.018
Malawi	0.029	0.029	0.013	0.029
Macedonia, FYR	0.029	0.030	0.025	0.030
Barbados	0.028	0.013	0.009	0.018
Chad	0.028	0.032	0.024	0.030
Niger	0.028	0.013	0.014	0.028
Mauritania	0.027	0.011	0.009	0.027
Benin	0.026	0.023	0.018	0.026
Burkina Faso	0.025	0.019	0.024	0.025
Albania	0.025	0.031	0.031	0.028
Kosovo	0.025	0.016	0.015	0.017
Central African Republic	0.023	0.006	0.005	0.023
Lao, People's Dem. Republic	0.022	0.014	0.016	0.022
Equatorial Guinea	0.022	0.052	0.030	0.037
Mongolia	0.021	0.015	0.013	0.021
Swaziland	0.021	0.016	0.009	0.016
Lesotho	0.015	0.010	0.005	0.015
Gambia, The	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.013
Montenegro	0.012	0.015	0.011	0.013
San Marino	0.009	0.012	0.005	0.010
Belize	0.008	0.006	0.004	0.006
Eritrea	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.008
Vanuatu	0.007	0.002	0.002	0.007
Djibouti	0.007	0.004	0.003	0.007
St. Lucia	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.006
Guinea-Bissau	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.006
Antigua and Barbuda	0.006	0.004	0.003	0.004
Grenada	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005
Samoa	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.005
Cape Verde	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005
Seychelles	0.005	0.005	0.003	0.005
Timor-Leste	0.005	0.007	0.003	0.006
Solomon Islands	0.004	0.003	0.002	0.004
Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.003	0.005

**Table A11. Illustrative Scenarios: Request by Mr. Weber -- by Member (concluded) 1/
(In percent)**

	Post Second Round Quota Share 2/	Calculated Quota Share	GDP Blend Share 3/	0/60/40 4/
Comoros	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.004
St. Kitts and Nevis	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.003
Bhutan	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.004
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003
Dominica	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003
Sao Tome and Principe	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.003
Tonga	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.003
Kiribati	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002
Micronesia, Fed. States of	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.002
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Palau, Republic of	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Tuvalu	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.001

Source: Finance Department.

1/ The simulations assume a 100 percent increase of post second round quotas. Simulations are based on Set 2 of Fourteenth General Review of Quotas-Realigning Quota Shares-Further Considerations (Table 4A) except that additional protection is provided to members that meet the following criteria: (i) contribute to all of the following activities: PRGT, externally financed Fund technical assistance and the NAB; (ii) the country's average share in contributions is greater than its post second round quota share; and (iii) the country is over-represented and will lose quota share relative to its post second round quota share. The maximum loss in quota share (difference between post second round and calculated quota share) for all eligible over-represented countries is reduced in proportion to the country's average out-of-lineness with respect to the 4 categories of financial contributions (PRGT loans, PRGT subsidies, technical assistance and the NAB). The out-of-lineness is defined as the country's share in the financial contributions divided by its post second round quota share.

2/ Includes ad hoc increases for 54 eligible members that are not yet effective; also includes Kosovo and Tuvalu which became members on June 29, 2009 and June 24, 2010, respectively. For the two countries that have not yet consented to, and paid for their quota increases, 11th Review proposed quotas are used.

3/ GDP blended using 60 percent market and 40 percent PPP exchange rates, compressed using a factor of 0.95.

4/ The overall increase is distributed to members on an equiproportional, selective and ad hoc basis in the proportion of x/y/z, respectively.

5/ Including China, P.R., Hong Kong SAR, and Macao SAR.

July 13, 2010

The Chairman's Concluding Remarks
Fourteenth General Review of Quotas—Realigning Quota Shares:
Further Considerations
Committee of the Whole on Review of Quotas Meeting 10/3
July 7, 2010

Today's discussion represents a further step forward in clarifying views and defining key issues to be resolved in the realignment of quota shares under the 14th General Review of Quotas. With the data set through 2008 now available, a previous obstacle to more rapid progress has been removed, and we should seek to make significant progress in narrowing the remaining differences in the run-up to the Annual Meetings. This will require a spirit of cooperation and compromise from all sides, aimed at an outcome that can command broad support from the membership and will enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Fund.

The G-20 call to complete our work by November highlights once again the urgency of completing the remaining steps needed to make the 2008 quota and voice reform effective. I urge those members that have not yet done so to complete their necessary domestic processes and notify the Fund of their acceptances as soon as possible.

I note that Directors remained committed to the IMFC-endorsed goal of a shift in quota share of at least 5 percent to dynamic emerging market and developing countries (EMDCs) from over- to under-represented countries, while protecting the voting share of the poorest members. However, it is clear that significant differences of view remained, including on the targeted outcomes and the modalities for achieving the agreed objectives. We will need to work hard to bridge those differences in a very tight time frame. I would like to highlight a few main points from our discussion today:

First, on alternative mechanisms for distributing ad hoc increases, differing views were expressed on the potential role of a compressed GDP blend variable, as either a complement or an alternative to the quota formula. Many Directors saw merit in exploring this approach further, with some also calling for a greater role for PPP GDP and for exploring alternative options. Many other Directors, however, strongly favored approaches that would not assign effectively larger weights to variables already embedded in the formula, and considered that the formula should remain the primary mechanism for distributing quota increases, including through a large selective component. Directors reaffirmed that the current quota formula remains the basis to work from. Many maintained

the view that the quota formula should not be reopened. In addition, some were willing to proceed on the basis of the current formula, provided there is a commitment to review it again after the 14th Review is completed. Some other Directors preferred to modify the formula during this review.

Second, Directors explored the possible role for mechanisms that could facilitate a larger net shift to EMDCs. These include the possibility that eligible advanced economies would not fully participate in ad hoc increases (while preserving their gains from the selective increase), and that over-represented advanced economies could become modestly under-represented. Many Directors objected to such approaches, noting that all under-represented countries should be potentially eligible for ad hoc increases, and that all over-represented countries should contribute to the adjustment in quota shares. These Directors stressed the importance of not creating new anomalies, whereby over-represented countries could become under-represented as a result of the reform. However, a number of Directors encouraged further work along the lines set out in the staff paper. A number of Directors saw scope for an equiproportional increase, while others remained open.

Third, Directors supported protecting the voting share of the poorest countries. A number of Directors favored protecting the quota shares of PRGT-eligible countries individually, while a few preferred using the eligibility criterion adopted for the Post-Catastrophe Debt Relief Trust. Other Directors preferred to leave options open at this stage, including alternative approaches to defining the poorest members, and some also remained open to the possibility of a further increase in the share of basic votes in the total voting power.

To conclude, today's discussion has provided useful further guidance for our work on realigning quota shares. I am encouraged that Directors expressed their commitment to remain strongly engaged in these discussions. The Board will shortly have an opportunity to discuss other aspects of the governance reform, recognizing, as many have stressed, that this work needs to proceed in parallel. I am hopeful that the next meeting of the Committee of the Whole scheduled for immediately after the summer recess can move the process forward, building on the views expressed today and also coming back to the important issue of the size of the quota increase.